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ABSTRACT
In 1996, when Brazil was well-underway to privatising and liberalising its electric power
industry, few would have predicted that within five years the reforms would be a shambles. Like
its nighbours Argentina and Chile, Brazil based its electricity reforms on the orthodox therapies
of privatisation and liberalisation. The industry was well-positioned to benefit from the reforms:
it was technically sophisticated, relatively efficient, and attractive to both domestic and foreign
investors. Electricity rates had been suppressed for a long time, but they were not populist and it
was the residential customer who cross-subsidised industry. As such, political backlash to
increasing electricity prices was unlikely and, in fact, Brazil had successfully begun to raise
electricity rates as early as 1993. Despite these fortuitous circumstances, the reforms did not
induce sufficient investment and Brazil suffered a massive electricity rationing in 2001. For ten
months all classes of consumers had to cut consumption by 20%. By 2002, the electricity
reforms were politically dead and none of the candidates in Brazil's presidential elections that
year, not even the incumbent administration's nominee, favoured continuing with them. My
dissertation explains why the reforms failed, approaching the issue from three different
perspectives-the policy, the economic and the industrial. Collectively, these essays explain why
sectoral neoliberal reforms had a short shelf-life.
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Paper One
MUDDLING MEANS AND ENDS
The Short and Unhappy Era of Electric Power Privatisation in Brazil
All serious reflection about the ultimate elements of
meaningful human conduct is oriented primarily in terms of
the categories 'end' and 'means'
- Max Weber (1949)
1. Introduction
Like its neighbours Argentina and Chile, Brazil based its electric power reform on the orthodox
therapies of privatisation and liberalisation. The Brazilian federal government initiated the
reforms in 1993 and persevered with them until a lack of private investment in power generation
led to a crippling energy crisis and forced the nation into mandatory power rationing in 2001. By
2002, the idea of persisting with privatisation was politically dead. None of the four major
candidates in Brazil's 2002 presidential elections favoured continuing the process; not even the
incumbent administration's nominee.
The results of the first seven years of electric power reform in Brazil are anomalous. Of
all the Latin American countries, Brazil was one of the best-placed to benefit from orthodox
reforms. First, many Brazilian power companies, especially the generation companies, were
technically well-managed even under state control. By enabling a more supportive economic and
commercial environment, orthodox reforms should have facilitated even more efficiency and
investment. Second, power rates in Brazil were never populist in the traditional sense. Cross-
subsidies in the electric power sector favoured large industrial consumers at the expense of
residential and commercial customers. Political resistance to price rationalisation-which is
generally one of the key barriers to implementing orthodox reform-was therefore unlikely.
Third, the Brazilian federal government had already completed the basic and politically difficult
reforms before initiating privatisation. Power rates had been raised and many of the state-owned
power companies had begun streamlining their workforce, forcing hundreds of employees into
retirement. Fourth, Brazil was one of the most important economies in Latin America, which
should have facilitated the foreign investment necessary to cement orthodox reforms. Finally, the
Brazilian government and policymakers had a wide range of experiences of orthodox reform
implemented in other countries in Latin America and Europe from which to learn. Given these
favourable factors, orthodox reform should have delivered immediate and self-reinforcing
benefits.
Indeed, in the first few years of the reforms, it did appear that the reforms were headed in
the right direction. Between 1993 and 1995, with the elimination of electricity rate controls, the
conditions were set for the recovery of the financial health of the power companies.
Subsequently, between 1995 and early 1998, most of the power distribution companies were
privatised, many at substantial mark-ups over their minimum reserve prices.
By 1998, however, serious problems had begun to appear in the Brazilian electric power
reforms programme. Privatisation of generation companies stalled in response to a combination
of macroeconomic difficulties, political opposition and investor disinterest. Subsequently, the
government's attempts to induce private investment in independent power projects (IPPs) also
failed. In 2000, but for some providential rains and an economic slowdown caused by the
collapse of the currency peg, Brazil would certainly have suffered power rationing. The
administration did not take much advantage of this temporary relief and in May of the following
year, warned by the Brazilian National Electric Systems Operator (ONS) that the hydropower
reservoirs in most of the country were practically depleted, President Fernando Henrique
Cardoso was forced to declare an emergency power rationing. All except the smallest residential
customers were instructed to reduce their power consumption by at least 20%. The rationing
lasted 10 months and cost the industry at least US$ 5 billion in lost revenue. Estimates of the loss
in GDP caused by power rationing varied between 1.5 and 2 percent, which indicates a further
loss of about US$ 10 billion to the Brazilian economy.
Given the tremendous losses caused by the flawed electric power reform programme, one
could logically expect that the government would have used all available means to avoid the
rationing. Indeed, the Cardoso administration in Brazil began electric power privatisation with
the objective of ensuring sufficient and efficient investment in electric power generation. Yet, by
the end of Cardoso's second term, investment in electric power was neither sufficient nor
efficient, despite the fact that there was ample warning of an impending power shortage, despite
the fact that resources were available to the federal government to promote investment in electric
power and despite the fact that state-owned power generation companies were enjoying
historically high profits and low debt (see Chart 1). The government could have dramatically
reduced the chances of rationing had it been more proactive in using state muscle to build the
needed power plants. Indeed, the administration did make considerable sums available to the
sector but by insisting on funnelling most of it through the private sector it delayed investment
and was unable to avoid the eventual power shortages. The question that guides this paper,
therefore, is: why did the government persist with a privatisation strategy that was not
delivering?
To answer this question and provide a more robust explanation for the anomalous results
witnessed in Brazil, this paper examines the policy dynamics of Brazilian electric power
privatisation. Its objective is not to explain why Brazil privatised its electric power industry but
rather to explain why they persisted with the privatisation strategy after it had rapidly become
obsolete. In doing so, the paper explains how the reformers' commitment to neo-liberal reform
subverted the stated goal of Brazil's power reform-ensuring adequate capacity expansion-and
substituted it by the strategy-privatisation-that had been adopted to pursue it. It shows how
the Brazilian reformers charted out a path of neo-liberal reform predicated upon privatisation and
strong money, which they believed was the best means to overhaul Brazil's economy.' In the
'It is important to clarify here the relevant actors in this analysis. When I speak of a political commitment to
privatisation, I am referring to the Brazilian presidential administration and not the Brazilian legislature. In Brazil's
federal system, presidential power has been limited ever since re-democratisation in 1984. Brazilian legislators have
historically often had different priorities than the executive and therefore have rarely supported their presidents in
implementing radical reforms policies. A recalcitrant Congress is an obstacle against which all Brazilian Presidents
have had to contend and Congressional reluctance cannot be used as a measure of political non-commitment. This is
especially the case with any research into the privatisation programme in Brazil, where Congressional opposition
course of the reform, progress in the means-in this case privatisation-became the metric by
which progress towards the end-ensuring sufficient electric power investment-could be
measured. While the electric power privatisation programme initially proceeded according to
schedule, the paper shows that when strategic tensions developed between means and ends, the
government proved to be more concerned about privatising successfully rather than successful
privatisation. 2 Perversely, the government began to use using state financial resources-in the
form of soft loans extended to private investors by the Brazilian National Development Bank
(BNDES)-in order to push privatisation. The end became privatisation, while the means used
was state financial resources. Muddling progress towards the means with progress towards the
end, the electric power reform programme ended up pushing the country into a severe electricity
rationing.
The narrative that follows will also demonstrate that in the beginning, there was little
tension between the ideas and pragmatic interests in Brazilian electric power privatisation. The
strategy of privatisation served both causes: the idea of a reduced state presence in the economy
as well as the interest of ensuring sufficient investment in the electric power industry.
Consequently, it would appear that the Cardoso administration's privatisation strategy was driven
by the more immediate pragmatic interests rather than any profound commitment to
privatisation. Later, however, as the ideas pulled in one direction and the immediate pragmatic
interests pulled in another, it becomes increasingly apparent that the administration's
commitment to privatisation exceeded its pragmatic interests.
Within this narrative are embedded several concepts and hypotheses that have guided its
preparation. Some concepts-privatisation, reform, and obsolescence-have commonly accepted
definitions and since I have used them accordingly they require no further elaboration on my
part. Others-means, ends, and muddling-are less common and require some clarification.
Means are strategies and specific policy decisions that have been adopted in the pursuit of a well-
defined goal. This goal is the end and generally there is broad consensus on its desirability, a
consensus that may well be lacking for the means. Muddling refers to the displacement of the
ends by the means as the driving objective of the policy process, but without the explicit
recognition of this interchange on the part of the policymakers themselves. The underlying
hypotheses in the paper are: (a) Muddling as a concept can only be witnessed after a certain
means has obsolesced, which is to say that muddling can be ascertained if policymakers refuse to
change the underlying policy even after it ceases to deliver benefits and indeed may have
commenced to harm the original policy objective, and (b) the probability of the occurrence of
muddling is directly related to the strength of the belief that policymakers have regarding their
chosen means. The paper itself is inductive in that the narrative was developed from the
observations and data that I collected during my fieldwork. The field research consisted of
personal interviews with policymakers and technical staff in the Brazilian electric power industry
and the collection and detailed analyses of news reports and technical literature.
has often paralysed both fiscal reforms and privatisation plans. Furthermore, it should be noted that the Ministry of
Mines and Energy was awarded to one of Cardoso's coalition partners and was not under the direct ministerial
control of Cardoso's party. However, this should not affect the analysis much because the Ministry actually had little
control over the privatisation process or in setting the policy agenda. Some technical co-ordination issues and
problems may have been caused by this somewhat fractured control over the ministry but I have found no evidence
to indicate that it was significant.
2By successful privatisation I mean strengthening the financial capacity of the industry and ensuring adequate
capacity expansion as opposed to privatising successfully by which I mean simply the sale of the companies for a
good price.
In the following two sections, I develop these arguments by explaining explain how neo-
liberal ideas came to command the global policy stage and how they penetrated the Brazilian
policy arena. Then, in section IV, I explain the translation of these ideas into the Brazilian
electric power industry and analyse Brazil's stubborn march to electricity rationing. In section V,
I explain the policy dynamics by which means came to be muddled with ends. Section VI
concludes.
2. Ideas and Interests in the Privatisation Movement
Scholarly accounts of privatisation in Latin America have tended to characterise them as
pragmatic responses to fiscal crises that rendered the state weak and vulnerable to the dictates of
neo-liberal ideology. These accounts buttress their claims with the undeniable fact that
privatisation was generally conducted in environments of extreme fiscal predicament.
Argentina's privatisation programme commenced in 1989, when the GDP had fallen by more
than 6% and inflation was raging at 3,000%; Brazil's first privatisation programme was initiated
after the successive oil price and interest-rate shocks that forced the government to negotiate
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1982; and even in Great Britain, privatisation
followed the country's fiscal woes and IMF bailout in the late 1970s. These accounts generally
conclude that privatisation was usually based on short-term interests rather than on any
fundamental shifts in the configuration of dominant interests, in governing ideologies or in
political coalitions. Thus, Latin American governments did not privatise because they were
suddenly convinced of the virtues of the market but because their fiscal shortfalls (Fishlow 1990)
and debt crises (Ramamurti 1992) had become unmanageable (see also Table 1). Similarly, some
scholars note that the Conservative revolution in Britain, which has often been described as the
intellectual precursor for the Latin American privatisation drive, was in its inception more of a
tactical response to the conservative electoral pledge to reduce taxes rather than an ideological
commitment to private ownership (Feigenbaum et. al. 1998). Also highlighted is the fact that
privatisation in Latin American countries such as Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico and Venezuela was
initiated by traditionally populist parties that enjoyed the left's political allegiance (Murillo
2002) and hence should not be attributed to a change in governing ideology (Fishlow 1990,
Vernon 1988). Others stress the role of the multilateral agencies, particularly the IMF, in
leveraging their assistance with structural adjustment programmes to force privatisation (Babai
1988; Stallings 1992; Ikenberry 1990).
Although it appears that pragmatism has dominated ideas in the privatisation drive, the
neo-liberal orthodoxy did have a rich intellectual tradition in criticising state ownership and
control. In 1957, Anthony Downs developed the essentials of public choice theory by extending
orthodox neo-classical microeconomic analysis to the political process and concluding that it is
the pursuit of votes that dictates policymaking in democracies. Built on the premise that man is
an egoistic, rational utility maximiser, public choice theory states that politicians and public
officials pursue their individual interests over the collective good while exercising their control
over state-owned enterprises. They are therefore likely to impose goals on the state owned
enterprise that are politically attractive-such as maximising employment at the enterprise and
keeping prices unreasonably low-but conflict with the efficiency and financial health of the
public sector firm (Buchanan & Tullock 1962). Without directly contradicting the premise of
market failure-which was the original reason for government involvement in various sectors of
the economy-public choice theory argued against state ownership on the grounds of the more
damnable effects of government failure. 3
The 1960s and 1970s literatures on property rights also claimed private ownership to be
superior to public ownership. The neo-classical property rights school condemned communal or
government ownership on the claim that dispersed ownership inevitably leads to a "tragedy of
the commons" (Hardin 1968). For Alchian (1965) and Demsetz (1967), the incentives created by
property rights were sufficient to explain differences in organisational behaviour: private
ownership concentrates rights and rewards while public ownership dilutes them; concentrated
rewards spur the owners of private firms to maximise profits and thereby efficiency while diluted
rewards spawn disinterest and rent-seeking in the public sector. Agency theory claimed that the
principals and agents of state owned enterprises have neither the incentives nor the tools to
ensure efficient, profit-maximising performance. On the incentives side, Alchian and Demsetz's
(1972) residual claimant theory argued that the existence of a specific claimant on the residual
income (profit) of a private firm provides strong incentives for principals to monitor agents and
control free-riders. Meanwhile, what incentives bureaucrats do face militate against efficiency in
the public sector. From the organisational perspective, Niskanen (1971) explained that
bureaucratic pursuit of the 3 Ps-pay, power and prestige-leads to overcapacity in state owned
enterprises. As Starr (1994) succinctly and perhaps sarcastically summarised the literature, the
pursuit of self interest is the source of all good in the private sector and all evil in the public
sector.
Despite the rich intellectual development of the privatisation argument, most analytic
approaches tend to assert that ideas played only a small and unimportant role in the neo-liberal
policy decisions of the 1980s and 1990s. Given that privatisation appeared repeatedly on the
policy agendas only after the various fiscal crises of the 1980s certainly appears to support the
commonly received view of privatisation as a pragmatic response in the face of fiscal pressures.
Coincidence, however, cannot be used to assume causality. While privatisation did
indeed appear to follow the fiscal crises of the state, a growing body of evidence is beginning to
point to factors other than pragmatism in pushing the privatisation agenda forward. Empirical
research in the policy arena contends that intellectual critique was important in driving the policy
debates fundamental to neo-liberalism's triumphs. Several scholars (Wolfe 1991; Gamble 1989;
Jenkins 1988) have asserted that the Conservatives in Great Britain were deeply influenced by
neo-classical market theories and Hayek's libertarian values. Meanwhile, in the United States,
Temin & Gallabos' (1987) study of long-distance telecommunications deregulation claims that
ideology dominated technology in driving the policy process. And, in Latin America, we should
not forget the compelling example provided by Chile and its Chicago boys which amply
illustrates an ideologically committed technocratic elite dictating the economic transformation of
a country through obviously neo-liberal economic policies (Sigmund 1990; Silva 1991).
Ideas were, therefore, not merely incidental bystanders to pragmatic pressures. I would,
however, caution against classifying ideas and pragmatic interests into mutually exclusive
domains because that risks obfuscating the symbiotic relationship that has long been
acknowledged to exist between them. Weber, for example, argued that ideas were powerless in
history unless they are fused with material interests. Lindblom (1965, 1977, 1990) too insisted
3 See Schleifer (1998) for a typical government failure argument and Charles Wolf Jr. (1979, 1988), who uses public
choice ideas to construct a theory of government failure that roughly parallels the theory of market failure.
that the impulse of theories and ideas must be blended with the compulsion of immediate
interests in the policymaking process. In similar vein, Majone (1996) has argued that ideas and
interests represent different and complementary analytic perspectives rather than mutually
exclusive domains. In essence, ideas must be able to sell themselves as having the most potential
to obtain successful solutions to specific problems that concern a wider population.
From this theoretical perspective, the contagious stagflation of the 1970s can be viewed
as an event that provided an opportunity for already simmering neo-liberal ideas to insinuate
themselves into the centre-stage of policy. Kingdon (1984) conceptualised these opportunities as
policy windows and argued that policy entrepreneurs exploit these windows to grasp a problem
and link it to their preferred solution. In his view, there are separate streams of problems, policies
and politics and that policy windows open at discrete moments to allow these separate streams to
merge into the specific policy initiatives policy entrepreneurs push. This conceptualisation
appears robust in explaining how neo-liberal ideas developed in academic journals in the 1960s
and 1970s were finally able to capture the wider public attention two decades later. Although the
details on how to privatise had not yet been worked out, privatisation as an idea was already
firmly established.
If the fiscal crises of the state were primarily responsible for prying open the policy
windows to neo-liberal reforms, then parallel developments in global economic stage were
responsible for pushing the windows wide open. With the progressive reduction of trade and
investment barriers under the GATT/WTO frameworks, economic activities became not just
internationalised but they became globalised in the sense that there was a dramatic increase in
interdependence and interconnection between economic nation-states. In this globalised world,
the state was considered as a container of distinctive economic institutions and practices (Talylot
1994) through its regulation of economic activities and its trade, investment and industrial
policies. The government's role thus came to be redefined as that of manager of the national
economy. The concept that in this globalised environment states were actually in competition
with one another and that there were certain identifiable characteristics that made certain
countries economically more competitive than others became popular. Although the opinions of
many scholars of national competitiveness differed substantially from what would be argued by
the neo-liberal orthodoxy that emerged dominant in the policy discourses in the 1980s and
1990s, the idea that states compete with one another, especially to attract investment and
productive facilities, and that certain policies were superior took firm hold and stoked the
popular imagination.
These certain policies came to be known popularly as the Washington Consensus, a term
which John Williamson (1993, 1994) had coined to describe a set of rational economic
reforms-specifically fiscal discipline, redirection of public expenditure, tax reform (lowering
marginal tax rates and broadening the base), financial liberalisation, a competitive exchange rate,
liberalisation of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, privatisation, deregulation and secure
property rights-that the IMF and World Bank thought would be good for Latin America. Of
these ten recommendations, the major focus of the policy reforms was, in fact, to reduce the role
of government through privatisation and the liberalisation of trade, finance, and FDI entry and
exit (Williamson 1999).
The staff of the Washington Consensus institutions, who perceived themselves as
"storming the citadels of statism" (Kanbur 2000), argued strenuously for a vast and radical
realignment of the state (Williamson 1999), emphasising that neo-liberal policies separated the
winners from the losers in the economic competition between nations. In doing so, they stressed
that government's proper role was to create supportive policies for the private sector and,
consequently, reforms came to be measured according to what these institutions felt was progress
along these lines-privatisation, deregulation, and fiscal and monetary conservativeness. Their
basic claim was a variant of institutional isomorphism (see DiMaggio & Powell 1983) at the
level of the nation-state and argued that less successful nations ought to copy the habits of
successful ones and make themselves over in the latter's image. And indeed, as we shall see
later, this isomorphism was as much about providing legitimacy for certain reform initiatives
than improving performance.
In this process, market fundamentalism came to dominate the politico-economic dialogue
as studies, some of questionable empirical accuracy, advocated a drastic reduction of the state. In
The East Asian Miracle, for example, the World Bank (1993) proffered a set of orthodox
economic policies-financial and trade liberalisation amongst others-as the fundamental basis
for explaining the economic success of the Asian Tigers. East Asian scholars immediately
repudiated the study for factual distortion claiming that the South Korean and Taiwanese
governments had, in fact, followed a heterodox set of policies, directing credit to privileged
industries rather than allowing the market to determine the allocation of credit, consistently
manipulating their exchange rates as part of their industrial policy and actively and extensively
using and non- barriers to protect and promote strategic domestic industries (Amsden 1994,
Perkins 1994).
Despite these analytic challenges, the advocates of neo-liberalism were largely successful
in popularising their views on privatisation, deregulation and trade liberalisation. Although
Williamson (1999) would later claim that he intended the term Washington Consensus to refer to
the intellectual convergence that underlined the development of the policy recommendations
rather than to the liberalising reforms programmes imposed by the IMF and World Bank or to
economic restructuring as it was actually practised in Latin America, Williamson's need to
defend his own term clearly indicates the extent to which the neo-liberal agenda had come to
dominate policymaking in that period. In the popular press and in the policy arenas that counted,
neo-liberalism and market fundamentalism was what became the primary policy driver. The
policy windows to a well-defined set of policy reforms were thus flung open.
3. The Windows for Economic Modernisation in Brazil
The previous section explained the process by which discontinuous change in the global
economic environment opened windows of opportunity for what Krugman (1995) called the
Victorian virtues in economic policy-sound money and free markets-to take hold. Sound
money was, of course, something that governments could strive for autonomously; trade
liberalisation was more a bilateral and multilateral negotiation game subject to a different
rhythm. In this section, I explain how the successive macroeconomic crises of the 1980s led to
the rejection of Brazil's entrepreneurial state and the adoption of an economic modernisation
programme based on the Victorian virtues. These crises led to the subordination of industrial
policy to orthodox monetarism and to the reduction of the state's role in the economy through
privatisation.
Import substitution and a strong state-led industrialisation strategy had characterised the
Brazilian economy from the 1950s onwards. These strategies were based on the Gerschenkronian
thesis that as a late starter to industrialisation, Brazil, like other developing countries, needed an
entrepreneurial and interventionist state to overcome underdeveloped and imperfect domestic
markets. An entrepreneurial state was an expression of both an economic nationalism and a
developmental ideology. It intended to accelerate and internalise technological learning in order
to create a robust and diversified domestic industrial base. Brazil's strategies based on state
entrepreneurship were not novel but part of a well-established trend in Latin America (Hirshman
1968; Evans 1979)4 as well as in Asia (see, for example, the case of the model government
factories in Japan).
Epitomised by Vargas' Estado Novo, Kubitschek's "50 years in 5" and rigourously
applied even by the later nominally right-wing military governments, the entrepreneurial state in
Brazil was generally based not on nationalisation via the expropriation of foreign-owned assets
but on heavy state investment in "empty spaces" in the economy-in areas such as minerals and
mining-where private investors had failed to make inroads. In areas where the state did
nationalise-electric power and telecommunications, for example-it did so only after the
private sector had proved unwilling and/or unable to invest sufficiently (Trebat 1983). State
intervention was, therefore, not a first choice but rather the result of the private sector inability or
unwillingness to invest. Of course, it can be argued that one of the main reasons the private
sector stopped investing heavily in industries like electric power was the constant threat of
government rate controls. For a long time, the entrepreneurial state yielded strong and sustained
economic growth in Brazil (see Chart 2). But, because foreign finance played a crucial role in the
Brazilian industrialisation effort, this growth came at the cost of a high internal and especially
external debt (see Table 2 and Chart 3).
State-owned firms played an important part in both Brazil's industrialisation and in the
country's economic stabilisation efforts. They led in the creation of basic infrastructure and the
development of heavy manufacturing, often gaining a reputation for efficiency and technological
leadership.5 However, during times of economic stress, the Brazilian government frequently
forced them to borrow excessively in international markets while at the same time restraining the
prices they could charge, first to promote industrialisation and then in an effort to combat
inflation. This strategy was initially successful in promoting economic growth but its internal
contradictions-of low prices and returns while trying to increase investment-made it
unsustainable after the macroeconomic shocks in the 1970s and 1980s. Squeezed between un-
remunerative prices and excessive debt, Brazilian state owned firms came to be blamed for both
their own financial insolvency and for Brazil's deficit problem. On the balance, therefore,
Brazilian state-owned firms were technically capable but frequently suffered abusive financial
policies at the hands of the government. Continuing economic stresses made their continuing
exploitation untenable and thus opened the policy windows to neo-liberal reform in Brazil.
4See also, for example, the work of Raul Prebisch and the Economic Commission for Latin America (1950) on
dependent development).
5 State owned firms such as USIMINAS and Embraer, both subsequently privatised, were acknowledged leaders in
their fields. Other state owned firms, such as Cemig and Copel, still not privatised, are also considered both
technologically and operationally efficient.
3.1. Opening the Policy Window to Privatisation in Brazil6
In Brazil, as in many other countries, the window to orthodox reform and privatisation
was unlatched by the external economic shocks of the 1970s and 1980s. The first shock was the
explosion of oil prices in November 1973, which resulted in Brazil's current account deficit
ballooning from US$ 1.7 billion in 1973 to US$ 7.1 billion in 1975. At that time, the Geisel
administration, gambling that it could pay Brazil's rapidly rising oil bill by growing even faster,
advocated a policy of growth via debt. Geisel's National Development Plan therefore
implemented a massive debt-based investment programme in basic industries such as metals,
fertilisers and petrochemicals and in infrastructure such as energy, communications, and
transportation (Baer 2001). As a result, net external debt7 grew at an average annual rate of
almost 40%, increasing from US$ 6.2 billion to US$ 31.6 billion between 1973 and 1978. In
1979, Brazil suffered a second shock when oil prices doubled and, simultaneously, tight
monetary policy in the United States triggered a large increase in international interest rates.
Both had predictable consequences on Brazil's debt and fiscal balances. In response, the
government announced major changes in economic policy and a series of austerity measures that
included devaluation, cuts in public spending, elimination of many subsidies and tax incentives,
limits on credit expansion and on imports, and reductions of incentives for export. Partly as a
result of these policies, stagflation hit the Brazilian economy the following year. The third shock
came in 1982 when international finance markets shut out Latin American borrowing following
Mexico's debt moratorium. External debt service was already absorbing 83% of Brazil's export
earnings. Unable to rollover its debt, Brazil was forced into structural adjustment programmes
even more painful than the ones it had already adopted in response to the first two shocks.
Initially Brazilian authorities tried to weather the storm without resorting to IMF assistance but
in November 1982, after the parliamentary and gubernatorial elections, the government began to
negotiate a US$ 4.8 billion IMF loan to pay the interest on its external debt. The following
January Brazil delivered the first of a series of letters of intent to the IMF promising various
austerity measures including a drastic reduction in public investments. Brazilian economic
growth slowed in response, but the external debt continued to rise and was accompanied by
extremely high inflation. Between 1982 and 1987, external debt almost doubled, increasing from
US$ 48 billion to US$ 91 billion, and inflation raged at over 1000% a year.
These shocks and the ineffectiveness of the government's response transformed Brazil's
economic and political landscape. First, the intractability of the Brazilian economic problems in
the 1980s made the idea of the entrepreneurial state obsolete. Second, the military government,
unable to pull Brazil out of its unrelenting stagflation in the 1980s, lost the support of the
industrial classes and was ousted from power in 1985. With Brazil's subsequent re-
democratisation, the policy windows opened for an economic modernisation project that would
attempt to reduce the scope and role of the state in the domestic economy.
As a direct result of the economic instability, Brazil's entrepreneurial state lost credibility
and became vulnerable to new ideas. These new ideas, fundamentally neo-liberal in character,
6 This section borrows heavily from Baer (2001).
7Net external debt = external debt - foreign exchange reserves.
were articulated politically by Fernando Collor who was elected President in 1990.8 His
administration intended to represent a clean, clear and fundamental break from Brazil's
historically entrepreneurial state. Having campaigned on a modernist platform of fiscal
discipline, privatisation and economic liberalisation, Collor initiated ambitious attempts to
dismantle the Brazilian state and transfer the responsibility of economic development to the
private sector, promising privatisation and liberalisation as incentives. He included these reforms
in a letter of intent sent to the IMF in January 1992 in which he also offered a tight credit policy
to reduce inflation. In exchange Collor wanted a US$ 2.1 billion standby loan and eventually a
restructuring of credit with commercial banks as part of the Brady Plan .
It was not external agents, however, who pushed Collor towards privatisation. Criticising
what he characterised as an overblown entrepreneurial state responsible for most of Brazil's
economic ills, Collor himself had introduced the National Privatisation Programme (PND) in
1990 (two years before sending his letter of intent to the IMF) as part of a comprehensive
government effort to introduce market reforms. The PND was ambitious, stating that its
objectives were to strategically reorient the state, reduce the public debt, reinitiate private sector
investment, modernise industry and strengthen domestic capital markets.' 0 A modest
privatisation effort, one which was clearly pragmatic in character, had already been initiated in
the previous decade when the National Economic and Social Development Bank (BNDES) had
begun to re-privatise the bankrupt firms it had taken over during the 1974-82 economic crises."
The PND, on the other hand, was a much more comprehensive programme that targeted
traditionally state-owned firms, such as large mineral and mining enterprises. As opposed to the
individual enterprise privatisations conducted in the 1980s, PND pursued privatisation on a
sectoral basis, focusing on the heavy industrial sectors-mining, petrochemicals, and fertilisers.
8Brazil's first civilian administration was handicapped by the death of the president-elect, Tancredo Neves before he
could even be sworn-in. His Vice, Jose Sarney, from the Liberal Front (a dissident faction of a party that had till
recently aligned itself with the military government), did not introduce any major reforms because he enjoyed little
popular support and remained politically handicapped throughout his tenure. The Sarney administration's economic
policy could be described best as indecisive, during which Brazil suffered through three different finance ministers
and an equal number of economic stabilisation plans, none of which was successful in controlling inflation.
9Developed by US Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady in 1989, the Brady Plan was a debt relief and rescheduling
programme that was extended to deeply indebted countries that would commit to pursuing orthodox economic
reform programmes. It allowed such countries to restructure their existing commercial bank debt by reducing either
the face value of the debt or the interest rate payable on it. To encourage the commercial banks which held such
debt to voluntarily participate in the programme, the IMF and World Bank either provided collateral on the reduced
value of the debt or awarded debtor governments loans to repurchase their debts directly. In this manner, the Brady
Plan allowed many developing countries to reduce their debt and debt service burdens and to regain access to
international capital markets.
"Foreign investors were restricted to 40% of the voting capital (unless expressly authorised to the contrary by
Congress). Furthermore, foreigners were restricted from acquiring a majority stake in PND companies for a period
of two to three years after privatisation. Foreign capital also could not be repatriated for at least six years following
the initial investment. This period was originally set at 12 years but was modified given the lack of foreign investor
interest. In any case, in the initial privatisations, foreigners acquired only 5% of the assets sold, most of it using
domestic debt instruments (Pinhero & Giambiagi 1994).
" During the economic crises, the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES) had lent substantial sums of
money to private firms to ensure their survival through the turbulence. However, as the crisis became prolonged the
firms remained unable to service their debt. BNDES then converted its credits into capital and assumed shareholder
control. It was these traditionally private firms that were the first targets of privatisation and the objective at that
time was simply to clean up BNDES' portfolio. The programme was rather modest, with only one company that was
worth over $100 million being privatised. However, one of the more significant consequences of the first phase of
privatisation was that as a result of the experience that it gained through the process, BNDES was put in charge of
the subsequent privatisation efforts.
This second phase of privatisation also marked the sale of efficient and profitable state-owned
enterprises, such as USIMINAS, which alone fetched twice as much as all the privatisations in
the 1980s. Collor also intended to privatise public utilities, but since the 1988 Brazilian
Constitution prohibited private provision of infrastructure services, Collor had to lay the legal
groundwork first.
Collor was, thus, not at all reluctant to privatise. He was, in fact, rather keen to accelerate
privatisation. His policies were similar to the ones Argentina and Mexico were pursuing, all of
which were, in fact, in competition with each other to secure foreign investment. Not
surprisingly, the agreements and reforms pleased the Finance Minister, Marcflio Marques
Moreira, who predicted that Brazil would receive over US$ 20 billion in foreign capital in 1991,
doubling and quadrupling the amounts received in the previous two years respectively. The
subtext was, of course, that in the competition for international investor interest in the region,
Brazil would attract funds away from Argentina and Mexico. In terms of institutional
isomorphism, the process was nearing completion, with the major Latin American economies all
following the same basic economic prescriptions.
3.2. Propping Open the Windows
The Collor administration was optimistic and had hoped both for quick sales of the state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) and to expand the privatisation programme into the infrastructure
sectors. Both, however, proved unattainable. It took several months to prepare each SOE for
privatisation and the administration' s attempt to expand the privatisation programme ended with
Collar's impeachment on charges of corruption in public procurement schemes.
Collor's Vice-President, Itamar Franco took over in October 1992 for the rest of the term.
Franco was not known to be a moderniser nor was he known to be sympathetic to private capital
and he initially resisted further privatisation. With the failure of Collor's economic stabilisation
plans, Brazil continued to suffer high inflation rates, operational deficits and a stagnant economy.
In 1992, the monthly inflation rate varied between 25% and 30%, the operational deficit hovered
around 2.5% of GDP and the real GDP declined about 1%. With these problems continuing to
plague his economic team, Franco went through three finance ministers, at the rate of about one
every two months, before finally appointing Senator Fernando Henrique Cardoso to the post in
May 1993.
When Cardoso took over as Finance Minister, it was popularly believed that the high
levels of fiscal deficits at all levels of government were the fundamental weakness in the
Brazilian economy and the critical cause of the failure of the economic stabilisation efforts of the
military as well as the democratic administrations. According to this view, articulated by Baer
(2001) Brazil was trapped in a vicious cycle of chronic deficits, inflation and high interest rates,
where market scepticism about Brazil's ability to service its debt forced the government into ever
shortening terms of financing, at times even in the overnight market at very high interest rates.
These rates increased the burden of debt service even more and further worsened Brazil's fiscal
balance and, predictably, the worsening fiscal deficits forced the government to offer ever-higher
interest rates. Fiscal indiscipline was believed to be at the root of the problem because the
government, forced to rely on financial markets to finance its deficit, was unable to break out of
this vicious cycle.
Cardoso's policy initiatives reflected the belief that fiscal indiscipline was at the root of
Brazil's economic troubles and that much of the blame for Brazil's fiscal problems rested with the
state governments. Determined to impose fiscal discipline, he began with an Immediate Action
Plan (IAP) to cut federal, state and local government spending by US$ 6 billion. Simultaneously,
he pressured state governments to clear up their debts to the federal government, threatening to
withhold federal guarantees for state borrowing unless they voluntarily set aside at least 9% of
their budgets to pay off their debts to the federal government. Cardoso also tried to control tax
evasion, which was estimated to cost the federal government between $40 and $60 billion
annually (Baer 2001). The initial efforts were only slightly successful: there was some economic
growth during this period but inflation remained high, exceeding 30% per month
In February 1994, Cardoso introduced his Real Plan. The Real Plan did not repeat the
previously failed strategies of price freezes and indexation but, instead, like the Argentine Law
of Convertibility pegged the local currency to the US dollar.12 First, the administration created an
index, the Unit of Real Value (Unidade Real de Valor-URV), which it pegged one-to-one with
the US dollar. According to the prevailing inflation rate, the URV's quotation in Cruzeiros (the
local currency) rose daily, accompanying the exchange rate. The government denominated
official prices, contracts and taxes in the URV and the private sector to use it too. As this system
quickly became popular, the government introduced the new currency based on this indexer, the
Real, in July 1994.
Cardoso's aim was to get the federal budget to balance. The currency peg was therefore
accompanied by an austerity programme. The Real Plan increased taxes, cut federal spending on
investments, personnel and state owned enterprises, and transferred to state and local
governments the responsibilities for health, education, social services, housing, basic sanitation,
and irrigation.' 3
The Real Plan was at least the sixth major plan for stabilising the Brazilian economy
since 1985, but unlike the previous plans, it actually worked. Inflation fell from a monthly rate
that exceeded 50% to less than 1% between June and September 1994. Economic stability helped
stimulate demand and industrial production, which led to growth rates exceeding 5% in the latter
half of 1994.
Brazil's currency peg overvalued the domestic currency. This, in concert with trade
liberalisation, was crucial in beating inflation. Between 1990 and 1994, Brazil had reduced
average s from 32.2% to 14.2%. As a result of this trade openness, domestic producers were
constrained in raising prices because the overvalued Real facilitated price competition from
imports. An overvalued exchange rate was also important to manage the debt since any currency
devaluation would increase the domestic value of the foreign debt:
Initial success with the Real Plan propelled Cardoso to the Presidency in 1995. However,
the high interest rates set by the monetary authorities, necessary to maintain the currency peg and
control inflation, were causing severe economic problems. As it was, the overvalued Real led to
a fall in exports and a rise in imports. In 1995, Brazil's trade balance became negative for the
2Unlike the Argentine Law of Convertibility, the Brazilian Real was not legally required to be pegged to the dollar.
13 This last measure reversed some of the negative effects of the 1988 Constitution, which had worsened federal
budgetary deficits by mandating the transfer of 21.5% of taxes on income and manufactured goods to state and
municipal governments without reducing federal government responsibilities in any significant manner.
first time in a decade (Table 3). In addition, the high interest rates were slowing economic
growth and pushing up Brazil's debt service payments.
It was at this stage that the privatisation of Brazilian public utilities took off, mainly
because Cardoso's high voter approval rating-he had won easily in the first round of the
Presidential elections-meant that he could get the legislation necessary to privatise public
utilities passed rapidly through Congress.
Privatisation served Cardoso's major policy objectives in three ways. First, privatisation
would provide immediate funds to help pay for a one-time reduction in the federal debt. Second,
privatisation would help prop up the value of the Real during Brazil's transition to fiscal balance.
Third, privatisation would fiscally discipline the federal and, more importantly, state
governments by eliminating the institutional structures that had facilitated fiscal indiscipline.
Cardoso was especially concerned about this last issue. By 1993, the various state
governments had racked up US$ 36 billion in debt to the federal government and of this US$ 2
billion were in arrears. Furthermore, many of these governments had excessively borrowed from
the banks that they owned and had driven them to illiquidity. This, in turn, fuelled inflation
because it pressured the Central Bank to issue more money in order to keep the state banks afloat
(Baer 2001).
It was also believed that state governments were using their power distribution companies
to extract resources from the federal government, especially after the latter intervened to prevent
unrestrained borrowing from state banks. Power distribution companies in Brazil generally
received bulk power supplies from federally-owned generation companies. In the early 1990s,
many state governments stopped paying the generation companies for the bulk power supplies.
As the federal government could hardly cut off power to entire cities and states, there was
effectively no way of addressing this fiscal indiscipline (Giambiagi & Aldrm 2001). However,
distribution companies felt justified in withholding payments to the federal generation companies
because, they argued, federal electric power policies had unfairly limited their revenues and
restricted them to a rate of return far below the 10% that was guaranteed by the 1934 Water
Code,
Thus, the privatisation of public utilities, in addition to being a goal to be pursued for its
own sake, served several strategic purposes. The administration expected Brazil's massive
electric power sector and the telecommunications firms to fetch tens of billions of dollars and
believed that this influx of this foreign exchange would increase demand for the Real and keep
its value stable. The resulting monetary stability itself would reinforce investor confidence and
demand and push privatisation prices even higher. Privatisation and the Real Plan were thus
symbiotic.
3.3. The Windows Shut Again
Back in the 1980s, globally contagious financial crises opened up the policy windows to
neo-liberal economic modernisation in Brazil. In the late 1990s, it was again contagious financial
crises that closed the policy window to Cardoso's modernisation programme and led eventually
to the electoral repudiation of his policies.
Cardoso's Real Plan ended Brazil's chronic inflation problem (see Table 4) but the long-
term success of the plan was always hostage to foreign investor enthusiasm. As long as the
dollars flowed in, the currency peg could be maintained. In the end, the Asian financial crisis in
1997 followed by the Russian debt moratorium in 1998 exposed the intrinsic fragility and the
internal contradictions in Brazil's monetary orthodoxy. Facing capital flight, the Central Bank
dramatically increased interest rates to maintain the currency peg but this exerted even greater
pressure on the operational deficit, whose value increased 8.4% in 1998. International investors
whose net portfolio investments had been financing the mounting current account deficit began
to withdraw their funds in larger quantities, expecting, correctly, that the Central Bank would not
be able to defend the overvalued Real for much longer. Speculative attacks on the Real served to
make an already bad situation worse. The Central Bank, wanting to maintain the peg and
monetary openness, doubled interest rates but failed to control capital flight. Foreign exchange
reserves were halved, from US$ 75 billion in August 1998 to less than US$ 35 billion in January
1999. In November 1998, the IMEF, World Bank and the US government put together a US$ 41.5
billion package to defend the Real and demanded, in exchange, strict controls on government
spending and tough limitations on public sector borrowing requirements (PSBR).
Although high interest rates and the overvalued Real were weakening the fundamentals
of the Brazilian economy, there was great resistance to timely devaluation because Cardoso, who
had already stated that devaluation would be a political and economic disaster, was unwilling to
entertain any changes in the Real's value before he secured his re-election.
His second term, consequently, began chaotically. Less than a week after the
inauguration-on l" January 1999-the new Governor of Minas Gerais, Itamar Franco, the man
who as President had appointed Cardoso as finance minister back in 1994, declared a 90-day
moratorium on his state's US$ 15 billion debt payments to the federal government. Franco's
rebellion was joined by the governors of Rio Grande do Sul and Rio de Janeiro. Together,
Brazil's 27 states owed the federal government over US$ 100 billion and the prospect of more
governors joining the rebellion put enormous pressure on the treasury. Within the week, Central
Bank President resigned and his replacement allowed the Real to devalue immediately 8%
against the dollar by widening the currency trading band. However, attempts to maintain pegged
exchange rates with high interest rates and external financial support rarely work and Brazil was
unable to stem the outflow of capital. In addition, the high interest rates were producing a
massive economic recession. Eventually, Cardoso yielded and allowed the exchange rate to float
freely. Over the next two months the Brazilian currency devalued 40% but despite Cardoso's
earlier dire prediction, the devaluation was not an economic disaster and inflation did not
remerge as a problem.
Paradoxically, Cardoso, the champion of fiscal orthodoxy ended up through his policies
presiding over a sustained increase in Brazil's public sector debt. In fact, public sector debt as a
percentage of GDP had been falling steadily since 1984 and it was the Real Plan that reversed
this trend in 1994 (see Chart 3). Debt rose partly because Cardoso failed to secure fundamental
fiscal reforms, which led to worsening operational deficits (see Table 5). To ensure that the
deficits did not push inflation, his administration did not finance the deficit by borrowing from
the Central Bank. Instead, Brazil borrowed heavily on domestic and international credit markets.
Even while the economy was stable and growing, the Brazilian monetary authorities had to offer
very high interest rates in order to maintain the Real's overvalued rates and to finance the public
sector deficits in a non-inflationary manner. In doing so, Brazil again fell into a vicious circle of
high interest rate payments that worsened the federal deficit and forced the government into
offering even higher interest rates in order to finance the increasing deficits. The benchmark rate
generally hovered around 30% and, at times, short term interest rates on Brazil's debt
approached the 50% mark. Indeed, investors generally recognised that the Real was significantly
overvalued and were demanding high interest rates mostly to compensate for the risk of
devaluation. As a result, although Brazil had been running a primary budget surplus, interest
payments led public sector debt to increase from 35% of GDP at the beginning of 1998 to over
50% of GDP a year later. In 1998 alone, the government paid US$ 49 billion in interest.
During this period, public utility privatisation had come to be regarded as synonymous
with the Real Plan, both for their symbiotic relationship and because of privatisation's high
public profile. The economic turmoil of 1998 and 1999 consequently weakened popular and
political support for both. Cardoso's second term witnessed his administration floundering,
unable to pursue privatisation to what they believed was its logical conclusion.
Public utility privatisation generally failed to deliver on its desired and expected benefits.
It did not much help Brazil's public debt problem. Despite receiving over US$ 90 billion from
privatisation between 1991 and 1999, Brazil's foreign debt actually increased by 77% over this
period. It did help prop up the Real, but only temporarily. In any case, there was only a finite
amount of assets that could be sold. It did bring in foreign and private investment, but not
enough to make a permanent impact on the Brazilian federal finances. The proverbial last straw
was when serious mistakes in the privatisation of the electric power industry led to a severe
electricity rationing in 2001. In 2002, the election of the Workers Party's Lula da Silva as
President slammed shut the window to further privatisation in Brazil.
4. Electric Power Reform Between the Policy Windows
The previous section explained how the policy windows to an orthodox reforms programme
opened as a result of the Brazilian military government's failure to provide economic stability
and growth in the early 1980s and then how the policy windows jammed with the vicissitudes of
the Real Plan. Paralleling developments in the Brazilian economy, the policy windows to
privatisation in the electric power industry opened, and shut, more or less in concert with the
political fortunes of the reformers. In this section, I analyse how electric power privatisation was
conducted between the policy windows.
4.1. Origins of the Crisis in the Brazilian Electric Power Industry
The crisis that Brazil's electric power industry was facing in the early 1990s traces back
to the federal government's policy responses to the economic turmoil of the 1970s and 1980s.
Until the early 1970s, the electric power industry enjoyed access to low-cost investment funds as
well as rates that were sufficient to remunerate both capital and operational costs. From 1974,
however, the federal government, in response to the macroeconomic problems of the 1970s and
1980s and as part of their economic development strategy, began to implement a series of
policies that distorted the economics of the industry.
First, the government equalised electricity rates throughout the country as part of an
effort to promote geographical depth in industrial development. Because the 1934 Water Code
under which electric power companies were regulated had established minimum and maximum
limits on the rate of return at 10% and 12% respectively, this meant that power firms with lower
costs of production stood to make more than a 10% return on assets while those with higher costs
stood to make less. To resolve this distortion, the government created a General Guarantee
Reserve (Reserva Geral de Garantia or RGG) and Results Compensation Account (Conta de
Resutados a Compensar or CRC) the following year. Firms with returns less than 10% return
would have their accounts credited in amount of the shortfall in revenue and firms with returns
over 12% would have their accounts debited in the amount of their excess revenues. Predictably,
this reduced incentives for both credited and debited firms to be cost efficient.
More serious, however, was that after 1977 the federal government began to limit
increases in electricity rates as a means to combat inflation. As a result, the return on assets of
electric power companies in general fell to about 4% as opposed to the 10% that was legally
guaranteed by the 1934 Water Code (Gomes, et.al. undated). Compounding the problem of
inadequate rates, the federal government also began to force state-owned enterprises (SOEs)-
especially power and steel companies-to borrow abroad in order to obtain the foreign exchange
that the government needed to finance its balance of payments deficits and to roll over its debt.
Thus, the government's policy of suppressing electricity rates not only reduced inflation
pressures but also was useful in persuading power firms to borrow overseas. Eroded by inflation,
electricity rates lost a third of their real value between 1974 and 1984 (see Table 9) and power
companies became increasingly dependent on foreign loans for investment (see Table 8). As a
result, resources began to be diverted from the power sector. Whereas in 1970 over 78% of the
financial resources in the industry had gone towards investment, by 1989 over 74% of these
resources went solely to debt service (Oliveira 1997). Perversely, it was no longer the
infrastructure needs of the country that motivated public firms to take out foreign loans but the
necessity to roll over the debt that created the projects. Adding to the injury, the government
often diverted funds from these loans so that state-owned enterprises racked up debt yet
developed no corresponding physical assets.
Price controls thus began a process of de-capitalisation in the electric power industry but
because of the guaranteed remuneration clause of the 1934 Water Code, it was the federal
government that became responsible for the accumulated deficits in the CRC. These deficits
would eventually add up to US$ 26 billion. In 1986, frustrated with federally imposed rate
controls, the government of Sio Paulo formally refused to contribute to the CRC and even
instructed its power company to stop making payments to the federal generating companies.
Given that President Sarney failed to take strong action against Sio Paulo, this strategy was
followed soon thereafter by other state governments. The intricate balancing system that the
military government had developed was beginning to unravel. By the end of the decade, the
electric power industry was saddled with high debt, handicapped with inadequate revenues,
plagued by insufficient investment capability and threatened with power shortages.
The popular view at that time was that state ownership was obviously to blame for this
sorry state of affairs. Price distortions, unnecessary and inefficient investment projects and the
progressively debilitated the finances of the sector were all blamed on political interference in
internal management of the power firms. The system was definitely broken and this unlatched
the window to the proposed privatisation of the Brazilian electric power system.
4.2. Laying the Legal Groundwork
Although electric power privatisation occurred exclusively under the Cardoso
administration, it was actually Collor who had first initiated attempts to privatise Brazil's public
utilities. Collor was unable to make much headway in privatising electric power firms because
the Brazilian constitution did not permit the privatisation of infrastructure services such as
electric power, telecommunications, and water & sanitation. He did, however, begin the legal
groundwork to privatising and liberalising the electric power industry and it was in fact under his
administration that Escelsa and Rio Light (the first two electric power companies to be
privatized, in 1995 and 1996 respectively) were entered into the National Privatisation
Programme (PND) in 1992.
The fundamental reforms of the Brazilian electric power industry were legally enacted
under Collor's successor, Itamar Franco. In 1993, the Brazilian Congress passed critical pieces of
legislation that paved the way for the financial recovery of the electric power industry. Law
8,643/93 ( Disequalisation Law) eliminated the uniform national power rate and allowed power
companies to charge customers rates that reflected both the cost of generation and an adequate
return on capital investments. The law also did away with the legally guaranteed but rarely
honoured 10% rate of return that had been established by the 1934 Water Code and,
consequently, with the CRC. Most importantly for privatisation, Law 8,631/93 sanitised the
finances of the electric power sector by having the Treasury assume the US$ 26 billion hole that
had developed in the CRC. Resolution 1,063/93 initiated market liberalisation by introducing
more flexible energy rates to large, energy-intensive customers and allowing utilities to negotiate
rates with directly with different customers. Decree 1009/93, which created the national
electricity transmission system (SINTREL), enabled free access to the federal transmission
network thereby facilitating, theoretically and legally, competition in the generation sector.
These laws collectively laid the foundation to modernising the institutional relationships in the
power sector. Franco, however, made no effort to privatise the electric power companies or to
really increase power rates.
Having defeated inflation and established a stable currency with the Real Plan, it was
Cardoso who had both the desire and the political capital to push through the constitutional
amendments and the new laws required to privatise and liberalise Brazil's state-owned and
monopolistic electric power sector. In his first year in office, Congress passed the Concessions
Law (Law 8,987/95), which opened public utility services to competitive public auctions14 and
Law 9,074/95 (complemented by Ministerial Decree 203/96), which established the procedures
for conducting public bidding and the designation of independent power producers to supply
power to free consumers.15 With the legal groundwork laid, the windows to electric power
privatisation were finally opened and the Cardoso administration proceeded to privatise in a
hurry.
1 Concessions were for 30 years in the case of distribution and transmission companies and 35 years for generation
companies.
1s The Law defined free customers as those who consume more than 10 MW and are supplied at a tension equal to
or higher than 69 kV. These customers were allowed to purchase power from IPPs immediately and after a period of
five years from any power producer-concessionaire or independent. New consumers with requirements over 3 MW
were also allowed immediate freedom of choice; existing customers whose requirements were between 3MW and 10
MW would have to wait till 2000 to exercise freedom of choice.
4.3. Electric Power Privatisation
When the Cardoso administration began to privatise electric power in 1995, the industry
consisted of mainly three types of firms. First were the four large federally-owned generation
and transmission companies (GENCOS)-Furnas, Chesf, Eletrosul and Eletronorte supplying the
Southeast and Centre-West (SE/CW), Northeast (NE), South (S) and North (N) zones of the
country respectively. These GENCOS were placed under Eletrobras, a holding company
established by the federal government in 1962. In addition, Eletrobras had three other
responsibilities-planning the expansion of electric power infrastructure, lending to electric
power projects and co-ordinating the dispatch of electricity from the various power plants in a
centralised manner. Second were electricity distribution companies (DISCOS) in each of Brazil's
26 states which were generally owned by their respective state governments. Third were the
vertically integrated power companies that combined generation, transmission and distribution
functions. These firms were owned by the governments of the wealthier industrialised states of
Sio Paulo (Cesp), Minas Gerais (Cemig), Parana (Copel) and Rio Grande do Sul (CEEE).
Although it was the power generation sector that was most starved for investment and
although it would have been easier to introduce competition in the generation sector first,
Cardoso's distrust in state governments' fiscal attitudes led the administration to privatise
DISCOS first. They reasoned that since DISCOS had been delinquent in their payments to
GENCOS, it would have been difficult to persuade private investment in power generation
without federal guarantees backing DISCOS' payments to privatised GENCOS. With the
Treasury having already assumed US$ 26 billion of cross-debt in the industry, the administration
did not want to provide any more guarantees to the sector and was very keen to ensure that the
revenue stream in the sector-from customer to DISCO to GENCO-be stable and secure. The
administration expected privatised DISCOS to be more vigorous in collecting bills and in
honouring their payment obligations to GENCOS.
There was another logical reason for beginning the privatisation process with DISCOS.
Brazil's power generation infrastructure was for the most part based on large multi-purpose
hydroelectric dams. As such, the rules for the proposed wholesale market as well as regulation
and charges for water-use were complex issues which would require time to analyse and
construct. They would also require the establishment of a new and independent electric power
regulatory authority and, preferably, also an independent water regulatory authority. The
administration, wanting to commence privatisation immediately, reasoned that while the
DISCOS were being privatised, the market rules and necessary regulatory agencies could be
created. The electric power sector still lacked its independent regulatory agency, but the
administration decided that the terms of service could be written into the DISCOS' concessions
contracts and would suffice until such time as the new independent electric power regulatory
agency could be established. 16
Since it was the state governments that owned most of the DISCOS, the administration
needed a tool to persuade them to relinquish control. To do so, the BNDES created the State-
level Privatisation Stimulation Programme (Programa de Estimulo as Privatizag6es Estaduais -
PEPE). In August 1996 the BNDES Board of Directors established procedures to anticipate
funds to state governments on the basis of future privatisations. After an initial valuation of the
16Nominally, the National Department of Water and Electricity (DNAEE) was in charge of regulating the sector but
the agency was rather moribund.
DISCO by a BNDES team, the state government was required to put up the shares of the DISCO
as security in order to receive a loan (at TJLP-the basic long term interest rate-plus 8%) of
equivalent value on the understanding that the shares would later be auctioned. The difference
between the value estimated by BNDES and the actual sale price-known as upside-would be
shared with 80% going to the state government and 20% to BNDES. To ensure that the
privatisation would actually go through, states were given a period of one year to carry out the
auctions, failing which BNDES' share in the upside would rise, interest rates on the original loan
would increase and BNDES would be allowed to go ahead and auction the DISCO on its own.
BNDES generally under-priced the shares initially as an additional means of persuading states to
actually sell the shares since they would stand to make more than the loans they had been given.
It can also be argued that by lowering the initial estimate, BNDES inflated the value of the
upside and consequently its own earnings from the transaction and, therefore, had a vested
interest in both keeping the initial value low and later, during the privatisation process, pressing
for maximising the eventual sale price.
Indeed, revenues from the DISCO privatisation programme generally exceeded
expectations, bringing in over US$ 20 billion. Although the total revenue from
telecommunications privatisations exceeded slightly the revenue earned from electricity
privatisation (see Chart 4), the largest federal GENCOS-Furnas and Chesf-and the large
vertically integrated state-owned power companies-Cemig and Copel-had yet to be privatised.
As a result of this frantic pace of selling Brazil, which before 1995 had privatised little, became
the largest recipient of privatisation revenues in Latin America. The first two DISCOS to be
privatised-Escelsa and Rio Light-were actually controlled by Eletrobras and not by their
respective state governments. Escelsa was privatised in June 1995 followed about a year
afterwards by Rio Light. Light sold for US$ 2.3 billion, which was at the time one of the largest
single privatisations in Latin America. A few weeks later, on 2 0 th November 1996, CERJ became
the first state government owned DISCO to be privatised. By late 1997 almost all the major
DISCOS had been privatised, fetching handsome premiums over their minimum reserve prices
(see Table 10). In fact, on a per-MW basis, Brazilian DISCOS generally commanded a much
higher price than DISCOS in other Latin American countries.
Privatisation of Brazil's generation capacity proceeded much less spectacularly. It was
not until May 1998, almost three years after DISCO privatisation had commenced, that the
Brazilian Congress passed the legislation enabling generation company privatisation. Law
9,648/98 established the guidelines to privatise the federal GENCOS, proposing to split Furnas
and Chesf into two generation and one transmission company each, Eletrosul into one generation
and one transmission company, and Eletronorte into six different firms. The law creating a
national water regulatory agency (ANA), which was important to privatising GENCOS given
that over 90% of Brazil's installed capacity was at the time hydro-based, took even longer. ANA
was finally established only in December 2000 after Congress passed Law 9,984/00 in June
2000.
Eletrosul's generation arm, Gerasul, was the first generation company to be privatised. It
was auctioned in September 1998, but there was only one bidder-Belgium's Tractabel-who
won the concession after bidding only the minimum reserve price. In the meantime, the state
governments of Sio Paulo and Parana began to prepare their own vertically integrated firms for
privatisation. Sdo Paulo had already divided its massive CESP into six different firms-three
each in distribution and generation. The distribution firms were all auctioned off in 1998. Two of
the three generation firms-CESP-Parapanema and CESP-Tiete-were auctioned off in 1999.
Privatising the remaining generation infrastructure proved to be much more complicated.
The auction of CESP-Parana was delayed because of construction delays in its Porto Primavera
hydroelectric plant and questions about environmental issues that could potentially delay the
filling of its reservoir. Furnas's privatisation proved to be even more complex. First, Furnas'
nuclear assets had to be separated from the company because Brazilian law did not permit
private ownership of nuclear plants. Second, the company's multi-billion reais debt to its
employees' pension fund needed to be sorted out. Finally, many industry experts, Fumas
employees and politicians were opposed to either to its dismemberment or to its privatisation or
to both. Chesf privatisation was opposed by the politicians of the Northeast who viewed the
company more as a development agency than as merely an electric power generator.
Eletronorte's privatisation was similarly delayed because the state-level politicians were
demanding guarantees that the proceeds from the firm's sale would be used to develop the
region's power infrastructure and not to pay off the federal debt.
Nevertheless, the administration did not flag in its efforts at privatising the GENCOS.
When the opposition to the proposal to split and privatise Furnas threatened to stall privatisation,
the administration agreed to change the privatisation strategy. Instead of splitting and selling
Furnas to strategic investors, the administration decided maintain Furnas as a single firm and to
sell shares in the company directly to the public, with the government retaining a golden share.
This process, known locally as pulverisation, had been employed previously in the case of
Petrobras, whose privatisation would have been politically even more controversial. For Chesf,
in order to overcome political resistance, the administration offered to use the funds accruing
from its privatisation to fund a long-standing pet project of North-East politicians-the
transposition of the waters of the Sio Francisco River.17 Similarly, offers of development
assistance and promises to use the privatisation proceeds locally were made to the politicians
stalling on Eletronorte.
Despite the administration's determination and the compromises that it made, various
legal and logistical problems kept delaying the privatisation of the GENCOS until early 2001.
The administration, however, persisted with the privatisation plans and it was only the looming
rationing and the presidential elections scheduled for the following year that pushed generation
privatisation off the near-term policy agenda.
4.4. The Stubborn Stumble towards Power Rationing
It was already apparent when the Cardoso administration began electric power
privatisation in late 1995 that Brazil was in danger of suffering power shortages. One would tend
to that conclusion by simply tracking the growth in electric power consumption versus the
growth in installed capacity in the years preceding and following privatisation. In the 1970s,
installed capacity grew at an average rate of 11.8% per year; in the 1980s, this fell to 4.1% per
year and in the 1990s to a further 2.6% per year. Meanwhile, in the 1980s, power consumption
increased at an average rate of over 7% per year and in the 1990s at over 4% annually. In the
7The project, known in Brazil as the transposition of the waters of the Sio Francisco river, involved building two
canals that were thousands of kilometres to link the major river basins of the Northeast, thereby massively
increasing the areas under irrigation.
three years after privatisation, which began when the power supply situation was already
stretched tight, power consumption increased by over 15% but installed capacity increases trailed
behind at 10% (see Table 11).
The peculiar technical characteristics of Brazil's electric power industry, however, made
it difficult to predict exactly what the potential power shortfall was and when the shortages
would occur. As I mentioned earlier, over 90% of Brazil's electricity is produced by large
hydroelectric dams and the level of water in the hydroelectric reservoirs depends upon rainfall,
which in Brazil varies substantially from year-to-year. Brazilian electricity planners had, in fact,
taken these variations into account when they designed the country's electric power system. The
volume of water in the reservoirs needs always to be maintained at levels sufficient to allow
hydroelectric plants to fully attend expected demand even if there is below-average rainfall
several years in succession. Given that predicting rainfall years in advance is technically
impossible, Eletrobras developed a computer programme called NEWWAVE to determine
whether the levels in the reservoirs was adequate or if additional capacity needed to be built.
NEWWAVE calculates the available power production capabilities under hundreds of different
rainfall scenarios and existing installed capacity is considered inadequate if in more than 5% of
the rainfall scenarios the system would not be able to satisfy expected demand. This probabilistic
nature of security of supply in Brazil means that even with a severely stressed supply situation,
power shortfalls and blackouts are not inevitable. If, in a given year, the rainfall is favourable,
then the system can produce sufficient electricity to satisfy all demand, even if installed capacity
is considered severely inadequate. As we will see later, it was this flexibility in the face of supply
shortages that allowed the Brazilian government to gamble with its electric power reforms.
Although it was technically difficult to predict with certainty when shortages would
occur, the rationing should not have come as a complete surprise because it was known for
several years that the power supply situation was greatly stressed. Based on the probabilistic
determination described above, various studies indicated that it was likely, given the trends in
electricity consumption and investment, that the risk of power shortage would surpass the 5%
level by 2000. As early as 1996, a BNDES study indicated that Brazil faced an elevated risk of
rationing after 2000. Even the consultants contracted by the Ministry of Mines and Energy
concluded that Brazil would face an elevated risk of rationing if generation investment suffered
any delays (Coopers&Lybrand 1997).
Despite these warnings, few in the policymaking circles publicly expressed
preoccupation with the supply situation in the initial years of the electric power privatisation
process. By late 1999, however, the difficulties in privatising generation had become apparent as
had a growing threat of power shortages. Reports of the reservoir levels released by ONS were
providing clear signals that the country was gambling with power deficits. After 1999 proved to
be relatively dry, hydropower reservoir levels fell to 19.7% of total capacity at the end of
November in the SE/CW and to 15.9% in the NE. The risk of rationing was elevated to 15%
against the normal benchmark of 5%. Even this elevated risk of rationing was an optimistic
estimate, given that the ONS based its calculations on the assumption that several power plants
that were then under construction would all come online on time. The situation would have been
even more critical had Brazil's economy continued to grow in 1999. Instead, the international
financial crises and the resulting instability of the Real had restricted Brazil's growth in 1999 to
0.8% as opposed to over 3% per annum over the previous five years. Consequently, power
consumption in 1999 increased by only 1.6% as opposed to an average of over 5% per annum
during the previous five years (see Table 11).
Brazil escaped power rationing in 2000 because of lower than expected power
consumption and some providential rains in 1999 but the authorities did not take much advantage
in 2000 of the respite that the economy and nature had provided. A year later, by January 2001,
Brazil's hydropower reservoirs were again practically depleted (See Chart 6). The reservoirs in
the NE were down to 10% of their storage capacity while those in the SE/CW were down to
18%. Only in the south were the reservoir levels healthy, but because of a lack of an integrated
transmission capacity, little of the excess power available in the south could be distributed to
other parts of the country.
Contemporary news accounts were full of warnings that the country was certainly headed
towards power rationing, yet even as late as 2000 the administration and the Ministry of Mines
and Energy continued to publicly deny the risk of rationing. Meanwhile, the administration
redoubled its efforts on privatisation, accepting compromises that it had earlier resisted such as
the pulverisation of Furnas and bargaining on political favours such as the transposition of the
Sio Francisco River in exchange for assent on Chesf privatisation. Although prior to the
devaluation, it could have been argued that privatisation was essential to maintaining the
exchange rate and economic stability, by 2000 this objective could no longer be argued.
While the power supply situation turned critical, the administration decided not to take
advantage of the ready technical capabilities, project execution capabilities and favourable
balance sheets of the newly reformed GENCOS. Instead the administration launched a Priority
Thermoelectric Power Programme (PPT), which aimed to provide the private sector financing
incentives via the BNDES to construct almost 50 natural gas driven thermal power plants with an
installed capacity totalling over 17,000 MW.
Initially, the administration assumed that the lines of credit and other financial incentives
provided to the PPT by BNDES would be sufficient to induce private investment. While
BNDES financing did solve the critical problem of the scarcity of long-term financing in Brazil,
it did not, however, solve the more critical issue of the commercial viability of thermoelectric
plants in the Brazilian electric power context. On one level, thermoelectric plants were preferred
by private investors in Brazil. They have a lower capital outlay and come online much faster than
hydroelectric plants. Given the risk and uncertainty of long-term capital intensive investments in
Brazil, a faster concept-to-cash-flow was preferred by investors. However, thermoelectric plants
suffered from the serious flaw that their fuel, natural gas in this case, had to be imported since at
that time Brazil had not developed significant sources of domestic natural gas. The government
had, however, built a gas pipeline from Bolivia and there were also possibilities of importing gas
from Argentina but the main problem was that this gas had to be paid for in dollars.
Pricing of natural gas in dollars made the signing of power purchase agreements (PPAs)
with DISCOS problematic. The first and immediate problem was that the pass-through of
wholesale electricity purchases to the consumers was governed by ANEEL. In 1998, ANEEL
had established a price ceiling for this pass-through which, in accordance with the Real Plan,
could not be indexed in any manner to the price of the dollar. Adjustments to the price of power
based on variations in the cost of natural gas could be made on an annual basis, but any variation
in the price of gas during the year would have to be borne either by the DISCO or by the
generator. In any case, the pass-through ceiling, called the normative value (VN) established by
ANEEL was already too low. Initially, ANEEL fixed the VN of natural gas based thermoelectric
power plants at R$ 72.35 per MWh which was too low to enable the plants to run profitably.
Subsequently, under the PPT, ANEEL increased the VN to R$ 106.40 per MWh for plants
smaller than 350 MW and R$ 91.06 for plants larger than 350 MW.
The gas pricing issue was not the only hurdle for the PPT. In the short term, there was not
any commercial space for the PPT power plants to sell their power. During the privatisation
process, the federal GENCOS were made to sign initial contracts with the distribution companies
and according to these contracts, 100% of the DISCOS' power requirements were covered by the
GENCOS until 2002. Consequently, DISCOS believed that in the event of a power shortage, it
would be the GENCOS that would bear the liability. As such, they were not inclined to sign
power purchase agreements with the PPT projects. In the longer term, problems with contracting
stemmed from the fact that ANEEL continued to maintain that the electric power sector would
be deregulated according to the schedule previously established. The proposed liberalisation of
the power sector at the retail level impeded DISCOS from signing PPAs with thermoelectric
plants because being trapped into contracts with these relatively expensive sources of power
supply would make them less competitive in the future. As such, DISCOS preferred to wait
rather than immediately secure future supplies with thermoelectric generators.
Theoretically, given the scarcity of electric power there was a possibility that investors
would build merchant plants-those that would sell only in the wholesale market as and when
the scarcity value of electricity be high enough to allow these plants to be dispatched profitably.
Indeed, a couple of investors did begin constructing such plants predicting, correctly, that the
country would soon have to confront power shortages which would cause a spike in the price of
wholesale power. For the majority of investors, however, merchant plants were too risky. Profit
from these plants could be made only if there was enough power scarcity (i.e., the country should
be running a substantially high risk of deficit). Given the nature of Brazil's hydroelectric power
infrastructure, these periods would be few and far between.
The PPT remained paralysed for months as a result of the impasse created by the
dollarisation of the natural gas prices, the Real Plan's prohibition of the denomination or
indexation of public service prices in dollars, and the lack of incentives and a commercial space
to sign power purchase agreements. It was only after the country was already at the brink of
rationing that the government engineered a solution. Given that the private investors were
refusing to accept the foreign-exchange risk, there were only three realistic options available to
the government. The first was for the government to assume the risk directly through the
treasury, explicitly guaranteeing protection to the investors against the risk of devaluation. The
second was to place the risk on the consumers by explicitly or implicitly linking power rates to
movements in the exchange rate. The final option, which the government eventually chose, was
to require Petrobras, Brazil's federally owned oil & gas company, both to assume the foreign
exchange risks and to enter into strategic partnerships with private investors in order to construct
some of the thermoelectric power plants. Consequently, of the 49 plants originally conceived in
the PPT, only 15 progressed beyond the concept stage and only because Petrobras was a strategic
partner in these ventures. In order to control the foreign exchange risk for the investors, the
administration finally fixed the price of gas at US$ 2.475 per mBTU, which was composed of
20% national gas at between US$ 2.00 and US$ 2.20 per mBTU and imported (Bolivian) gas at
US$ 3.30 per mBTU, with Petrobras assuming the risks of any adverse movements in the
currency markets. Furthermore, the administration required Eletrobras to sign PPAs with the
thermoelectric plants, thus shifting commercial risks to the state-owned entity.
With the government assuming most of the risks, it appeared that the commercial
problems with the thermoelectric plants had been resolved. In a final blow to the PPT, however,
the scarcity of turbines in world markets further delayed the construction of the plants. To
accelerate deployment, some plants even opted to use modified aeroplane engines. As a result of
the delays, the plants that finally went on-line were much more expensive than originally
envisioned. Nevertheless, thermal power investment was much lower than expected. In the
meantime, the hydropower reservoirs continued to be drawn down. By April, the rains had failed
and the reservoirs were down to 11%
Finally, in May 2001, ONS warned that an immediate reduction of 20% in electricity
consumption was essential in the SE/CW and NE to avoid a complete depletion of the reservoirs.
To deal with the crisis, the administration immediately created an energy crisis management
committee (CGE). To avoid the co-ordination problems that had plagued the industry
transformation thus far, CGE included all the relevant actors-the ministers of mines and energy,
finance and planning, the Advocate General, ANEEL, ONS, BNDES and Eletrobras. In choosing
between generalised power cuts and voluntary power reduction, CGE favoured the latter. All
classes were required to economise. Residential customers whose consumption was over 100
KWh/month and commercial customers had to reduce their consumption by 20% and industrial
consumers by between 20 and 25%. To promote economic efficiency, CGE allowed firms who
were able to reduce their consumption more than required to sell their rights to other consumers.
The rationing programme was successful in that Brazil avoided blackouts that generally
plagued other places, such as California, that suffered energy shortages but the ten months of
rationing severely impacted Brazil's economy and the financial health of the electric power
sector. Various estimates put the combined industry losses at over R$ 10 billion. In addition,
most of the contractual arrangements in the industry were in shambles with DISCOS, GENCOS
and ONS blaming one another for bad planning. The issue of legal liability was hotly debated.
The DISCOS believed that according to Annex V of their contracts they were covered for losses
incurred in the case that GENCOS did not supply the power which they had contracted.
GENCOS refused to accept responsibility and argued that not only had they been prevented from
expanding capacity but also that ONS had erroneously continued to dispatch their cheaper
hydropower rather than engaging more expensive thermal power, perhaps in an effort to keep
prices low or perhaps because of a technical problem with the NEWWAVE electricity dispatch
software.
In the end the Cardoso administration managed to hammer out an industry accord in
which in exchange for the power companies renouncing the right to seek further and future legal
recourse, BNDES would loan the power companies a negotiated amount representative of the
losses that they had incurred. This loan could, in the books of the companies, be treated as
income for the current year. The companies, in turn, would be allowed a special 10-year
surcharge on electricity rates-2.9% for residential customers and 7.9% for industrial
customers-to cover the cost of the loan. The government thus created an asset for itself (the
loan made by BNDES), the companies realised income and profit (the same loan) and the
consumers first had to curtail their consumption and then to pay over a period of 10 years for the
power they were not allowed to consume.
Other relationships in the industry also suffered. Newspapers reported that the President
blamed the Chairman of ANEEL for not having warned of and averted the power rationing and
ANEEL itself was relatively sidelined in the CGE. Following the rationing, the administration
made an attempt to salvage the electric power industry model that they had introduced in 1998,
but the power reforms were essentially dead. During the presidential elections the following
year, none of the candidates, not even Jose Serra from Cardoso's PSDB, declared themselves in
favour of continuing with electric power privatisation.
5. Privatisation as Ends Instead of means
Scholars have generally argued that privatisation in Latin American was driven mostly by
pragmatic concerns about getting enough investment and the policy pronouncements emanating
from Latin American administrations also reflected this concern. In Brazil, according to the
statements attributed to President Cardoso in the period before and after the rationing,
privatisation of Brazil's electric power infrastructure was necessary because the state was unable
to make the investments required to ensure adequate power supplies for the country. It would
certainly appear, based on such pronouncements, that the administration was preoccupied with
the pragmatic concern of ensuring the security of electricity supply in Brazil.
There can be little doubt that at the beginning of the 1990s, Brazil desperately needed to
reform its electric power industry and obtain a more reliable source of investment. A static
interpretation of the situation certainly gives the impression of privatisation as a pragmatic
reaction. But, a dynamic analysis of the policy decisions taken during this period indicates that
despite its stated preoccupation, the administration prioritised privatisation over investment in
new generation capacity. The previous section provided evidence that there were ample
indications of a looming energy crisis and that although privatisation of generation infrastructure
proceeded much slower than originally envisaged, the administration repeatedly bypassed state-
owned companies in developing plans to overcome the energy supply crisis. In doing so, the
Cardoso administration pursued privatisation as the "end" of its policy to the detriment of
investment in the new generation capacity. This section analyses how tensions appeared between
the means and the ends and the processes by which they came to be muddled.
5.1 How Means and Ends came to be Muddled
The muddling of means and ends in Brazilian electric power privatisation did not become
apparent until the process had been underway for several years. In the beginning, there was little
tension between means and ends, which is to say that the measures that the administration took
to facilitate the privatisation of the industry-the means-were exactly those that were required
to promote a sustainable investment programme-the ends. First, preparation for privatisation
required rate reform because securing investment was predicated upon investors (private or
public) receiving an adequate rate of return. Second, the industry was restructured as part of the
privatisation programme and this was critical to allowing competition in the various segments of
the industry in the future. Third, privatisation initially led to some quality of service problems,
basically because investors were interested in recuperating their investments as quickly as
possible, but after ANEEL began to fine the concessionaires for the service problems, the issues
were generally and quickly resolved. This led to infrastructure upgrades and improvements in the
quality of service.
5.1.1. Public Finance for Private Investments
Although there were few tensions between means and ends in the beginning, there were
strong signals that privatisation was being prioritised over other objectives in the government's
power sector reform programme. Despite an outward determination to withdraw the government
from the electric power sector, the Cardoso administration actively employed state resources to
ensure "private" investment. This paradox was evident from the very beginning when, as Brown
(2002) observed, Rio Light, a state-owned firm was bought by a consortium led by Electricit6 de
France (EDF), another state-owned firm (albeit French) in a transaction financed by BNDES, a
state-owned bank and the process was celebrated as "privatisation". In fact, almost throughout
the privatisation process, BNDES made available up to 50% of the reserve price as a loan to the
eventual winners. BNDES funds were also made available to private investors to expand
electricity infrastructure. The level of BNDES financing in the sector became so significant that
the state-owned electric power companies began to complain, only half-ironically, that they were
at a competitive disadvantage because they were not allowed access to the low-cost BNDES
funds. BNDES was not the only source of public money being provided to private investors in
the power industry. In several subsequent privatisations, funds originating from other state-
owned entities, such as Banco do Brasil's workers' pension fund, Previ, (one of the largest in the
country) also figured prominently in the investor consortia. For example, a consortium headed by
Spanish Ibredrola bought Coelba, Bahia's DISCO, but Banco do Brasil and Previ's share in the
consortium was almost the same as Iberdrola's. In all of these cases, the administration applied
pressure on government-owned financial institutions to apply resources to facilitate
privatisation.18
The purpose of using BNDES funds was to promote privatisation not investment. If
privatisation was intended to bring in foreign and private investment, then BNDES financing was
counterproductive in that it would have a substitutive rather than complementary effect. Brown
(2002), instead, has hypothesised that BNDES funds were used in order to make Brazil's
"balance sheet" look stronger. Providing low-cost financing via BNDES helped inflate the final
sales price of the privatised electric power companies. This allowed the government to creatively
"pay off' more of its debt. By making loans to private investors, the government created an asset
for itself (the loan) while part of the outlay came right back as a premium on the sale price. This
view is supported by public statements made by senior BNDES executives where they confirm
that BNDES funding was vital to making sure privatised power companies fetched a high price.
The downside of increasing risk to public moneys was not articulated, nor was the fact that the
higher capital outlays made by private investors would have to be later compensated through
higher electricity rates.
5.1.2. The Means Displace the Ends
The simmering tensions between means and ends really manifested themselves in the
beginning of 1999. Until that time, the privatisation of distribution companies had proceeded at a
steady pace and was virtually complete. It appeared that with the passage of the enabling
18Technically, the investments being made in the power sector were private even though it was BNDES or Banco do
Brasil that provided most of the money. The state only acted as financier but that did not immunise it from risk.
Years later, in 2002, when Eletropaulo threatened to default on its BNDES loan repayment, it was the government
that was forced into an unfavourable debt renegotiation.
legislation in 1998, the privatisation of generation companies would follow suit. Since the
privatised distribution companies had, after some delay, began to ramp up their investment
programmes, there was a general expectation that generation companies would do the same. In
1999, however, a series of problems attacked the Brazilian economy in general and the power
sector in particular.
As the privatisation of generation companies began to flounder, the tensions between
means and ends really became apparent. In responding to the setbacks in the GENCO
privatisation schedule, the Cardoso administration committed a series of strategic errors that
delayed investment and eventually led to power shortages. These errors, motivated by a strong
commitment to privatise the electricity infrastructure, evidence the administration's pursuit of
privatisation beyond pragmatism.
Amongst the most serious of the various strategic errors of the electric power industry
reform and the most compelling evidence of the Cardoso administration's faith in the
privatisation idea, was its determination to withdraw state investment in the generation sector
even before private investment had taken hold. The supply situation in the industry was already
tight when the Cardoso administration had initiated the electric power privatisation programme
in 1995. Installed capacity had been trailing demand increases for many years because of the
restrictive rate policies followed by previous governments. In addition, power demand
accelerated after the Real Plan because the resulting monetary stability stimulated consumer
demand and industrial production (see Table 11). Consequently the power supply markets
became even tighter. It was precisely at this time, in April 1995, that the Cardoso administration
entered the Eletrobras generation companies in the PND. This resulted in a substantial
curtailment of their investment programmes (see Chart 5). The government also withdrew many
concessions to develop hydropower sites that had been awarded to the GENCOS in order to free
them for the private sector to develop later.
Because of their commitment to the idea of privatisation, the administration pursued it
beyond pragmatism. The main evidence for the claim that the Cardoso administration focused its
energies on privatisation even to the detriment of investment in new generation capacity and
ensuring security of electricity supply is that it did not allow the federal GENCOS to ramp up
their investment programmes even when the power supply situation was becoming seriously
compromised. The initial power industry reforms of 1993 had set the stage for the recuperation
of the financial health of the GENCOS. Nonetheless, the Cardoso administration retained curbs
on the Eletrobras companies' investment programmes because it wanted to reduce their
outstanding liabilities in preparation for privatisation. The GENCOS' increasing revenues were
therefore applied to paying down their debts. Between 1995 and 1997, Furnas' debt was more
than halved, from R$ 5.65 billion to R$ 2.72 billion. Eletrosul's debt reduction was even more
dramatic: in two years it slashed its debt 80%, from R$ 1.45 billion to R$ 300 million. Given its
balance sheet, debt levels and projected cash flows at that point in time, Eletrobras could, were it
not under restrictions imposed by the federal government, have invested up to US$ 7 billion per
annum. Instead, Eletrobras investments were less than US$ 3 billion per annum during this
period. This meant that in the three years during which the DISCOS were being privatised,
investment in generation did not receive much priority. Consequently, the security of supply
situation steadily deteriorated, evidenced by the fact that in each year following 1996 the levels
of the hydropower reservoirs were always less than those in the corresponding period in the
preceding year (see Chart 6). In other words, the reserve stock of water, necessary to guarantee
the security of electricity supply, was steadily being depleted.
By requiring that the bulk electric power investments be made by the private sector
instead of the already established state-owned generation sector (that still controlled 78% of the
nations generating capacity) the administration slowed investment in new generation capacity.
Eventually, Brazil ended up paying much more for electricity than it would have had to had the
investment been undertaken by the federal GENCOS. Because of the delays in investment, the
government needed to increase installed capacity much more quickly and was thus forced into
promoting a larger-than-necessary thermal power plant development programme. A more
judicious mix of hydroelectric and thermal power plants would have yielded lower overall costs
but hydroelectric plants would have taken much longer to construct. To expedite the projects
even more, the government told the investors to build plants that used the more expensive single-
cycle turbines. The subsidised funding and other contractual concessions that the government
was compelled to offer given the critical state of power generation added even more to the cost
of power supplied.
Furthermore, in insisting that the investment in new power generation had to come from
the private sector, the Cardoso administration was forced to deny that the threat of power deficits
was both real and serious. The administration could hardly afford to admit that there was already
an elevated risk of rationing and at the same time refuse to allow state-owned GENCOS to
increase their investments. Consequently, Brazil failed to implement less drastic and cheaper
energy conservation measures earlier on.
The administration also did not create any contingency plans to avoid power shortages
even as evidence mounted that the privatisation of GENCOS and IPP investment was not going
according to plan. In 1999, the administration failed to privatise the GENCOS because they had
underestimated the complexity of preparing the firms for privatisation. In Furnas' case, for
example, the firm's liabilities towards its workers' pension funds stalled privatisation until the
government agreed to have BNDES absorb the liabilities. Despite repeated setbacks, Rudolfo
Tourinho, the Minister of Mines of Energy, repeatedly pronounced that all three remaining
GENCOS would be privatised in 2000. The Minister also declared, even as investors complained
about the high natural gas prices, that the administration's thermal power programme was "a
reality" and that it would "not be affected under any hypothesis and will not suffer any type of
interruption." While it may be argued that it was only political bravura compelling the minister
and senior administration officials to make such confident pronouncements, it is also undeniable
that behind the scenes the administration did nothing to prevent the looming energy crisis, which
had been evident since 1996 (see Chart 7) and had only been postponed because the pluvial
conditions were unusually favourable in 1997 and 1998. The truth, which was evident to all
sector professionals, was that Brazil was depleting its hydropower reservoirs faster than nature
could replenish them.
It was at this point that the tension between means and ends was the starkest. Given that
the generation companies had improved their financial health over the previous several years,
they were now in a position to significantly increase investments in the short term through both
debt and equity financing. Furthermore, Brazil's state development bank, BNDES, was also in a
position to apply a substantial chunk of its portfolio to power investments. The choice that the
administration faced at this point was whether to continue pursuing a very uncertain programme
of private investment in electric power or proceed on a more predictable and manageable path of
increasing state investments to see the crisis through and then re-starting the privatisation
initiative. Given the nature of the emergency that was evident at the time, the latter path would
have been the more prudent choice. The administration, however, chose the former strategy and
continued to restrict the Eletrobras companies' investment.
Subsequent policy decisions revealed the extent of the administration's bias against public
investment. To facilitate private investment, the administration transferred most of the
commercial and financial risks to the public institutions. The administration did make available
increasing amounts of finance for the sector via BNDES, but all of these loans were extended to
only the private sector. When it became obvious PPT would not take off, the administration
pressured Petrobras to sign on with private investors as a strategic partner. It then required
Eletrobras to sign power purchase agreements with any of the PPT projects that might be
constructed. Petrobras was also required to assume the foreign exchange risk associated with the
purchase of natural gas for electric power plants. Thus, although the state did have the resources
to finance a massive electric power capacity augmentation programme-after all, 80% of the
finance for the 17 GW PPT was to come from BNDES-the administration refused to allow
state-owned GENCOS to invest directly increasing generation capacity.
5.2. Muddling through an Inaccurate Conceptualisation of the SOE Problem
Had the Brazilian power rationing been caused by the fact that the state had no available
resources and was therefore powerless to intervene, or by the fact that high quality technical staff
and advice were not available in the sector, or even by the fact that the administration was caught
unawares by the gravity of the supply situation, then the rationing would not have been
surprising from a policy perspective. However, what this paper has shown is that none of these
three conditions were satisfied. What, then, can explain the anomalous results of the Brazilian
power reforms experience? An answer is to be found in identifying and analysing the conceptual
frameworks within which the administration was operating.
In Brazil, as in other highly indebted countries, privatisation was constructed upon
orthodox economic rationalising. According to neo-liberal thinking, state profligacy had hobbled
economic growth by creating fiscal imbalances and causing monetary instability. With
privatisation, the neo-liberals argued, governments could use the proceeds to repay their debts,
which would then initiate a virtuous self-reinforcing cycle of lower interest rates, increased
investment and economic growth. Shedding perennially loss-making state enterprises would
further ease pressure on state finances and possibly even free up resources for other, more
pressing, social, educational and health projects. For the neo-liberals the withdrawal of the state
from the productive sphere had to be as extensive as possible and, arguing that privatised firms
would be more efficient, they exhorted governments to sell even profitable industries and
enterprises.
Neo-liberal thinking thus promoted a symbolic generalisation of state ownership as
inefficient and ultimately harmful to the domestic economy. It was symbolic in that it relied
mostly on a stylised model of the ills of the public sector and was motivated by the desire to
promote a specific reform strategy. Efficiency is almost always an issue upon which state
ownership is faulted and the case of the Brazilian electric power industry was no different.
Privatisation advocates blamed state ownership in general and the guaranteed remuneration
clauses of the 1934 Water Code for promoting inefficiency in the entire spectrum of the industry
(see, for example, Pires, et. al 2001). The Collor and Cardoso administrations championed the
privatisation of Brazil's electric power industry-and other state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as
well-with similar claims. Both claimed that Brazil's state entrepreneur model was exhausted
because SOEs were inefficient and were responsible for Brazil's huge debt problem and both
revealed their commitment to the idea of private infrastructure ownership.
But, was the symbolic generalisation accurate? Amongst the various state-owned power
firms in Brazil there is a wide variation in efficiency. The federal GENCO Furnas along with the
state government owned vertically integrated firms Copel and Cemig were widely believed to be
amongst the technological leaders in hydropower development and to be efficiently managed.
Indeed, even after many power firms were privatised, state-owned firms such as Copel continued
to be ranked amongst the best Brazilian and Latin American power firms. State government
owned DISCOS were generally considered much less efficient, but even amongst these some
such as Santa Catarina's Celesc were certainly not grossly inefficient. As far as the criticism
against the 1934 Water Code is concerned, various forms of rate of return regulation, such as
cost-plus or guaranteed remuneration, were until very recently standard practice globally and, in
fact, had been adopted in Brazil when the electric power industry was almost completely
privately-owned. Since such regulation was not a symptom of government ownership, any
inefficiency resulting from the guaranteed remuneration clauses of the Water Code had less to do
with government ownership than it did with the limitations of monopoly regulation.
A problem much more critical than the real or perceived operational inefficiency of
Brazilian state-owned power companies was that these firms, because of their heavy debt loads,
were forced to commit a large proportion of their revenues to debt service and were thereby
severely handicapped in making new and required investments. Analysts tend to blame state
ownership for this heavy debt load. There is some anecdotal evidence to suggest that this was the
case. Some Brazilian power firms were certainly not very efficient and there is evidence to
suggest that some generation projects, most notably the massive Itaipu Dam that Brazil
constructed on its border with Paraguay and the Porto Primavera hydroelectric project initiated
by Sio Paulo's CESP may not have been economically justified when they were initiated.
This does indicate that state ownership was certainly problematic but a closer
investigation of government policy in the power sector reveals that the case against government
ownership of power firms in Brazil is much more nuanced. Internal management problems were
not at the root of the crisis that the power industry found itself in during the late 1980s and early
1990s. The primary culprit instead was the electricity rate control imposed by the federal
government from the 1980s onwards that prevented power firms from making an adequate return
on their investment: In 1974, retained earnings financed almost half of the total electricity
investments and direct government transfers another fifth. Foreign loans financed only 13% of
the investments. Between 1974 and 1986, however, real electricity rates fell by almost a third
and in the early 1990s fell by another third. As a result, foreign loans began to finance over half
of the power investments, whereas retained earnings financed less than a fifth.
Would private ownership of electric power assets have forced government into following
a different strategy? Examining the history of the Brazilian electric power industry reveals that
the government, in fact, followed similar policies of rate controls even when the power firms
were privately owned (Tendler 1968). Indeed, the common complaint of infrastructure investors
in Brazil, and often elsewhere in Latin America, was that the government did not allow rates
sufficient to cover capital and operational costs. Public ownership was therefore only
incidentally related to the government's decision to not allow electricity rates to keep pace with
inflation.
The tendency to conflate state ownership with government policy is a common problem
in analysing SOE performance. If SOEs are unprofitable and debt-ridden, it is often because
governments, for various economic and social reasons, consciously choose a policy of
unremunerative prices for the sector in which these firms operate and not because the firms are
owned by the state. If there is a correlation between unremunerative rates and government
ownership it is because private investors tend to sell their assets when rates of return on assets
fall below a certain threshold and the industry automatically comes to be dominated by the state.
Indeed, facing similar rate controls as other SOEs, the two major private electric power operators
in Brazil had preferred to sell out to the federal government. In 1963 Amforp sold its assets in
Brazil for US$ 135 million just before the military government passed through a series of rate
increases, the first in about 30 years. The other remaining investor, the Light group, sold its
interests to Eletrobras in 1979 after the Brazilian federal government again began limiting rate
adjustments and would not allow compensation for earnings eroded by inflation
State-ownership is thus more a symptom of underlying policy failures at the
macroeconomic level than a cause in itself for the problems confronting the Brazilian electric
power industry. Brazilian state-owned electric power companies became mired in excessive debt
not because their management made strategic mistakes nor because they treated capital
investments cavalierly but because the federal government did not allow them to adjust their
rates even to keep pace with inflation, a policy that was very similar to the one forced on to the
firms when they were in private hands.
In reality, the Brazilian public sector power firms, far from being the cause of the
government's fiscal problems, initially contributed to ameliorating immediate fiscal and balance
of payments pressures. Before the economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s, Brazilian electric
power companies-and SOEs in general-were largely self-financing through their rates and
through taxes earmarked for the industry (see Table 8). While the credit crunch began to affect
Brazil government borrowing, past reputation and efficiency ensured that Brazilian state owned
power companies continued to enjoy easier access to foreign finance and it was these firms that
ended up bringing in the foreign exchange to finance the government's balance of payments
deficits and rolling over the debt. Even so, of the public sector borrowing requiremet (PSBR) of
3.7% of GDP in 1986-91, over 60% (2.3% of GDP) was accounted for by federal and state
government spending and only 1.4% by SOEs. This was very different when we compare it to,
for example, Argentina where the SOEs alone were responsible for a PSBR that amounted 3.3%
of GDP (ECLA 1988).
Nevertheless, the standard neoliberal claims about inefficient SOEs resonated strongly in
Brazil as similar views were widely held with respect to most of Latin America in both the
popular and the academic presses. Consequently, it was assumed that state ownership caused
uneconomic pricing and that privatisation was necessary to solve the problem of appropriate
pricing for infrastructure services. Policy entrepreneurs often presented privatisation as a
preferred solution to the problem of insufficient prices charged by SOEs. They have argued that
political exigencies are often too strong for politicians to resist calls for populist pricing of public
services or, once implemented, to repeal populist pricing. They have recommend privatisation
precisely because it serves to deflect this political pressure. Their conceptualisation is consistent
with a diagnosis that state-ownership is the root cause of distorting pricing policies forced by
politicians.
In the general case, while pricing reform has, in fact, accompanied privatisation
initiatives, such reforms have usually preceded privatisation. The motivation to privatise leads to
rate reform basically because investors are unlikely to bid for assets while rate controls are still
in effect. Indeed, most analysts have often advised that pricing reform be conducted before
privatisation so as not to expose the private investors to political protests. Privatisation as a
political cover for pricing reform thus appears to be theoretically attractive but is, in reality, an
exception to established practice.
In any case, unlike other developing countries, Brazil's electricity structure was not
populist. Instead, residential power prices provided part of the subsidy for industrial power.
Brazilian policymakers had kept industrial prices low to promote industrial development and,
more importantly, to control inflation. Therefore, privatisation would not facilitate price reform
by, as is commonly argued, insulating government from populist pressures to keep electricity
prices low.
On the contrary, liberalising electric power prices-a pre-requisite for privatisation-
would once again threaten to push inflation, the control of which was the centrepiece of various
economic stabilisation efforts. In the meantime, the Brazilian economy and industry, especially
the electro-intensive firms, had become used to low electricity prices. Given the rate controls
practised during the period leading up to the reforms, electricity prices would rise regardless of
whether the sector was privatised or not. After privatisation, however, investors would be much
more sensitive to any future efforts of the government to moderate electricity prices and might
well delay their investment until the government provided them with credible guarantees.
Thus the symbolic generalisation, while popular, was inaccurate and it contaminated the
analytic framework that was being developed to reform the Brazilian electric power industry.
Reforming the Brazilian electric power industry was predicated on rate reform and while
privatisation was a strong motive it was not a prerequisite for reforming electricity rates. The real
reforms were required at the policy level which affected both private and public firms because
without such reforms even privatisation would fail. But, the conceptual framework upon which
the administration's reform strategy was based assumed that the financial disequilibrium in the
electric power industry was caused by problems internal to the management of the firms. The
administration was, in effect, claiming that even though electricity rates had been rationalised,
state-owned electric power firms still could not operate efficiently.
This incorrect conceptualisation of the problems with Brazilian electric power set into
motion a series of strategic miscalculations. First, it led to strong causal reasoning within the
administration and reinforced greatly the assumption that if the problem was state ownership, the
only logical solution was privatisation. Consequently, in the administration's mindset, if
privatisation were successful, other concerns would automatically resolve themselves. This faith-
based approach to privatisation resulted in policy decisions geared towards immediate concerns
about privatising rather than any comprehensive sectoral investment strategy. Having, however,
misjudged and ignored the complexities of transforming the state-owned and centralised
electricity industry into a private and competitive one, the administration only outlined some
general policy principles calling for a competitive electric power sector but did not create a
strategic vision for the future of the industry nor a detailed transition plan. The lack of a
transition plan facilitated muddling because there were no checklists, other than privatisation,
against which the administration could judge progress.
Those that did not share the administration's conceptualisation of the power sector's
problems were, naturally, marginalised. These included those amongst the most experienced of
Brazil's electric power sector professionals. The administration saw this as inevitable because it
operated under the assumption that the power sector professionals themselves would have too
many preconceptions and divergent opinions on electric power industry restructuring and too
many vested interests to be relied upon to enable a smooth transition. In the administration's
view, many of the senior power sector professionals were "corporatist" in the sense that they
prioritised the institutional welfare of their organisations, such as Eletrobras or Furnas, over the
general public good.
To overcome the opposition of the power sector professionals, many of whom openly
expressed that privatisation and liberalisation as it was being conceived would seriously impact
on the security of power supply in the country, Brazil's Secretary of Energy, Peter Greiner,
contracted the UK office of Coopers & Lybrand to prepare an industry restructuring study in
collaboration with these public sector power professionals. It took over a year for the study to be
completed and the consultants presented the final report to MME in August 1997. The study was
generally criticised for drawing too many of its conclusions from the British electricity industry,
which is mainly thermal, rather than from the Brazilian electric power sector, which is
overwhelmingly hydro-based. Even Cardoso later commented.that the report was not particularly
good or useful. However, even the prescient warnings that the report presented on the need for
cautious transition planning and the importance of not delaying generation investment were
ignored during the electric power privatisation process. The C&L report clearly stated that, "The
demand for energy in Brazil will continue to increase rapidly and the country does not have any
excess capacity. Imminent reforms will introduce uncertainties and tend to delay decisions.
Brazil cannot risk interruptions in its energy investments." But, the government's faith was
placed in privatisation as a self-driving and self-regulating process.
The effective isolation of many of the sector's most experienced professionals from the
policymaking process contributed to the policy confusion and mistakes. Informational flows
were compromised because, unfamiliar with how the Brazilian electricity system really worked,
policymakers were forced to base their decisions on general principles borrowed from the
workings of other foreign power systems. Warning signs were not heeded because their
relevance was not comprehended. Consequently, despite having access to financial resources and
despite the presence of a skilled technical capability in Brazil, the country suffered rationing.
5.3. Tenacity of Belief and the Muddling of Means and Ends
Traditional analyses of policymaking tend to follow a means-end continuum where
policymakers observe an initial and unsatisfactory state of affairs (the problem) upon which they
apply their chosen strategy (the means) in order to get to a final desirable state (the end). The
choice of the means is one of the principal tasks of the policymakers and is conditioned strongly
by how they define the problem and the intellectual approach that they bring to it. In any
complex policy programme, the means-end continuum cannot, of course, be a uniformly smooth
process that moves along a precise predefined schedule. Frequent changes in operational
strategies may be required and, sometimes, even a fundamental rethink of the chosen means.
During the implementation stages, changes in strategy can be forced by a variety of
factors. For example, opposition by affected groups may be stronger than was originally
envisaged. Or, the agencies charged with implementation may consciously or unconsciously
subvert the policy. Policy changes may also be driven by changes in the economic environment
in which they were originally conceived.
This last kind of policy change is what this paper has investigated. In such cases, policies
when they were originally selected had a basis in the economic environment that existed and that
which was expected. Changes in this environment can cause obsolescence in the policy. As the
environment changes, policies become subject to diminishing returns up to a point where further
pursuit of the policy leads to more harm than good. At this point and beyond, fundamental
rethinks of the policy are called for.
Rethinks of strategies or means may be a normal part of the policymaking process but
they are usually ignored by the traditional linear models of the policymaking process which
assume that policy implementation follows from and closely adheres to the policy decision. How
easy it is to perform a rethink is related to how closely linked the means are to the policymakers'
operating paradigms. For example, writing about the reversals of privatisation, Vernon (1984)
coined the term "obsolescing bargain". He proposed that developing country governments were
naturally averse to foreign ownership and would tolerate it only to the extent that the benefits-
infusion of capital, new technologies, better management practices, etc.-offset the disadvantage
of foreign ownership. Over time, however, as these technologies and management practices
become internalised and the foreign capital becomes less necessary, the bargain that foreign
investors have with governments becomes obsolete and the latter become tempted to re-
nationalise. Vernon's conceptualisation proved popular with privatisation scholars because it
helped explain the cycles of privatisation and nationalisation. In Vernon's example, privatisation
went contrary to the policymakers' operating paradigms and, therefore, was subject to easy
reversal. Policymakers were always on the lookout for the turning or tipping points when the
costs of privatisation outweighed their benefits.
An intriguing observation stemming from Brazil's power privatisation experience is that
if a chosen means is compatible to the policymakers' operating paradigms, then it may, in fact,
blind the policymakers and they may refuse to recognise that their bargain (in our case with
private investment) has, in fact, obsolesced. Around 1998, the Cardoso administration's electric
power reforms strategy was showing signs of obsolescence. The currency crisis had reduced
investor interest in purchasing generation assets, a workable solution to creating a functional
electric power market that would not lead to a price explosion had yet to be found and both of
these problems had emboldened the political opposition to GENCO privatisation. Delay in
GENCO privatisation was unavoidable while at the same time the supply situation was steadily
deteriorating. A quicker and more efficient solution under these circumstances would have been
for the government to reassume an immediate state-led investment programme and hope to re-
commence privatisation after the power crisis was defused. Yet the administration repeatedly
rejected these options, labelling those that suggested it as "corporatist" interests, and continued
pushing for a bargain that had, for most other observers, already obsolesced.
When policymakers are unable to respond to situations that demand more fundamental
rethinks, we can say that they are displaying a tenacity of belief.'9 The expression of the tenacity
of belief through inflexibility in dealing with emerging problems reveals not only the
policymakers' underlying assumption and motivations but also how strongly these are held. In
the Brazilian electric power reforms case described in this paper the principal policymakers
identified the problem as a lack of investment caused by state ownership, the means as
privatisation and the end as obtaining sufficient investment for the industry via the private sector.
The causal reasoning-state ownership leads to inefficient management and abusive pricing
policies (abusive from the point of view of the capital invested)-and the symbolic
generalisation about it reinforced by the national experience of the crisis years served to create a
tenacious belief that privatisation was a unique, necessary, and perhaps sufficient strategy to
conduct and conclude the power sector reforms.
Clearly then, the Brazilian reformers held a strong belief in the underlying theory of
privatisation. While there were ideas about implementation that were open to further analysis and
bargaining, the fundamental proposition about pushing privatisation was not. Kuhn's (1962)
treatise on scientific revolutions helps explain why the administration might have ignored
alternative solutions to the power investment problem. According to Kuhn, once paradigms are
accepted, those who share them generally accept without question particular sets of problem-
solutions. Solutions sets outside the paradigmatic framework are not acceptable and anomalies, if
and when they do crop up, are usually discarded or ignored (Kuhn, 1962). The paradigm under
which the Cardoso administration was functioning was, therefore, not open to -questioning. The
strength of this paradigm, even after the apparent obsolescence of the policies that derived from
it, originates in the global dominance of the neo-liberal paradigm which I discussed in section II.
It was reinforced by tendencies towards institutional isomorphism wherein any alternative to
privatisation was not viewed as legitimate by the dominant policy community. These factors
subverted the original ends of the privatisation programme by blinding the administration's
ability to see turning points as well as alternative strategies as viable. If the means remains the
only legitimate mechanism for arriving at the desired end, then automatically progress with the
means is considered sufficient to measure progress towards the end. It is then, only a short step
to muddling the means with the ends.
6. Conclusions and Implications
Policy fiascos are notoriously difficult to analyse, much less to conceptualise in general terms.
The more complex the policy programme being investigated, the harder it is perform such
analyses. Furthermore, it is difficult to say with any degree of certainty whether a policy fiasco
has resulted from a flawed policy or from a flawed implementation, or both. This paper has only
partly sought to perform such an analysis for the Brazilian electric power reforms. In this case, it
would be impossible to deny that both formulation and implementation failures contributed to
19The concept of tenacity of belief was articulated by Charles Pearce in an article he wrote for Scientific American
in 1877. In a short but influential article that remains popular even a century later, Pearce argued that the act of
belief itself produces human satisfaction, even if the belief is false, and that there is a natural tendency to cling to
beliefs. As he articulated it:
Doubt is an uneasy and dissatisfied state from which we struggle to free ourselves and
pass into the state of belief; while the latter is a calm and satisfactory state which we do
not wish to avoid, or to change to a belief in anything else. On the contrary, we cling
tenaciously, not merely to believing, but to believing just what we do believe.
the failure of the reforms. The narrative presented in section IV should have impressed upon the
reader how complex the privatisation process really was.
What this paper has concentrated on, however, was a different question. Why was the
government unable to avoid power rationing given the resources that were available to it? In
order to answer this question, the paper has investigated the policy environment within which the
reformers operated: section II of the paper described how neo-liberal ideas became hegemonic
and coloured strongly the global policy process during the 1980s and 1990s; section III analysed
how these global policy trends were translated into the Brazilian economic programme of the
1990s while section IV extended this analysis into the power sector; then, section V brought it all
together by explaining how and why means and ends got muddled in the Brazilian electric power
reforms.
This article differs from other privatisation analyses in that it does not accept that
privatisation in Brazil was driven primarily by pragmatism or by external pressures. Rather it
shows that the Brazilian power privatisation programme was driven by dynamics internal to the
Cardoso administration. A pragmatic administration would have realised that the main problem
for electricity investment were the price controls established in the industry and that after these
controls were lifted private as well as public firms were able to make adequate returns on their
investment. They would have also realised that given the looming power shortages it would have
been cheaper and more efficient to employ state owned firms quickly to create the additional
generation capacity that was required. On the contrary, even after the Real's devaluation, when
privatisation no longer served a strategic purpose in the macroeconomic stabilisation plan, the
administration remained committed to selling the GENCOS. When the administration realised
that it would not be able to sell Furnas to strategic investors, it recommended instead selling
Furnas' stock to the general public. In the case of Chesf, to overcome regional politicians'
opposition to its privatisation, Cardoso promised to use the funds from Chesf's sale not to pay
down the debt but to fund a massive scheme for the transposition of the River Sao Francisco,
which was one of the Northeast politicians' pet projects. To help push through Eletronorte's
privatisation, the administration again committed to using proceeds from the sale not to pay
down the national debt but to invest it in expanding the north's electric power infrastructure.
None of these efforts, however, paid off.
Despite the failures with electric power reform and the general economic chaos during
his second term, Cardoso deserves credit for pushing through some fundamental reforms. His
championing of fiscal discipline had a beneficial long-term effect in providing economic
resilience even though his administration itself was not able to achieve fiscal discipline to the
extent that it was required. Cardoso also established independent regulatory agencies which,
although not perfect, are fundamental to creating institutional stability for future investments in
infrastructure. Finally, the reform of the state-owned enterprises, even though that was done to
prepare them for privatisation, has put them in good stead for the future.
On power reforms the Cardoso administration was confident, but wrong, about many
aspects of the Brazilian electric power system. In believing that privatisation was both necessary
and sufficient to resolve the electricity sector's troubles, the administration made the reforms
process itself more vulnerable to planning and transitional errors and oversight. Indeed, a
sequential view of the privatisation process reveals that the reforms often cannibalised
themselves. Being absorbed by its preoccupation with privatisation and because of its abiding
faith in the strategy itself, the government overlooked its flawed assumptions about the ease of
electric power privatisation and the ability of privatisation to singly solve the investment
problem. While the government's reform programme kept faltering, the single minded pursuit of
privatisation, even to the paradoxical extent of using government resources to finance the private
sector, drove the country into the very situation that it was meant to avoid-a shortage of power.
The resulting economic and financial losses were enormous and the eventual cost to the
government, the private sector and the Brazilian economy in general was considerably more than
would have been incurred had the government taken a more interventionist approach.
The power of the idea can blind reformers to its shortcomings. In the Brazilian case that I
have analysed, the reformers, convinced that their chosen means was the one best way, viewed as
failure even the contemplation of strategies other than privatisation. Thereby, when the
programme began to stall, the reformers muddled progress towards the means with progress
towards the end and redoubled their efforts on the former even as they distanced themselves
from the latter. The danger of this sort of muddling is that other, more feasible, policy
alternatives are summarily rejected. Cardoso administration's intellectual and ideological
commitment, even in the face of rapidly obsolescing and failing strategies, drove the industry to
crisis and greatly prejudiced Brazil's short-term economic growth. In fact, this paper has
described a similar trend in fiscal and monetary policy where orthodox reform aimed at reducing
the deficit to eliminate inflation and high interest rates ended up dramatically increasing Brazil's
deficit and debt. Privatise at all costs thus ended up a very expensive proposition in Brazil.
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Table 2. External Debt 1968 - 2000 (US$ millions)
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Table 4. Annual Inflation Rates 1990 - 1999
Source: Banco Central do Brasil























































Table 5. Operational Deficits as a % of GDP
Source: Banco Central do Brasil
Primary Operational Debt Increase
under Real Plan
Total Federal Total Federal
1990 -- 2- 1.6- 1.6 2.81
1991 3.0 0.8 1.5 0.3 _1
1992 2.31 1.3 -2.2 -0.8 _r1993 2.61.4 0.3 0
1994 4.3 3.0 0.5 1.61
1995 0.3 0.6 -4.8 -1.6
196 -0.7 0.4 -3.9 -1.71 31.41
11997 0~ - 9 0.3 -4.3 ___ -1.8 134.5
19980 0.5 -8.4 -5.3 42.61
1999 3.77 4.15 11.4 8.0 J 51.01
Table 6. Public Enterprises Indebtedness (% GDP)
Source: Banco Central do Brasil
1 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Inernal 1 8.5 11.4 9.7 8.4 4.9 4.8 4.0 0.9 1.3 1.4
External 6.7 9.3 6.5 5.6 1.9 1.7 2.0 1.9 1.3 1.7
Total 152. 20.7 16.2 14.0 1 6.8 6.5 6.0 2.8 2.6 3.1
Table 7. BNDES Participation in Electric Power Investments (R$ million)
Source: BNDES
Year Operations-Contracted Total Investmen BNDES Participation
'by BNDES
199$ 1148 1480 77.60%
1996 1003 3062 32.70%
1997 108 21 50.50%
1998 1065 1886 56.50%
1999 1337 3001 44.60%
2000- 1048 3766 27.80%
Total 5710 13408 42.60%
Table 8. Source of Power Investments (in %)
Source: Eletrobras
[nternal 34 44.9 24.2 17.9
Forced Loans 8.1 9.4 7.6 3.9
State Resources 31.9 20.3 6.1 6
Domestic Loans 13 6.6 30.1 9.4
Foreign Loans 13 18.8 32 62.8



























Table 10. Privatisation Prices and Premiums Paid
Source: BNDES
for Brazilian DISCOS
Firm Value of Premium (%) % of Total Sales Winning







































































































































Table 11. Energy Consumption (1981-2000)
Source: Eletrobras
'growth Energy 'Change (% Installed Capacity (MW)
Consumption
(GWh)
-4.3: 118,482 2.6 34,2281
0.8 125,439 5.9 36,181
-2.9:_ 134,1801 7.0 37,1861
5.4:_ 149,092 11.1 _38,026
7.9 164,088 10.1 39,874
7.5 177,357 8.1 40,257
3.5 182,565 2.9 42,663
-0.1 192,738 5.6 44,4021
3.2 201,474 4.5 _47,870
-4.4 205,310 1.9 48,819
1.0 _214,429 4.4 _50,707
-0.5 218,425 1.9 51,698
4.9 - 227,121 4.0 -- 52,713
5.9 235,627 3.7 54,117
4.2 249,120 5.7 155,379
2.7 260,111 14.4 57,199
3.3 276,186 6.2 159,160
0.2 287,392 4.1 61,327
0.8 291,858 1.6 63,966
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Paper Two
THE RISK OF REFORM
Analysing the Effects of Privatisation on Costs of Capital and Prices in the Brazilian
Electric Power Industry
1. Introduction
In the 1990s, infrastructure privatisation was popular in Latin America. Reformers from within
governments and development assistance agencies from outside championed privatisation with
the claims that it would bring in the investment needed to expand infrastructure networks and the
efficiencies required to make it affordable. They also argued for privatisation on the grounds that
it would wean governments away from populist but not-remunerative prices for public services
and that it would reduce corruption. For their part, investors, from mostly the industrialised
countries, welcomed the opportunities that investor-friendly privatisation policies provided them
to expand beyond stagnant home markets.
A decade later, infrastructure privatisation is much less popular. Both customers and
investors are deeply dissatisfied, especially in capital intensive industries-electric power and
water & sanitation, for example-where the fundamental technologies and industry structures
have not changed substantially. On the one hand, consumers are complaining about high prices.
In Brazil, as a first step towards privatisation the Franco administration passed a law in 1993
lifting the strict controls on electric power rates; in Buenos Aires, the Menem administration
raised water charges by 25% in February 1991 and a further 29% in April of the same year,
before auctioning a 30-year concession to private investors in 1993; and even in England, the
government increased regulated power prices by 25% for residential customers and by 19% for
industrial customers between 1989 and 1991 in what analysts believe was a bid to make the
system more attractive for privatisation. These increases were justified by stating that they were
necessary to provide a minimally remunerative rate of return to investors. On the other hand,
investors are now complaining about insufficient returns. Rate increases after the initial increases
have not been as generous to the private investors. Indeed, while privatisation had initially forced
policymakers across Latin America to increase the charges for infrastructure services, investors
are now complaining that these rates are no longer sufficient and that regulators are not passing
through what they-the investors-would consider adequate rate increases.
One explanation for both consumers and investors are simultaneously dissatisfied with
infrastructure privatisation that has been overlooked in most analyses is the impact that the
reforms might have had on the costs of capital employed in these industries. Privatisation
fundamentally changes the magnitudes and the distribution of the risks involved in infrastructure
investment, particularly policy and regulatory risks. Infrastructure industries are particularly
vulnerable to such shifts in the risk profile because they are typically capital-intensive ventures
with long asset lives. If sectorial reforms do, in fact, increase the exposure of investors to policy,
regulatory and market risks, thereby increasing the cost of the capital employed, and if such
increases in the costs of capital are not compensated for by sufficiently large price and/or
efficiency increases then investors may still feel under-compensated even if prices and/or
efficiencies are rising. With capital costs constituting a large part of total costs, risk, as it
translates into the cost of capital, thus assumes a pivotal role in determining investor behaviour
and the pricing of infrastructure services.
Privatisation proponents dispute that it increases the costs of capital and argue that in any
case privatisation and liberalisation spur efficiency gains that offset the higher cost of private
capital. The cost of capital of a project, they claim, is a function of its risk profile and changing
ownership does little to change that profile. They admit that costs of capital could be lower in the
public sector if it were more adept at managing project risks, but they claim that this is not the
case.
In this paper, using the Brazilian electric power reforms as an empirical and illustrative
case, I discuss the opposing arguments about the relative cost of capital in the public and
private sectors. The two principal empirical questions that this paper addresses are (1) whether
privatisation raised the cost of capital employed in the Brazilian electric power industry and if it
did (2) whether the efficiency gains realised through privatisation and liberalisation were
sufficient to compensate for the increased capital costs. The theoretical problem that I tackle is
whether private capital is really more expensive than public capital.
To address these issues, the paper presents two hypotheses: First, that if the costs of
capital are large relative to operating costs then, unless efficiency gains are also very large,
privatisation will lead to an increase in prices. Second, that the potential efficiency gains in the
Brazilian power generation sector were low because of the dominance of hydropower in the
energy matrix and because the state-owned generation firms were not that inefficient to begin
with. To confirm these hypotheses, the paper presents data on post-privatisation efficiency gains
in the Brazilian electric power industry and compares the costs of capital for public and private
sector firms. After confirming the hypotheses, the paper will show that in infrastructure
industries a positive relationship exists between the risks of privatisation as a reform strategy and
the level of capital required in an industry.
The paper presents the theoretical concepts underlying this paper by discussing of the
role of risk in determining the cost of capital and comparing public and private costs of capital.
Empirical evidence related to post-privatisation costs of capital and efficiencies are presented in
section III while section IV analyses and explains the root causes behind the shifts in the risk
profiles of electric power investment in Brazil. Section V presents the core theoretical
proposition of this paper-why public capital, in certain industries, may be cheaper than private
20The Brazilian electricity reforms explicitly illustrate the issues under consideration in this paper. Because of its
economic weight in the region, what happens in Brazil is in itself important but what makes the Brazilian electric
power reform case particularly useful is precisely the peculiarity of its electric power system, especially in terms of
industry structure, which magnifies certain impacts that may otherwise be lost within the general noise
accompanying policy research. For example, the dominance of hydropower in Brazil's electricity matrix emphasises
the impacts of changes in the cost of capital because capital constitutes a much larger percentage of total cost in
hydropower than it does in an electric power system dominated by, say, gas-driven thermal power plants. In
addition, the fact that Brazil's hydropower system allows it to meet full demand for several years in a row even in
the face of under-investment but then leads to a massive risk of under-supply accentuates the pitfalls of incorrect
policy trends, precisely because it makes mid-course policy corrections unlikely. As the impacts of policy decisions
are starker, they become easier to identify and study. The Brazilian case with its hydro-dominance is therefore not,
as some scholars would argue, idiosyncratic but rather is one in which certain forces common to all infrastructure
industries are amplified.
capital. Section VI evaluates the potential impacts of the Brazilian electric power reforms on
prices and investment in the sector while section VII concludes with some recommendations for
public policy.
2. The Role of Risk
2.1. Conceptual Background
It was Frank Knight who first suggested that profits and entrepreneurship were linked to
risk and uncertainty and, indeed, formed the basis of the free enterprise system. Following
Knight's proposal in his 1921 treatise on Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, other economists (Hicks
1931; Keynes 1936; Kakecki 1937; Makower & Marschak 1938; Stigler 1939; Tintner 1941;
Hart 1942) also began to include risk and uncertainty into their analyses of investment decisions,
financing, the size and structure of firms, etc. Later economists (Freidman & Savage 1948;
Markowitz 1952; Arrow 1965; Rothschild & Stiglitz 1970, 1971; Diamond & Stiglitz 1974) built
upon and formalised these ideas consistently throughout the 2 0 th century. In 1944, von Neumann
& Morgenstern introduced expected utility rules as the foundation for studying decision-making
under risk, while Savage (1954) innovated with subjective (not mathematically expressed)
probabilities in the place of objective (mathematically expressed) probabilities.
Risk, defined in layman terms, is the probability that the outcome of a venture differs
from that which is desired. In economic terms, risk determines the opportunity cost of the capital.
Projects that are more risky require higher payoffs and for an investment to be viable, its
expected rate of return must be at least equal to the cost of capital adjustedfor risk. Venture
capital, for example, demands a high payoff to compensate for the high probability that the
investment will yield little or no return. Treasury bonds of industrialised countries, on the other
hand, receive low returns reflecting the very low probability that the investor will not be repaid.
Consequently, risk can be treated as just another cost of doing business-like interest, wages, or
rent-for which an investor would require remuneration.
Given their centrality to investment decisions, it is indeed surprising that analyses of risk
and uncertainty have not figured more prominently in the study of infrastructure privatisation in
developing countries. The privatisation literature is, instead, focussed overwhelmingly on
efficiency issues, from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. On the theoretical side
agency (Alchian & Demsetz 1972; Niskanen 1971), property rights (Alchian 1965; Demsetz
1967), and public choice literatures (Buchanan & Tullock 1962) have been marshalled to
discredit government ownership as inefficient and wasteful. On the empirical side there is
substantial confirmation of the theoretical predictions. Megginson & Netter's (1999)
comprehensive survey of privatisation cites numerous empirical works which indicate that
private and privatised firms outperform their state-owned counterparts and that privatisation
generally leads to improvements in operational efficiencies. Other surveys have reached similar
conclusions.2 Indeed, the steady supply of empirical cases provided by the privatisation
21 For other summaries of privatisation studies, see Tittenbrun (1996) and Villalonga (2000). Some contradictory
evidence challenging the operational superiority of private over public firms does exist. For example, Kay &
Thompson (1986) and Wortzel & Wortzel (1989) suggest that privatisation does not improve economic efficiency.
An earlier study comparing the performance of private and public electric power companies showed that the
government owned power companies in the United States were actually more efficient than their private
movement has kept scholars busy in comparing pre- and post-privatisation efficiencies to the
neglect of other effects of ownership and regulatory changes.
In comparison to the voluminous literature on the efficiency effects of privatisation, its
effects on risk and on the cost of capital have not generated a lot of polemic. Privatisation,
intrinsically, shifts risks between the public and private sectors. The critical question-from the
economic and policy reforms perspectives-is whether privatisation creates or eliminates risk or
whether the aggregate risk remains constant and it is only the various component parts that are
shifted between the public and private sectors. This obviously has major implications for the
behaviour of prices during privatisation processes. If privatisation increases aggregate risks, it
will result in a higher discount rate and tend to induce higher prices and vice-versa. If
privatisation transfers risk, then the amounts and types of risk transferred and the relative costs of
risk bearing between the public and private sectors will determine the impacts on prices and
investment.
The theoretical literature on the issue is sparse, with the notable exception of some work
performed over three decades ago, such as Hirshleifer (1965) and Arrow & Lind (1970), which
compared and disagreed on public and private sector costs of capital. Arrow & Lind's article in
the American Economic Review argued that governments enjoy lower costs of capital because
they are able to neutralise risk by spreading it among a large population. While it was generally
accepted and empirically verifiable that governments could obtain debt at a cheaper rate than
could private firms and therefore could invest at lower discount rates, privatisation advocates,
especially the monetarists, strongly objected to government investment on the claim that it was
inflationary. They did not, however, dispute the claim that government finance costs are lower.
The debate was reopened recently when a 1997 issue of the Oxford Review of Economic
Policy was dedicated to comparing private versus public costs of capital and its implications for
public investment. Several articles in that issue (Brealey, Cooper & Habib 1997; Klein 1997;
Grout 1997) took issue with Arrow & Lind's assertions. The orthodox pro-privatisation view
argued in them is that the public-sector's advantage in raising cheaper capital is illusionary and
stems from that fact that it does not remunerate taxpayers who are effectively providing it with
credit insurance. These articles, and others, have also claimed that in any case, the cheaper credit
available to governments is often offset by their inefficiencies and recommended that public and
private projects should be evaluated at the same discount rates and that governments should
redirect investment to the private sector by focusing on macroeconomic stability, deregulation
and liberalisation.
While this advice has not yet been extensively operationalised, institutional efforts to
promote it are strong. This policy advice goes counter to established infrastructure finance
practices and, if adopted, would indicate not just a deeper commitment to privatisation but also
fundamentally changing the way public finance works. Is this theoretically justified? To answer
this question one really needs to understand better not just the risks involved in infrastructure
development but also how to conceptualise them theoretically.
counterparts (Faere, et. al. 1985). However, such examples are rare and have not successfully challenged the
popular notion that privatisation leads to increased efficiencies.
2.2. Is Public Capital really Cheaper than Private Capital?
Finance theory defines the risk of an investment as the correlation between the expected
returns of an investment and the expected returns on the overall market portfolio (generally
known as the P of an investment or asset). Analysts commonly use techniques such as the capital
assets pricing model (CAPM) to determine expected returns, R, on an investment or asset, which
is calculated as: R = Rf + /(expected portfolio return - Rf), where Rf is the risk-free rate.
What approaches such as CAPM assert is that the real cost of capital for a particular
project is a function of a project's risks and not the source of its financing. This is an important
distinction between borrowing and investing which emphasises that the cost of debt relates only
to the debtors' repayment abilities and not at all to the risk profile of the project for which the
debt is being incurred. Thus, while governments need pay only the risk-free interest rates on the
funds that they borrow, when that amount is invested in a project there is still an additional cost
represented by the project risk, (which depends upon the project's design and which needs to be
accounted for). Accordingly, pro-privatisation economists argue that both public and private
projects should use discount rates based on the co-variance of project returns with those of
investments on the market and consequently, that the opportunity cost of capital is the same for a
particular project regardless of whether it is undertaken by the public or the private sector. It
follows from this reasoning that in practical terms the difference between public and private
investment is that the latter explicitly builds the price of the project's risk into the cost of capital
whereas the former masks it.
Arrow & Lind (1970) explain how, in fact, the public-sector masks the effect of risk in a
project as it goes about financing it. They start with the assumption that "individuals are not
indifferent to uncertainty and will not, in general, value assts with uncertain returns at their
expected values." As an extremely simplified example, we can imagine that individuals who are
naturally risk-averse would, if given the choice, prefer to receive a guaranteed $1,000 rather than
gamble on a coin toss to win $3,000 even though the latter option has a higher expected value
(.50 x $3,000 = $1,500). Thus, they conclude that "investors do not choose investments to
maximise the present value of expected returns, but to maximise the present value of returns
properly adjustedfor risk." In general terms, therefore, for individuals the expected value of net
benefits overstates willingness to pay by an amount equal to the cost of risk-bearing.
Given risk-averseness in individuals, Arrow & Lind ask "whether it is appropriate to
discount public investments in the same way as private investments," and conclude that
governments should, in fact, ignore uncertainty and behave as if indifferent to risk. They argue
that a public investment is one in which each individual taxpayer has a very small share because
governments have the unique ability to distribute the risks of an investment among the
population of taxpayers as a whole. As the population becomes large, the individual cost of risk-
bearing tends towards zero because the share borne by each taxpayer becomes negligible
compared to his income and/or wealth. In this manner, by reducing each individual's financial
exposure as a taxpayer to essentially zero, governments are able to eliminate the cost of risk-
bearing so that the value of a public investment equals the expected value of that investment and
not the expected value of the investment adjusted for risk. These results hold, Arrow & Lind
show, even if the value of the investment and the costs of risk bearing are large in an absolute
sense as long as the population and national income are sufficiently much larger in comparison.
For public investments, therefore, Arrow & Lind conclude that the cost of capital is cheaper than
the cost of private capital by an amount equivalent to the cost of risk-bearing.
The counter-argument, anticipated by Arrow & Lind, is that the case of corporations
where the number of shareholders is large would mirror the public sector where the population of
taxpayers is large, i.e., in the former case also the total cost of risk-bearing for shareholders
would be essentially zero. In such an eventuality, managers acting in the best interests of the
shareholders should also ignore the cost of risk bearing while making investment decisions.
However, in the case of a private sector firm, Arrow & Lind argue that the principal shareholders
generally retain a large block of stock and for them this block represents a significant component
of their wealth. They cannot, therefore, behave in a risk-neutral manner. Additionally, Arrow &
Lind argue that the careers and income of managers are related to their firm's performance and,
consequently, they too cannot afford to be neutral to risk.
Arrow & Lind's risk-spreading argument is conceptually different from portfolio
diversification-an instrument available to private (and public) investors to reduce the volatility
of their returns by investing in ventures whose outcomes are low or negatively correlated.
Vickrey (1964) had argued that governments are able to diversify their portfolio and risks more
cheaply than private investors because they automatically pool a number of different projects
"without any cost of extra financial transactions." For Arrow & Lind it was essential for their
results to hold that the government's portfolio of projects be diversified since otherwise the total
costs of risk-bearing for all of the government's projects might well end up representing a not-
negligible portion of each individual taxpayer's income but the chief benefit of public investment
in their analysis arose from the ability to divide the cost of risk-bearing of each individual project
among an extremely large population and not from reducing the transactions costs of portfolio
diversification.
Klein (1997) is fairly representative of the several criticisms of Arrow & Lind's position.
His basic argument is that if taxpayers were remunerated for the risk that they assume in public
projects, then governments would not enjoy any capital cost advantage. He claims that
governments effectively coerce taxpayers into assuming a contingent liability and therefore the
apparent benefits of sovereign finance have no social value. In this manner Klein also explains
why governments are able to raise debt more cheaply than the private sector. The cost of debt
does not depend upon the project for which it is incurred but rather on the credibility of the
debtor to pay back the loan. Government debt is cheaper because if the project fails it can always
fall back on tax revenues to service the debt. In other words, taxpayers provide de facto credit
insurance for government borrowing but since governments do not reimburse taxpayers for this
credit insurance they enjoy a competitive advantage vis-a-vis the private sector. Klein goes on to
argue that instead of using their ability to raise cheaper debt to finance infrastructure projects,
governments should concentrate on making the typical and basic orthodox reforms-improving
macroeconomic stability and the policy environment for private projects, and deregulating and
liberalising the financial sector-in order to induce more private investment.
Grout (1997) takes a different approach to countering the claim that the public sector can
fund projects more cheaply than the private sector. He shows that consumers have identical
utilities whether a project is undertaken by the public or the private sector but his example rests
on the assumption that everyone in the economy is a shareholder in the private sector, which is
an assumption that appears untenable.
Another objection to the risk-spreading argument is the government portfolio is not, in
fact, sufficiently diversified. Many public projects are concentrated in a narrow range of
activities and are often large as well as markedly correlated with national income. The returns
from investment in infrastructure, for example, are highly correlated with national income (and
this correlation stands regardless of whether it is undertaken by the public or the private sector).
Consequently, there remains on balance an element of undiversified risk and so the entire
portfolio of government investment may well burden heavily the individual taxpayer.
This was the view that was, in fact, articulated by an Australian government task force on
private infrastructure that rejected the contention that the public cost of capital is cheaper than
22
the private cost (Economic Planning Advisory Commission 1995). The immediate policy
advice that follows is, of course, that risks should be discounted in the same way for the public as
for the private sector.23 Indeed, Hirshleifer (1966) had urged this position many decades ago
when he cautioned against the use of a lower rate of discount for the public sector. His chief
concern appeared to be that given a finite amount of capital available within an economy,
governments might choose to invest in projects which would be profitable only when returns are
evaluated at the government's low borrowing rate, thereby leading to the displacement of higher-
yield private investments by lower-yield public investments. He recommended that instead of
evaluating public investments differently from private ones, the government should borrow
cheaply and then subsidise the higher-expected-yield private investments.2 4
Criticisms of Arrow & Lind's propositions are accurate to the extent that even in the case
of public financing someone-i.e., the taxpayer-has to bear the project risk, which in absolute
terms is non-zero. However, Klein (1997) is not completely accurate in claiming that when
public investments are undertaken, it is at the expense of the taxpayers who are being coerced
into providing credit insurance and thus economically exploited. Since public sector projects are
generally undertaken for the public benefit and the lower costs of capital are usually passed on to
the public in the form of lower prices for public services such as electric power and water &
sanitation, it is hard to argue that public sector investment at lower costs of capital represents
coercion and exploitation. Indeed, the very definition of the populist politician would appear to
be the one who, in Klein's view, does the most coercion and exploitation. 25 Lower prices are, in
fact, the compensation taxpayers receive for guaranteeing the public debt and the privatisation
exercise can be conceptualised as an exercise in reducing public risk in exchange for paying
higher prices for public services.
One could argue that public ownership is an inefficient form of compensation for risks
borne by the taxpayer. Some taxpayers may end up bearing the risk for a service-a hospital or a
road in a different city for example-which they do not use. However, on an economy-wide
basis, this might well average out since governments generally construct hospitals, roads and the
22 The Task Force's report is quoted in Klein (1997). 1 have relied on the author's quote.
23 I ignore the taxation issue here. For readers interested in the issue, I recommend pages 21-22 in Brealey, Cooper
& Habib (1997) and page 269 in Hirshleifer (1966).
24Interestingly, this was exactly what the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES) did during the country's
electric power privatisation process when it extended subsidised credit to private power sector investors.
25 Empirical evidence would also counter the argument that the populist politician exploits the rich, since
infrastructure services in developing countries go mostly towards the privileged classes, while the poor are often
excluded from the networks and have to self-provide.
26like throughout the country. Moreover, for the purposes of this paper, which deals with the
electric power industry, it would not be a stretch to assume that the entire population does in fact
partake of the service.
So, the argument reverts to the question of efficiency. If the government has no real
advantage in raising cheaper capital and merely compensates citizens for their contingent
liabilities in the form of cheaper public utility prices then in real terms it is irrelevant whether it
is the public or the private sector that invests in infrastructure. Privatisation advocates would
then claim that if the cost of capital is the same for both sectors then society would gain through
privatisation since the private sector is more efficient than the public sector. Dissenters might
then rebut by claiming there is no a priori reason why privatisation would deliver efficiency
gains, that efficiency depends more on market structure than ownership (Vickers & Yarrow
1991), that public ownership pursues worthwhile goals other than profit maximisation, and that,
in fact, empirical evidence does exist that shows that after controlling for cost of capital and
other factors in some cases public companies have been more efficient than private ones (see, for
example, Faere, et. al. 1985). These objections are, however, overwhelmed by the numerous of
empirical studies that do judge in favour of private enterprise.
In the general case, therefore, the preponderance of evidence supports the pro-
privatisation view. Arrow & Lind's reasoning applies not just to infrastructure but to all
industries-industries that are monopolistic and those that are competitive, industries that deal
with public goods and industries that deal with purely private goods, industries that are
economically strategic and ones that are not. Their reasoning, however, cannot stand up to either
modern finance theory or empirical observation. In the vast majority of industries governments
could arguably apply cheaper sovereign finance, but their cost of capital would be lower not
because they are more efficient at dealing with and dissipating risk but because of what Klein
terms their coercive power over taxpayers. In competitive industries, like bicycles for example,
governments could try competing with the private sector to test out theories of ownership and
efficiency but we would be hard-pressed to find anyone seriously proffering that opinion.
Privatisation and private finance thus appears to be a robust policy recommendation on
theoretical grounds. Empirical observation of the Brazilian electric power reforms, however,
raises some doubts on this score.
3. Empirical Observations on Post-Privatisation Costs of Capital and Efficiency
The Brazilian electric power reforms lasted seven years, from 1993 to 2000. Privatisation began
in 1995 and virtually ground to a halt in late 1998. Direct observations on actual rates of return
during this period are both difficult and potentially misleading. In the general case, immediately
before privatisation prices may be increased substantially (as an incentive to potential
purchasers) but efficiency improvements may lag, large and immediate investments may be
necessary and some firms might make them while others might prefer to follow a "profits now
investment later" strategy, and there may also be a period of learning involved as new operators
take over the infrastructure. All of these factors may contribute to an incorrect interpretation of
the data on costs, efficiency and returns. In the specific case of Brazil, analysing rates of return
are complicated by additional factors. Most prominent of these additional factors was the
26In making this claim, I reluctantly but perforce assume away the very real problem of unbalanced infrastructure
service provision that has been empirically identified in many, especially developing, countries.
devaluation in the beginning of 1999 during which the Brazilian currency lost 40 % of its value.
Electricity rates, which were denominated in the local currency (as expressly required by the
Concessions Law), remained stable while concessionaires' costs, especially their debt service
payments which were linked to hard currencies, shot up. As such, profitability and rates of return
plummeted even though the operational results in terms of the local currency remained strong.
Given the brief period under consideration, the unavailability of critical data and the as-
yet-incomplete and anything-but-smooth transition from state owned to privatised, it would be
misleading to attempt performing a statistical exploration of rates of return, costs of capital or
efficiencies. However, the available quantitative data supplemented with qualitative data does
provide an indication of certain trends in the cost of capital and efficiency in post-privatisation
Brazilian electric power. I present this limited evidence below and use it not as proof of my
subsequent theoretical arguments but rather as an illustration of the issues involved.
3.1. Cost of Capital
Electric power reforms and privatisation tended to push up the required rates of return in
the Brazilian electric power industry. Before 1993, electric power investments were governed by
the 1934 Water Code which limited rates of return to a minimum of 10 % and a maximum of 12
%. The 1993 Tariff Disequalisation Law did away with specific controls on rates of return,
freeing electric power companies to establish rates that reflected both the cost of generation and
an (undefined) "adequate" rate of return on capital investments. The subsequent 1995
Concessions Law repeated this provision by stating that the electric power regulator would
establish electricity rate so as to guarantee the economic-financial equilibrium of the
concessionaire, meaning that electricity rates should be high enough to theoretically enable the
concessionaire to obtain financing for needed investments and expansion.
What was this adequate rate of return? Data released by the Brazilian electric power
regulator, ANEEL, during its distribution company tariff review processes provide some
indications. For distribution companies, ANEEL (2001) estimated equity costs at 17.47 % per
annum. ANEEL used the standard CAPM and included exchange rate, regulatory and sovereign
risk in its calculations of both equity and debt costs. Dissatisfied with ANEEL's estimates, the
distribution companies contracted a consultant who estimated equity costs at 21.60 %, arguing
that ANEEL had under-estimated exchange rate and regulatory risks as well as the betas of
Brazilian electric power firms.
The consultant's report echoed my own qualitative data based on interviews with electric
power executives, which indicated that private investors were looking to make about a 20%
return on equity. Similar interviews with executives of state-owned power firms revealed a much
lower demand for equity returns, in the region of 10%. However, in calculating costs of capital
for distribution companies, ANEEL did not distinguish between privatised and state-owned
firms. Instead of calculating the WACC for each firm separately ANEEL created a "model firm"
and argued that the most efficient distribution of capital would be 50% debt and 50% equity.
Generation company rates of return were not regulated given that wholesale power prices
would be set by the market after the expiration of the initial power supply contracts (from 2003
onwards). However, for generation companies, a government commission established to manage
the electric power rationing estimated equity costs at 18% (CGE 2002).
Increases in the cost of equity were mirrored in the cost of debt. On the distribution side,
ANEEL (2003) had estimated distribution companies would need to pay about 15.76% for
foreign exchange loans. A previous ANEEL (2001) study indicated that privatised distribution
companies paid an average of about 17% on debt papers they issued in the Brazilian markets in
2000 and 2001. State-owned firms paid much lower rates. Eletrobras, for example, paid an
average of 7.8% on its US$ 8.2 billion debt in 2000, while Furnas paid between 6% and 12% on
debts in the local currency and between 3% and 8.8% on debts in foreign exchange. In the
meantime, Eletrobras charged a subsidised 10% plus inflation on loans it extended to AES-Tiete
and Parapanema, two of Sao Paulo's privatised generation companies.
To conclude, on a nominal basis, both equity and debt costs for privatised Brazilian
power firms were almost twice those of their state-owned counterparts. For the moment, this
analysis does not address the issue that subsidised equity and sovereign finance may be at the
root of this seeming advantage in capital costs that state-owned firms enjoy. I will address this
issue in Sections IV and V.
3.2 Efficiency
The strongest argument for privatisation is that it encourages and realises operational and
investment efficiencies. According to the residual claimant theory (Alchian & Desmestz 1972),
the critical distinction between public and private ownership is that private principals operate
under a strong incentive to increase efficiencies and reduce costs because they earn profits.
Although the incentive to increase efficiency operates even in the absence of liberalisation, many
scholars criticise the mere transformation of public into private monopolies asserting that it is
unlikely to bring any real benefits to consumers (Clark & Pitelis 1993; Vickers & Yarrow 1991).
In such cases, regulation, especially of the incentive-based type, can serve as a surrogate to
competition, driving efficiency gains as well as providing a means to share gains with
consumers. Deregulation and liberalisation ought to spur even greater efficiency as firms seek to
gain competitive advantage, with the added benefit that the consumers can benefit in economic
terms from the inter-firm competition.
Empirical evidence does indicate that privatised Brazilian firms did increase operational
efficiencies but these gains were not restricted to privatised firms nor did they commence with
privatisation. In fact, Brazilian power firms began to reform and become more efficient more or
less after the commencement of the industry commercialisation process in 1993. Many of them
began by dismissing hundreds of workers, continuing a process that had already been initiated
under the National Voluntary Retirement Programme while the firms were still under state
control. Coelba, for example, trimmed its workforce by 40% even before it was privatised. After
privatisation, some distribution companies began to aggressively tackle power losses and thefts.
Performance indicators, such as unplanned power cuts, also improved over pre-reform levels.
In the case of distribution companies, between 1993 and 1996 (by which time only three
out of 17 major distribution companies were privatised) the average MWh sold per employee
increased from 1,231 MWh to 1,844 MWh (see Chart 2), indicating that efficiency gains
commenced prior to privatisation. In terms of efficiencies, privatisation also demonstrated some
perverse trends. Between 1993 and 1997, supply interruptions on average decreased from 26.32
hours per year to 24.52 hours per year (see Chart 3), but for the privatised distribution companies
supply interruptions increased (from 13.20 hours per year to 16.59 hours per year for Light and
from 34.07 hours per year to 47.86 hours per year for CERJ), indicating that cost-cutting
measures could be having a negative impact on the quality of service. Similarly energy losses for
the industry in general remained stable between 1993 and 1997 averaging 13.2% in both years
but increased for Light (14.4 to 16.1%) and CERJ (18.6 to 25.3%). These performance indicators
improved only after 1997 following the establishment of the electric power regulatory agency,
which began to impose stiff fines on errant distribution companies.
The vertically integrated firms, none of whom were privatised, also became more
streamlined and productive. Cemig, for example, cut its payroll by over 5,000 employees
between 1993 and 1997. Overall, employment in vertically integrated firms fell from a high of
62,200 in 1994 to 36,800 in 1997 while MWh sold per employee increased from 1,902 MWh in
1993 to 3,573 MWh in 1997 (see Chart 2). Supply interruptions were also reduced, from an
average of 26.19 hours in 1993 to 21.02 hours in 1997. Energy losses increased marginally from
7.3% in 1993 to 8.1% in 1997 (see Chart 3).
On the generation side, we can compare the operational performances of Fumas, Chesf
and Gerasul (formerly known as Eletrosul), the first two remaining under federal ownership and
the last being privatised in 1998. Between 1993 and 2000, data collected from the firms indicates
that Furnas and Chesf reduced their operational costs per MWh sold by 5% and 3% respectively.
Meanwhile, Gerasul, reduced its operational costs by about 10% per MWh. Thus, increases in
efficiency were not restricted to only the privatised firms. For example, data from federally-
owned Furnas indicates that the company reduced its workforce from 7,094 in 1995 to 5,216 in
1997 and even further to 3,846 in 2000. During the same period, its sales increased from 97.7
TWh in 1995 to 111.3 TWh in 1997 to 152.4 TWh in 2000.
To summarise, the data shows that Brazilian electric power firms did become more
efficient after privatisation, but the data also shows that firms began to increase their efficiency
before they were privatised and even those firms that continued under state ownership also
became more efficient. It is therefore unclear what role privatisation played in increasing
efficiencies in the Brazilian electric power sector. It appears that efficiency gains have resulted
more from preparing the industry for privatisation by loosening policy and regulatory controls
during the commercialisation phase (as discussed in Section 3.1.1.) than from the change in
ownership itself.
4. Explaining Post-Privatisation Risks in Brazilian Electric Power
The principal focus of Brazilian electric power reforms was on privatising and shifting the
responsibility for investment from the public to the private sector. As this responsibility shifted,
so too did the incidence, allocation and compensation of sector risks. In the process, risk was not
simply transferred from the public to the private sector, but rather some old risks were eliminated
and some new risks were created. Other risks were transferred, but not always completely. Even
their magnitudes changed. In addition, many risks, which were always present but not accounted
for, began to be explicitly considered by the private investors.
At the outset it should be recognised that even if no new risks had been introduced,
privatisation by itself would have increased, nominally at the very least, the cost of capital and
discount rates employed in the industry. Private firms generally borrow at higher rates of interest
than do governments. More importantly, the introduction of equity, which is inferior to debt and
must be compensated at a higher rate, further increases costs of capital for private firms with
respect to their public counterparts because governments generally demand a much lower return
on their equity than do private investors. Empirical verification of this effect is already available
from studies of the British utilities privatisation process. According to Newbery, the target rate of
return for British power firms was raised from 3% to 6% in preparation for privatisation.
Similarly, New Zealand's electric power utility increased its rate of return on equity from 4% to
12% in the five years following its corporatisation and preparation for privatisation (Culy, et. al.
1996).
Based on the theoretical discussions of Section II, risk shifting can explain at least part of
the apparent advantage of public over private capital, especially as far as the cost of debt is
concerned. In the strict economic sense, this advantage is illusory because it results from
taxpayers as investors bearing higher levels of risk in exchange for enjoying lower utility rates as
customers.
This reasoning, however, does not preclude the fact that the risks for public and private
investment may indeed have been different. Indeed, in the following pages, I will show that the
electric power reforms introduced new risks into the electric power industry and the introduction
of these risks helps explain some of the movement in the costs of capital.
Typical risks in infrastructure projects include political risks (such as expropriation,
currency inconvertibility and non-transferability), regulatory risks (such as taxes and changes in
environmental protection laws), quasi-commercial risks (such as that a private investor will
contract with a public body that may renege on its commitments), commercial risks (such as
demand, default by customers and construction cost variability) and exchange and interest rate
risks (Irwin, et. al. 1999). Commercial, exchange rate and interest rate risks affect public and
private firms equally. Policy, regulatory and quasi-commercial risks, however, have differential
impacts on public and private firms.
4.1. Policy Risks
An immediate consequence of privatisation was that it greatly reduced government
interference in the operational and pricing decisions of the power companies. Various federal and
state administrations had interfered liberally in the past, especially during periods of economic
crises, when the power firms were especially vulnerable. To stem inflation, the federal
government had instituted price controls which resulted in massive falls in real electricity rates
and subsequently in investments; to promote industrialisation in backward areas, the federal
government had mandated a uniform rate for the entire country; to access foreign loans during
the credit crisis of the 1980s, both state and federal governments had forced power companies to
take loans in the international markets and then had diverted the funds to pay off their own
creditors. Furthermore, politicians at both federal and state levels also leveraged their control
over power firms to exercise patronage. All of these policy interventions contributed to
weakening the financial and operational health of the power companies and it was such negative
influences that the reformers were seeking to eliminate through privatisation.
Privatisation reduces policy risk inasmuch as it diminishes the government's ability to
exert such control over the commercial operations of a firm, but it does not by any means
eliminate the temptation for the government to interfere actively in the sector. The source of such
temptation and the associated policy risk is the fact that infrastructure industries suffer from the
problem of incomplete contracting and asset specificity. Infrastructure assets have long lives and
as a practical matter it is impossible to predetermine future costs, prices, technologies, services,
etc. Consequently, some degree of flexibility in the regulatory contract is both necessary and
desirable. Wherever there is flexibility, there is always the temptation and the space and for
opportunistic behaviour on the part of the government (or for that matter, even the private
operator), especially when-as Vernon (1971) described in his obsolescing bargain theory-the
political opportunity cost becomes higher relative to the economic and/or political benefits
brought by the private investor. Meanwhile, the investor remains particularly vulnerable because
his investment was expensive, and his assets durable and quite immobile. 27 As Gomez-Ibanez
(2003) explains it, the problem of reducing policy risk is one of establishing a commitment to a
stable set of rules governing the relationship between the government and the private
infrastructure provider. Inflexible regulatory contracts can diminish this risk by making the rights
and obligations of the various parties clearer but they cannot eliminate this risk. In addition, for
long-lived projects like infrastructures, inflexible contracts are neither feasible nor desirable. In
the first place, it would border on the impossible to predefine all the contingencies of such long-
lived contracts. In addition, in some cases, inflexibility might itself contribute to a more
complete breach of contract if it becomes too expensive for one party to continue complying
with contract provisions. Flexibility, on the other hand, may allow for a more mutually beneficial
renegotiation.
The bottom-line of these risks is that a government might, in the future, expropriate a
firm (through nationalisation) or its earnings and/or profits (through regulatory and exchange rate
controls). In the Brazilian context most analysts agree that outright nationalisation is very
unlikely in the short and medium terms and can, for the purpose of this analysis, be ignored.
Other, more subtle forms of expropriation are, however, much more likely. Indeed, the risk that
the government through the electric power regulator might seek to suppress prices and thereby
expropriate revenues is not insignificant in the Brazilian case.
The fear of policy uncertainty is not a risk in the strictly Knightian sense in that there is
no effective way to assign a mathematical value to it, but as long as governments cannot credibly
commit to refraining from intervening, private investors will continue to discount their expected
returns to compensate for this risk. Despite the limitations in accurately gauging policy risk, my
interviews indicate that investors were looking for an additional 2% to 3% return to compensate
for the policy risks. Meanwhile, a study by the Brazilian Chamber of Energy Industry Investors
(2004) estimated that policy risks in Brazil added at least 1.5 % to the discount rate.
4.2. Regulatory Risks
Policy risks are related to conscious government actions that expropriate investor
earnings by opportunistically changing the rules of the game. Regulatory risks are related to the
character of the regulatory institutions and how they might adversely impact investor returns
27 Some investors have attempted to get round the immovability of electric power assets by mounting thermal plants
on huge barges which can be towed away if the regulatory commitment is found wanting. It is an ingenious solution
with obviously limited applications.
without changing the framework of the rules under which the game is played. Regulatory risk is
therefore not derived from official government policy but is an outcome of the design and
normal functioning of the regulatory institution.
From the regulatory perspective, the Cardoso administration's decision to change the
system for regulating distribution monopolies from cost-of-service to incentive-based regulation
changed the profile of regulatory risk industry. These risks were different from the policy and
regulatory uncertainty discussed above and stemmed from the fact that, according to the 1995
Concessions Law, the federal government would not guarantee returns on investment. Eschewing
the rate-of-return regulations under which Brazilian power companies operated ever since the
enactment of the 1934 Water Code,28 the Brazilian government chose to follow the British model
of price-cap regulation. This model of utility regulation, commonly referred to as the RPI-X
system, where RPI (Retail Price Index) is basically an inflation index, establishes a price-cap
which is first adjusted for inflation (in order to maintain real tariff levels) and then re-adjusted by
an X factor that functions as a proxy for expected efficiency gains that the utility operator ought
to obtain and must pass on to consumers. Under this system, firms that are more efficient than
the regulator expects will be able to earn a higher rate of return on their investments while those
that under perform would be penalised with lower rates of return. This system therefore provides
stronger incentives for firms to pursue efficiency but it also introduces the risk for the firm that it
might not be able to achieve the levels of efficiency established by the regulator as well as the
risk that the regulator might confiscate revenues through progressively higher X-factors.
In addition to the risk that the concessionaires might not achieve the required level of
efficiency gains, the government also absolves itself from compensating for unexpected changes
in the concessionaires' markets. Since distribution revenues are greatly dependent on total
consumption, negative changes in total market demand could have a big impact on returns.
Under rate of return regulation, the government would have been obliged to compensate for
demand changes by raising rates but under price-cap regulation, there is no such obligation.
In a recent revision of distribution company tariffs in Brazil, ANEEL explicitly
recognised this regulatory risk and estimated it as the difference between the f of US electric
power firms that are regulated under cost-of-service rules and that of UK power firms that are
regulated under the RPI-X system. In ANEEL's calculations, the difference was estimated to be
3.3%. Brazilian distribution company investors were, however, dissatisfied with this estimate.
They protested that in view of the weaker Brazilian institutions (and the greater degree of
asymmetric risk), the regulatory risk was being underestimated and should, instead, be set at
6.18% (Tendencias 2003).
However, the main risk from such incentive-based regulation, which was not
contemplated by ANEEL, is that it is discretionary and as such it introduces an asymmetry of
risk for the investor. While not a theoretical certainty, there is substantial empirical evidence that
regulators are more inclined to control excessive profits than they are to compensate firms in
case of excessive losses. In other words, rates are stickier on their way up than on their way
down. This is especially true in developing countries given their greater sensitivity to increases
28 The 1934 Water Code guaranteed power companies a minimum 10% rate of return on assets. In practice, the
guaranteed was rarely honoured for the state-owned companies.
in electric power prices, especially in the political context, and more so when the relevant
investors are not domestic but foreign.
5. Re-Conceptualising Policy and Regulatory Risk
If finance theory argues that the risks of a project depend upon its commercial characteristics and
not upon who owns and finances it, how then do we reconcile the public versus private sector
differences in costs of capital and required rates of return in the Brazilian electric power
industry? There is no evidence that indicates governments might be better at dealing with
commercial risks than private firms and at least some evidence to the contrary, so public capital
should be at least as expensive as private capital. On the issue of policy and regulatory risks, it
could be argued that both public and private firms would need to account for them since they are
equally subject to it and as organisations equally damaged by it. For example, if a government
forces unremunerative rates on electric power firms, both public and private firms will see their
earnings fall and so both should use similar discount rates. The orthodoxy itself tends to ignore
policy and regulatory risks in cost of capital calculations, generally arguing that governments
should bear these risks. In other words, policy and regulatory risks should be treated only as
exogenous undesirables that governments should seek to eliminate from the equation as quickly
as possible. Both of these claims are flawed.
On a superficial level, the public sector firm, especially if it has a soft budget constraint,
is indifferent to policy and regulatory expropriation of its earnings. The public-sector manager
would prefer cost-covering rates because otherwise routine maintenance and service expansion
become logistically difficult but on a fundamental level neither the manager's pecuniary
remuneration nor career prospects are affected by the firm's financial performance. For
investment, the government has the choice to finance projects through the firms' retained
earnings (in which case the government would have to set rates high enough) or through
transfers from general revenue sources such as taxes (in which case it would have to set taxes
high enough) or even through loans taken on the basis of anticipated tax revenues. The decision
as to which rates to set and how to finance investment will depend on the government's political
and policy priorities and objectives. A government may prefer to institute higher user charges
rather than fund a venture via tax revenues because of productive and distributive efficiency
concerns but might still find itself unable to raise user charges because of political reasons. These
are strategic decisions that policymakers have to make but since in the ultimate analysis it is the
citizen that pays, either through user-charges or through taxes, the government as owner-investor
is passively indifferent as to where the money comes from as long as the sum of user charges, tax
revenues and anticipated future tax revenues proves sufficient. Of course, there is no guarantee
that future tax revenues-often based on optimistic assumptions of economic growth-will
prove sufficient and, in fact, many Latin American governments have found their predecessors
have saddled them with infrastructure related debts that they found difficult to repay.
Privatisation, therefore, is not about whether the government wants the firm to set user
charges at a level sufficient to cover costs (including capital costs) or at a level that requires
transfers from general present or future tax revenues. It has been argued, correctly, that if the
government wishes to implement low user charges then it would, barring few exceptions, be
productively more efficient to privatise and provide the subsidy directly to the private operator.
Indeed, like their public sector counterparts, private investors too would be indifferent to whether
the government pays them a subsidy or allows them to set adequate rates for their services. The
relevant question in this debate about risks is not how government subsidises but whether the
government will behave opportunistically once the private investment is made and renege on its
commitment, forcing low rates on the private operator while not passing on the subsidy
payments.
Arguing on the principles of risk allocation-that risks should be allocated to those who
have the most control over the risk and those who can bear the risk at lowest cost-some
privatisation advocates have called for risks related to government policy and regulations be
borne by the government itself (Irwin, el al. 1999). They tend to categorise policy and regulatory
risk in that category of risk which the government is better suited at managing. The reasoning
behind it is simple: Governments are the source behind policy and regulatory risk and so they are
best able to deal with it. Governments should, therefore, provide the private investor guarantees
that they will be compensated if regulatory or policy changes work against the investors'
interests.
This reasoning, unfortunately, is rather tautological and misses the real nature of policy
risk. Including in the privatisation procedure the conditions under which investors would have
the right to recourse merely defines the contractual environment. It does not prevent the
government from behaving opportunistically in the future nor does it assess the probabilities that
the government will honour in letter and spirit the nature of its commitments to the private
investor. Policy risks are therefore additional to contractual guarantees. As mentioned in the
previous section, the contractual relationships that are meant to define rights and responsibilities
are by nature incomplete and government enjoys a wide range of policy instruments with which
to circumvent them. If government really intended to compensate investors for changes in policy
then they would be unlikely to implement the policy changes in the first place. The fundamental
point about policy risks is that the government may not honour its commitments in the future.
Indeed, orthodox economists admit that the main issue is "how the government can credibly
commit itself to bearing the risk" (Irwin, et. al. 1999) but then generally skirt the issue, offering
only that "obtaining this commitment may involve approaching an agency such as the
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)." Investors may, if they so choose, insure
themselves against risks to their well-defined rights but then, in the first place, it would, by
definition, be difficult to purchase insurance for the incomplete parts of the contract and, in the
second place, the costs of such insurance would make private projects more expensive than their
public counterparts thus approximating the same effects as a change in the costs of capital.29
Given that the source of the policy risk is government's refusal to honour previously
made commitments combined with investor lock-in due to asset specificity, a more accurate way
to conceptualise such risks is to adopt a transactions cost framework. Coase (1937) applied
transaction cost economics to solve the puzzle as to why firms emerge in the first place. He
concluded that there are costs of using the price mechanism and the main reason for the existence
of a firm is to reduce the cost of procuring inputs and intermediate products. In other words,
there are costs associated with the procurement process that make it cheaper for a firm to bring
an activity in-house even though an outside supplier enjoys higher levels of productive
efficiency. Other economists (Masten, Meehan & Snyder 1989; Monteverde & Teece 1982;
Teece 1983) applied this reasoning to organisational issues such as determining when and why
29 Because of pooling effects, it might be cheaper to purchase insurance rather than have the risks reflected in the
costs of capital, but the general analysis still holds.
firms would choose to integrate vertically or expand internationally but it was Williamson (1975,
1979, 1991) who did the most to develop transaction cost economics to explain the trade-off
between markets and hierarchies. Williamson (1979) argued that transaction costs in
intermediate-product markets depended upon the level of asset specificity and explained that
unspecialised items presented few hazards to buyers or sellers since the former could easily
source from alternative suppliers while the latter could sell to other buyers without difficulty. In
the case of specialised physical capital, on the other hand, there is a symmetrical lock-in effect:
buyers cannot turn to other sources of supply and neither can suppliers sell to other customers.
Under this framework, we imagine the government not as a regulator or policymaker but
instead as a producer of services for the general population. In other words, the decision that the
government faces is the classic "make or buy" decision that is treated under the transaction costs
literature. Let us now assume that the government decides that it is cheaper to buy than to
make, i.e., to privatise. What privatisation does is that it converts a vertical relationship governed
by hierarchy (descending from the level of the politicians to the operational staff of the public
sector firm) to a horizontal market relationship governed by contracts between the private
investor-operator and the government. For the government, buying rather than making will
undoubtedly increase productive efficiencies, since that is the point of privatisation, but at the
same time privatisation will create not only the costs of setting up the governance structures or
institutional frameworks within which the transactions will take place but also the policy and
regulatory risks stemming from government opportunism. In this case, the policy and regulatory
risk represents costs to the investor of enforcing-or not being able to enforce-the contractual
relationship between it and the government.3 1
Using this framework, we will see in the following analysis that it is not only incorrect to
avoid including policy and regulatory risk in the cost of capital calculations but also that these
risks are context-specific. An implicit trade-off is made during privatisation: higher productive
efficiencies accompanied by higher transactions costs and, as Willialmson (1979) stated simply,
the objective must be to minimise the sum of production and transaction costs.
The weakness of most existing empirical studies of privatisation is that having proved the
former (productive efficiency realised through privatisation), they proselytise on the latter. That
governments should state their policies clearly and commit to them by instituting rules that make
it difficult for current or subsequent administrations to renege on commitments to investors is
clearly normative reasoning. While few would dispute that that is exactly what governments.
should be doing, there is no reason to expect that governments will, in fact, do so. The whole
concept of policy risk rests upon the fact that governments will, if it suits them, opportunistically
301t may not be immediately obvious the electric power industry fulfils Williamson's conditions of asset specificity.
In a liberalised market, electricity suppliers may sell to many potential buyers and customers also have a choice of
suppliers with whom to contract. But, absent a liberalised market, we can see how quickly the industry structure
migrates to asset specificity. The suppliers have made investments in generation plant and transmission and
distribution wires and these, as well as the customers they serve, are geographically fixed. Full market liberalisation,
especially at the retail level, has yet to be implemented for various technical reasons.
311t should be clear to the reader that the transaction cost of establishing the contractual relationship is distinct from
the transaction cost of enforcing it. The costs in the former case are the direct costs associated with the privatisation
exercise and these costs in and of themselves may be significant since they require "detailed analyses, tough
negotiation, complex legal contracts, expensive monitoring arrangements, and possibly the high costs of settling
disputes in court," (Irwin, et. al 1999). In the UK privatisation case, Newbery & Pollett (1997) estimated such
restructuring costs to total as much as 2% of the total pool price.
renege on their commitments. While rules and contracts will protect the investor to some extent,
past experience has left it clear that private investors have little recourse when governments have
determined to expropriate their earnings. This does not, however, mean that it will be impossible
to attract investors in situations where policy credibility is found wanting. It only means that in
such situations policy risks are higher and, consequently, the discount rates demanded by private
investors to compensate for these risks will be higher.
Investors themselves have been incorporating the effects of policy and regulatory risks as
they have prepared their bids for privatisation. During infrastructure privatisation investors have
generally made their bids based on future utility rates, either pre-defined by the government or
estimated by the investor. Knowing what the rates will be allows the investor to appropriately
discount the present value of the assets. The process may also be reversed. In the Buenos Aires
water privatisation case, for example, the government gave away the water company without
charge. Investors were required to bid on the lowest water tariffs they would charge to provide a
defined set of services and to meet a defined series of investment targets. By appropriately
discounting their capital costs-implicitly accounting for policy and regulatory risks-the
winning investor was able to bid an appropriate tariff. The point is that in privatisation processes
asset prices are flexible in the sense that investors pay for the asset based on estimated revenues
and, therefore, privatisation is capable of attracting investors under a wide range of revenue
expectations. If the investors perceive the risks to be high, this will be reflected in lower bids and
lower privatisation prices. In the case of new investments, however, the costs of assets are more
or less fixed and it is the revenue stream that has to prove adequate if investors are to be
attracted. In other words, utility rates have to reflect the impacts that policy and regulatory risks
have on the costs of capital. This helps explain why private power investors in Brazil are
reluctant to invest in additional plant capacity despite their previous enthusiasm for privatisation.
To complete our understanding of policy and regulatory risks we would need to ask what
measures exacerbate and what measures ameliorate them. At a minimum, asset specificity in the
presence of incomplete contracts is what allows the exercise of opportunism (which can be
defined as self-interest combined with a willingness to bend and break the rules of the game).
The exercise of opportunism depends how much it costs the government. Governments'
costs of policy opportunism are inversely related to how acceptable it is for the government to
renege on its commitments. For example, if a country suffers a significant and negative
macroeconomic event it will be politically more beneficial to argue that infrastructure
investors-especially foreign infrastructure investors-share in the economic pains of the
population. In such a case, even if the private investor is contractually protected, the policy risk
that her revenues will be reduced will be elevated. This risk will be even more elevated if rates
are denominated in hard currency and the local currency devalues sharply. With nominal rates
increasing even as economic difficulties assail the consumers/citizens, policy risks for the
investor will increase. On the other hand, if the government is really concerned about attracting
further investment, policy risk in the medium term might remain low even in the presence of
other pressures. What this illustrates is that policy risk is not constant through the life of an
infrastructure project but that it changes based on economic and political conditions. It is
important to note in such circumstances is that these effects often set off a mutually reinforcing
chain of events: economic stress may trigger contractual clauses (such as rates indexed to
inflation or the exchange rate) that cause prices to rise; rising prices add to policy risks by
making government opportunism more legitimate politically; the increase in policy risk causes
costs of capital to increase putting further upwards pressure on prices while simultaneously
higher costs of capital may reduce investment creating supply shortages and pushing up prices
even more; rising prices induce a government reaction thus increasing policy risk, and so on.
The policy risks of investment related to privatisation are themselves context-specific.
For example, the policy and regulatory risks for investors in the bicycle industry are obviously
less than they are in the electric power industry. For one, asset specificity in this industry is low
so even if the government were to consider it one of its public responsibilities to provide bicycles
for its citizenry, it can do so on a competitive basis. For another, the industry does not have
significant backwards or forwards linkages, so the legitimacy of government involvement in it is
low. The question of the steel used in bicycle manufacturing is an entirely different one from
which it would be easy to draw the opposite conclusions and, in fact, policymakers have
repeatedly done so. The important point is not whether the market for the product is competitive
or can be made competitive, but rather what is the degree of asset specificity and what is the
degree of government interest and ability-or, in other words, the political legitimacy-in
having the outputs of the industry serve particular policy and political objectives. Hence, because
policy and regulatory risks are lower, public capital does not have as much of a cost advantage
over private capital in the bicycle industry as it does in the electric power industry.
Similarly, policy and regulatory risks are lower in industrialised countries than in
developing countries and also vary across developing countries. Institutional attributes such as
the strength and independence of the judiciary account for some of this diversity but the
legitimacy of government intervention also explains a lot about how risky the policy and
regulatory environments can be. Critical differences between developed and developing
countries in infrastructure markets include their high cost relative to income, the high
participation of foreign capital and the high levels of return that it demands, all of which help
foster an us-versus-them mentality. As a result, the relative advantage of public over private
capital in industrialised countries is lower than in developing countries. This exactly parallels the
findings in the transactions cost literature, which claims that transactions costs in developing
countries are higher than in industrialised countries.
The value of this approach to evaluating the impacts of privatisation on the cost of capital
is that it provides us with a better understanding of the financial dynamics that underpin
privatisation and points us in the right directions for more robust policymaking with regards to
privatisation. By adopting this framework, we see clearly why outside of the theoretical realm
public capital cannot be evaluated at the same rate as private capital. Adopting this approach
does not in itself fundamentally alter the dynamics of the situation but it does clearly indicate
that policy and regulatory risks are real costs imposed upon the private investor which can be
avoided through public provision. In other words, the public cost of capital is cheaper than the
private cost of capital by an amount equal to the policy and regulatory risk.
This framework also allows the incorporation the negative effects of public ownership on
efficiency. Indeed, one of the fundamental trade-offs in the make or buy decision is between
internal production efficiencies and the transaction costs involved with contracting for the good
or service. Consequently, this framework allows policymakers and analysts to calculate more
accurately the potential impacts of privatisation on prices and investment. By determining
approximately the magnitudes of policy and investment risks on the costs of capital and the share
of capital in total operational costs and by adjusting for expected gains in productive efficiency
one can estimate whether prices will rise or fall and by how much. By formally incorporating
policy and regulatory risk in such calculations one should also be able to force a more honest
evaluation of these risks rather than merely elicit vague and unenforceable promises from the
government to eliminate them.
The analysis presented here has been positive, not normative. The paper offers no opinion
on the intrinsic desirability of privatisation, only an argument to recognise accurately the risks
involved with the privatisation process. The decision-making implications are clear: sectorial
reforms involving privatisation have an inherent risk based on the potential trade-offs between
productive efficiency and the transactions costs of dealing with and accounting for policy and
regulatory risks and these ought to be explicitly evaluated.
If privatisation is essentially a make or buy decision then the following factors need to be
evaluated: the relative inefficiency of the public with respect to the private sector in the
production of the good or service under consideration and the policy and regulatory risks
involved with privatisation.
This discussion provides a basis for introducing the concept of the "riskiness" of reforms
(see Figure 1). If the policy and regulatory risks are low but there is little difference in
efficiencies between the public and the private sector, then there is little to be gained or lost
through privatisation, which is the situation we encounter in many industrialised country
privatisation experiences. Reform under these circumstances has a low risk. The gains in
efficiency are unlikely to be great, but the policy and regulatory risks are also low. With little
difference between public and private costs of capital and between public and private sector
efficiency, privatisation is unlikely to result in substantial changes in prices and service quality.
The privatisation of Great Britain's electric power industry illustrates this well. Many analysts
have shown that large efficiency gains were not realised through the British electric power
privatisation exercise because the industry was already quite efficient under state ownership.
Newbery & Pollett's (1997) analysis shows that there were some absolute gains accruing from
privatisation-on the order of 2% of final prices. They did not take into consideration any
possible differences in the costs of capital between the British public and private sector, but these
differences were, in any case, small.
If policy and regulatory risks are high but at the same time there is a big difference in
private and public sector efficiencies then it might well be worth privatising. The Argentine
electric power privatisation case is fairly representative in this case. Like any developing country
embarking upon a massive economic overhaul, policy risks in Argentina were high. At the same
time, the Argentine power sector was highly inefficient, plagued by power losses, overstaffing
and poor operational performance. The policy and regulatory risks were substantial but so were
the potential benefits. The risk of the reforn adjusted with the potential benefits was, therefore,
medium.
If the relative differences in efficiency in the public and private sectors are low but the
policy and regulatory risks are high, then privatisation will deteriorate the social welfare
function. The risks of reform in this case are high. Policy and regulatory risk are likely to
increase substantially the costs of capital that are applied, but the corresponding efficiency gains
will be unlikely to compensate for these increased costs. As I will show in the following section,
Brazilian electric power privatisation is representative of this case.
6. The Impacts of Power Reforms on Risk and Prices
It is axiomatic that prices in privatised infrastructure markets will reflect the rates of return
required by private investors, which in turn reflects the risks assumed in the investment. Clearly
then, an increase in risk creates upwards pressures on prices although these pressures can be
reduced or even completely overcome if efficiency gains are sufficiently high.
What was the impact in the Brazilian electric power industry? The empirical evidence
presented in Section IV suggests that costs of capital increased by at least 4.8% (1.5% due to
additional policy risk and 3.3% due to additional regulatory risk at the lower bounds of
estimation) and could have increased as much as 10%, even if we ignore the public sector's
ability to obtain debt at a lower rate. On the efficiency side, by 2000, generation efficiencies
increased by about 10% in the best privatised case and by about 5% in the best state-owned case.
Were the efficiency gains sufficient to overcome the increase in the costs of capital? The
potential impacts of increases in the costs of capital on wholesale power prices can be estimated
using data on the capital and operational costs of hydro and thermal power plants (see summary
in Tables 3 and 4). The data indicate that hydropower plants constructed with project finance
consisting of 40% equity and 60% debt would produce electricity for US$ 36.62/MWh, given a
required return on equity of 18% and cost of debt at 8% (i.e., a WACC of 11%-ignoring, for the
moment, the taxation differences between equity and debt). Debt costs are set at 8% because the
BNDES currently offers loans for electric power investment at that rate. Running the same
calculations with a return on equity of 15% reduced power prices by $4.75/MWh. In other
words, for each percentage difference in average capital costs, wholesale power prices would
change by 15%. For thermal power, the price sensitivity to cost of capital increases was much
lower. A percentage change in average capital costs caused a 4.73% change in total costs. 32
Thermal power plants, however, suffered from a higher market risk. It was not only more
expensive-around US$ 38 per MWh for thermal vs. US$ 32 per MWh for hydro-but also
exposed the investors to exchange rate risk since most of the natural gas to be used in these
plants had to be imported from Bolivia and Argentina and paid for in dollars at international
rates.
In terms of efficiency, while the privatised generation company did achieve greater
operational efficiencies than the federally-owned generation companies, the gains did not offset
the effect of the increase on the nominal cost of capital. Comparing efficiency gains with the cost
of capital increases described in the previous sections clearly indicates that on the balance there
was substantial pressure to increase prices. If a 1% increase in the cost of capital translates into a
15% increase in costs for over 80% of the installed capacity, then efficiencies in the Brazilian
electric power industry would have to practically double after privatisation to compensate for a
5% to 6% increase in the nominal cost of capital.
On the generation side, because of the structure and the technology of the industry, such
large increases in operational efficiency are not possible in Brazil. Power generation in Brazil is
32In the case of thermal power investments, equity was estimated at 30% of total capital because the government
intended to provide additional lines of credit to incentivise thermal power production based on natural gas.
overwhelmingly hydroelectric. One of the defining characteristics of hydropower is that its
operational costs are very low-consisting mainly of routine maintenance and opening and
closing sluice gates-and its capital costs are very high. In Brazil, capital costs of hydropower
account for over 80% of total costs whereas capital costs for natural gas fired thermal plants
account for only about 30% of total costs (see Tables 3 and 4). Analysing the spot-market prices
for hydropower in Brazil clearly reveals this fact (see Chart 5). When the hydropower reservoirs
are full and the opportunity cost for storing the power low, firms have been noted to sell power at
essentially the operational costs, which have been about US $5 per MWh. Even if operational
costs are greatly reduced through efficiency gains, they form such a small portion of total costs
that their impacts on sector prices would not be significant. Privatising hydropower, therefore,
would in a relative sense yield little efficiency. Similarly, deregulation and liberalisation would
also be unable to induce large increases in efficiencies in the Brazilian electric power generation
sector.
A similar result holds even for investment in new infrastructure. The government may be
less efficient in constructing new infrastructure, but if its capital costs are much lower and capital
costs are a significant component of final costs then even though the state-owned firm is less
efficiency productively, it would be able to offer lower prices.
The fundamental conclusion of this empirical research is that policy risk in power
generation privatisation was high and potential efficiency gains low. The Brazilian electric
power reforms were conducted during an economic stabilisation programme whose principal
focus was to control inflation but the reforms were quite likely to put significant upwards
pressure on prices. Given that electric power is a basic input in almost all industrial and
commercial processes, it would be likely that sustained increases in electric power prices would
drive up inflation. In such an eventuality, the government would be forced to step in and rescue
the stabilisation programme, very likely leading to some sorts of control on electric power prices.
This would, in effect, set off a negative feedback loop on policy and regulatory risks. Attempts to
control prices would be seen by investors as manifestations of policy and regulatory risk, further
increasing their perceptions of such risks. This would translate into demands for higher discount
rates and curtailments in investment programmes. Curtailed investment could lead to mutually
reinforcing tighter energy supply markets, an increase in prices, a stronger policy response and
higher policy risks.
7. Conclusions
Brazilian electric power privatisation fundamentally shifted the nature, amount, incidence and
compensation of investment risks in the sector. Privatisation forced investors to consider the
various policy risks and changing the regulatory system for the monopolistic parts of the industry
introduced regulatory risks. Under government ownership these risks were usually ignored when
calculating discount rates but privatisation forced an explicit recognition of these risks. The cost
of debt and equity of the private sector thus substantially exceeded that of its public counterparts
in the Brazilian electric power industry.
On the issue of efficiency impacts of privatisation, reformers have argued that private
owners could be compensated for the increased risks that they bear while at the same time the
pressures to increase prices could be mitigated. Almost a decade ago, as the privatisation
movement was gaining strength through much of the developed and developing world, the World
Bank's 1994 World Development Report, which was devoted to infrastructure, invoked this
issue, stating that, "in infrastructure projects, the cheaper credit available to governments needs
to be weighed against possible inefficiencies in channelling funds through government."
In practical terms, given public capital's advantage in the electric power industry, it is not
enough for organisations to become merely more efficient than they were previous to
privatisation; they must boost efficiency to a degree sufficient to recuperate the increased costs
of capital. On this issue, the paper has argued that in the case of Brazilian electric power reforms,
the condition regarding the trade-off between cost of capital and efficiency was, in fact, not
satisfied. Privatisation did increase levels of efficiency in the Brazilian electric power industry.
However, the Brazilian power firms were, on average, not sufficiently inefficient under state
ownership and the structure of the industry with its hydro dominance did not allow the private
sector to make the kinds of efficiency gains that would have compensated for the increased rate
of return requirements. Thus, one lesson from Brazil's electric power reform experience is that if
new investment requirements are substantial, then infrastructure privatisation should be the
preferred strategy only for those countries with highly inefficient government enterprises.
From relevant policy perspectives, the relative magnitude of capital versus operational
costs in a project or industry thus assumes particular importance. The larger the relative capital
outlay in an industry, the more sensitive it will be to changes in required rates of return resulting
from privatisation and liberalisation and the less likely it is to benefit from increases in
operational efficiencies. In the Brazilian electric power industry, the relatively low operational
costs of hydropower plants meant that even large efficiency gains would be overwhelmed by
small increases in capital costs.
The results from this analysis are thus counterintuitive. Just because a sector is
theoretically competitive does not automatically mean it is ripe for privatisation and
liberalisation. The Brazilian electric power reform experience shows that the potentially
competitive generation sector was actually a poorer candidate for privatisation because of its
relatively higher capital to operating cost ratio and the higher associated policy risk. Privatisation
of Brazilian distribution companies was, in fact, a more robust decision than attempting to
privatise generation given the fact that capital costs of distribution are relatively lower than
operational costs when compared to generation.
This paper does not argue a general theoretical case against privatisation but it does
caution against orthodox reform in an infrastructure industry where the policy risks are high and
the potential efficiency gains are low. As such, what the paper has argued most strongly for is
appropriate contextualisation in deciding when how and where to reform. Just as one cannot
make a universally-applicable judgement about the make or buy decision in the private sector,
one cannot pass similar judgement about privatisation. If the existing state-owned firms are not
substantially inefficient, privatisation might yield little benefit to consumers. If government
operation is very inefficient then regardless of what the theory says about public and private
finance, the social function can be improved through privatisation. In Argentina, for example, the
existing state-owned power firms were so inefficient that privatisation, even with increased rates
of return demanded by the investors, yielded net benefits to the consumers. On the other hand,
if the root causes of inefficiency are government policy and not government ownership then the
introduction of more market-oriented policies, or commercialisation, may well be a policy
superior to that of privatisation.
Incorporating the effects of changes in risks and the costs of capital into privatisation and
liberalisation analyses thus enriches our understanding of the dynamics of reform because it
helps explain when, where and why reform efforts might fail on economic and political grounds.
For example, on economic grounds, if reforms introduce more risk and uncertainty for the
investor-risks that the investors are not able to compensate for by increasing operational
efficiencies-then on the balance prices will rise and the reforms might prove to be
unsustainable. If capital costs are a substantially larger proportion of total life-cycle costs than
operational costs, then increased operational efficiencies may not be reason enough to privatise
and/or liberalise because then the effects of more expensive capital might dominate over
increases in operational efficiencies. On political grounds, if reforms do not bring visible
improvements and benefits to the consumer despite the increase in prices then they might well be
difficult to defend politically even if they are entirely justified on the grounds of economic
theory. This strongly suggests that privatisation studies should do much more to analyse both the
balance of risk introduced into the system through reforms efforts and the relative costs of capital
for the public and private sector.
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Internal 34 45 24 1
Forced Loans 8 9 8
State Resources 32 20 6 6
Domestic Loans 13 7 30 9
Foreign Financing 13 19 32 63
Table 2


























Year Real Tar f
.fs
Table 3.




Return on Equity 15.00% 18.00/
Equity 30.00% 30.00%
Debt 70.00% 70.00%
Cost of Debt 8.00% 8.00%
Capital Outlay per kW installed $600.00 $600.00
Costs (US$/MWh)
Capital Costs 9.86 10.94
Fuel 20.15 20.15
Other 0 & M 5.22 5.22
Misc. Taxes 2.71 3.32
TOTAL 37.84 39.63
Parameters
Return on Equity 15.00% 18.00%
Equity 40.00% 40.00%
Debt 60.00% 60.00%
Cost of Debt 8.00% 8.00%
Capital Outlay per kW installed $700.00 $700.06
Costs (US$/MWh)
Capital Costs 21.09 24.33
Fuel (Water Charge) 1 1
Other 0 & M 4.39 4.39
Misc. Taxes 5.39 5.39
TOTAL 31.8? 36.62
Table 5.
Debt-Total Capital Ratios of Brazilian Distribution
(State-Owned firms in Bold)
Companies
FRIM 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 3d - Average Weight
2002 (firm)
AES Sul 40.5 67.4 87.5 95.1 84.3 120.6 75.0 3.3
Bandeirante 69.1 77.2 76.1 78.0 74.1 2.2
Cataguases-Leopoldina 44.0 47.4 53.6 59.7 59.5 59.2 51.0 0.9
CEB 30.3 28.5 28.9 35.1 55.1 69.4 35.6 1.2
CEEE 66.7 72.2 78.3 78.6 80.3 85.3 75.2 3.3
CELESC 27.5 42.4 51.6 54.9 63.5 64.2 48.0 2.8
CELG 92.6 97.9 72.7 80.4 92.0 114.8 87.1 2.2
CELPA 57.5 49.2 54.7 58.3 53.6 59.7 54.7 2.1
CELPE 29.9 39.9 42.6 51.1 50.0 57.5 42.7 2.6
CEMAT 56.7 59.0 67.0 75.3 66.1 71.9 64.8 1.9
CEMIG 29.1 29.3 33.8 34.2 47.4 56.0 34.8 15.3
CERJ 74.5 84.7 89.7 86.3 94.7 97.3 86.0 4.4
COELBA 49.2 50.5 57.8 55.5 55.0 57.4 53.6 4.0
COELCE 49.0 53.7 30.0 35.2 48.7 53.3 43.3 2.7
COPEL 34.6 37.0 39.9 38.4 17.9 25.6 33.6 6.9
CPFL 46.1 49.7 30.0 31.9 51.4 59.9 41.8 9.3
Elektro 53.1 49.7 53.0 79.8 110.5 58.9 3.4
Eletropaulo 69.0 66.5 71.0 74.8 82.3 70.3 14.2
Enersul 52.3 44.2 51.9 51.8 56.3 61.1 51.3 1.3
Escelsa 49.2 51.1 61.4 63.8 71.5 97.2 59.4 2.8
Light 33.5 62.1 72.4 76.0 101. 85.7 69.0 13.4
1
Average (year) 48.0 54.4 56.6 59.7 65.7 74.6 56.9 100.0
Note the lower debt level of state owned firms. CEEE appears with a higher than average
debt because the firm was split into three parts, of which two parts were privatised and during
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An Exploration of the Potential Effects of Deregulation on Investment in Brazil's
Electricity Industry
1. Introduction
In the aftermath of Brazil's electricity rationing in 2001, Francisco Gomide, a career electricity
man, was called in to take charge as the Minister of Mines and Energy and guide the
restructuring of Brazilian electric power sector. In his presentations, Gomide had a stock phrase
he would often use to describe his government's electricity policy: "as much market as possible;
as little government as necessary." The phrase hid more than it revealed. Its main objective was
to communicate the government's continuing commitment to private investment and market-
based reforms in the electricity industry; a commitment that had taken a severe battering as a
result of the rationing. With many, experts and otherwise, blaming the rationing on the power
reforms (or lack thereof), it remained not at all clear how much market is in fact possible and
how much government is necessary.
It would be easy to blame Brazil's power reforms fiasco on a flawed policy
implementation, and many have done so (see, for example, Gall 2000 and Greiner 2002). Such
an explanation would, however, be incomplete and unsatisfactory. Brazil's power reform fiasco
was not an isolated failure. Internationally, many power reforms have run into serious trouble,
even in advanced industrial countries that enjoyed access to ample financial resources, technical
expertise and political environments favourable to implementing power sector reforms. Power
supply problems have hit various countries-such as Norway, New Zealand, Chile, the United
States in California and, of course, Brazil-that have deregulated their electricity markets. This
international experience indicates that one of the critical areas in which electricity markets have
experienced a lot of trouble has been in generating investment sufficient to maintain reliable
supplies, especially in peaking power plants.
This paper investigates why investment has been a troublesome issue in competitive
electricity markets and translates the general case to the Brazilian context. It does not present its
conclusions based on solely on an analysis of the actual performance of the Brazilian electricity
markets. The main reason for this is that the Brazilian power reforms were never fully
operationalised. Rationing hit Brazil as the power markets were still in a transitional phase and
the planned liberalisation was only partly implemented. Even though the Brazilian electricity
market was only partially liberalised, we can still analyse, using technical documents and other
information about the industry, what some of the potential impacts of liberalisation might have
been. Indeed, the Brazilian electricity market liberalisation remained incomplete partly because
the problems related to market-making. What the paper does intend to do is explain, by
reviewing international experience and analysing the Brazilian case in terms of actual and
potential dynamics, why it proved to be so difficult to design a well-functioning power market in
Brazil in the first place. It is based on an analysis of dozens of technical documents prepared by
various government agencies in Brazil, interviews with sector professionals and academic
literature on electric power market liberalisation in other countries.
In analysing the problems with Brazil's electricity reforms, this paper puts forward a
series of propositions that can aid in understanding the conditions under which electricity
reforms become inherently more difficult, especially from the point of view of generating new
investments. Two useful propositions to introduce at this stage are that electricity markets have
found it difficult to create the right incentives for investment (i) when the marginal cost of new
power plants are more than the marginal costs of the existing power plants, and (ii) when the
investment required in peaking capacity represents a large proportion of the total investment
requirements. In both cases, investors face uncertain returns in competitive electricity markets.
Furthermore, such markets have a tendency towards price volatility, which induces a policy
reaction that tends to reduce the scope of liberalisation in the industry.
Starting with these issues, the paper traces the difficulties with electricity markets to a
trade-off that has to be made between the security of supply and price. Electricity industry
reformers have been faced with a choice of increasing the security of supply by allowing higher
returns to investors and thereby dampening the effects of competitive markets or increasing price
competition amongst suppliers to lower electricity rates at the risk of less reliable supply. When
reforms were undertaken in industrialised countries, supply has generally been more or less
secure and policymakers have preoccupied themselves with trying to reduce the price of
electricity in wholesale markets. The governance structures the policymakers have instituted
therefore have focused more on reducing prices, but this was subsequently noted to reduce
supply reliability and in some cases cause severe shortages. On the other hand, governance
structures geared more towards ensuring secure supplies have been criticised as being too
expensive. This fundamental trade-off is of even more concern in developing countries that are
trying simultaneously to keep prices low, encourage massive amounts of investment, and
maintain reliable supplies. In the electricity market design process, it is not easy to determine and
decide which the right governance structures are. Trying to optimise on many fronts
simultaneously, policymakers have risked leaving regulatory lacunae and sending out incorrect
signals, responding to which markets have played mischief.
The rest of the paper develops these ideas and is divided into six sections. In section II,
the paper discusses the trajectory of some countries towards electricity markets; in section III, it
relates the international experience with power markets; in section IV, the paper explains the
technical and economic reasons behind the difficulty in creating efficient electricity markets; in
section V, the paper introduces the reader to the Brazilian electric power system; in section VI
the paper analyses the particular difficulties of the Brazilian power reforms; section VII
concludes.
2. The Move towards Markets
Industrialised countries have moved only gradually towards competitive electricity markets and
while doing so have adopted a variety of approaches. Some have privatised state-owned
monopolies, some have divided their electric power firms vertically and horizontally, and some
have liberalised only wholesale markets while others have moved more dramatically towards
retail level deregulation. Despite the variety of approaches that have been tried, most electricity
deregulation exercises were commonly experimental in nature, slow in their transition to
liberalised markets and suffered through many mistakes. At the same time, markets have been
successful in reducing wholesale rates in many instances by promoting productive efficiency,
reducing labour and maintenance costs and better fuel management strategies (Newbery & Pollitt
1997).
Indeed, in industrialised countries, it was a desire to get cheaper rates that motivated
policymakers to deregulate the electricity industry. For many decades, electric power utility
regulation had been a comfortable activity. Technical advances and the realisation of economies
of scale that caused a steady decline in unit cost had allowed regulators to periodically reduce
electricity rates even as utility investors made higher profits and enjoyed good returns on their
investments. Where electric power utilities were owned by the state, ample resources were made
available to fund capacity expansion. This easy period ended in the early 1970s with the
exhaustion of scale economies and the petroleum price hikes. At the same time, new
environmental concerns began to pressure utilities and their regulators. With their production
costs beginning to rise rapidly, investors clamoured for more frequent rate reviews as regulatory
lag, which hitherto had functioned in their favour, now began to eat into their returns.
Consumers, on the other hand, began to resent the frequent electricity rate hikes.
Competitive electricity markets often did not come about by design but rather evolved
gradually from a series of isolated private and public decisions. In the United States, competition
in electricity markets was originally thought to be technically prohibitive and vertically
integrated utilities operating in regionally exclusive franchises were generally the norm.
However, these utilities themselves began constructing the infrastructure that would eventually
make competition amongst them possible. In response to rising power production costs,
especially of the peaking supplies which they needed to maintain reliable service for their
customers, the utilities began to progressively develop high-voltage transmission networks and
experiment with wholesale markets in which they traded electricity amongst themselves. Taking
advantage of regional variations in demand and capacity utilisation, utilities "wheeled" power to
one another in order to reduce the total amount of installed capacity that they needed to have to
maintain reliable supplies (Stalon 1997). These exchanges initially were limited to the small
amounts needed to balance supply and demand and did not constitute a real market nor did they
fundamentally change the monopolistic regulated nature of electric utilities. But, as it turned out,
the high-voltage transmission infrastructure that was built and the small experiments in energy
trading that the utilities engaged in on their own initiative became the foundation for later
introducing more widespread competition in wholesale electricity markets.
Various market making experiments were subsequently carried out. In one such
initiative, the US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) obliged utilities to contract
with outside suppliers instead of building generation facilities in-house. The 1978 Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), mostly with environmental goals in mind, required utilities to
sign long-term power supply contracts with certain types of independent power producers (IPPs),
known as Qualifying Facilities (QFs) 33 instead of constructing additional generation facilities
themselves.
This early experiment with making electricity markets was not felicitous. While
successful in enabling hundreds of IPPs to establish themselves, PURPA did not reduce
electricity rates. It turned out that the power supplied by the QFs was more expensive than the
utilities' avoided costs and at the same time that the Act forced utilities to buy from QFs, it
prohibited them from contracting with non-QFs that could have supplied power more cheaply.
33These facilities were mainly co-generators and small producers that used renewable fuels.
Furthermore, the avoided costs established by some state regulatory commissions were so high
that it provided incentives for the QFs to supply more power than the utilities could sell. Given
that it was the state regulatory commissions that had forced utilities into signing these power
purchase agreements (PPAs), utilities were allowed to pass through these costs to the consumers
in their retail prices.
Although PURPA did not reduce electricity rates, and indeed it even increased them, the
Act did succeed in dispelling the myth that the generation sector was per-force a natural
monopoly and in doing so set the stage for a subsequent unbundling of electricity services.
PURPA also created pressures for introducing more competition in wholesale electricity markets,
though not in the manner that the Act's proponents would have anticipated. Many years later, a
rate gap began to appear between those states whose regulators had not aggressively pushed the
expensive PURPA-inspired plants and those that had, with the latter having to embed the
stranded asset costs of the PURPA-contracted plants into their regulated rates (White 1996).
Additionally, states that had to deal with fewer stranded asset problems found it easier to
deregulate generation markets, thereby lowering their wholesale rates even more.
In 1992, while regulators were under pressure to deregulate the industry (given their role
in causing high prices), the US Congress passed the Energy Policy Act. It removed barriers to
entry into the generation market by creating "exempt wholesale generators" (EWG) who were
authonised to supply wholesale power to utilities and their competitors. The authors of the Act
expected EWGs to use modem generation technologies and thereby reduce costs and supply
power at prices lower than what the utilities themselves could achieve. In 1996, FERC's open
access rules 888 and 889 further liberalised electricity markets by forcing utilities to allow
competitors to access their wires in order to transport and deliver energy.
The US experience shows that the process of deregulating electricity markets was
experimental and incremental. It was a learning process in which market making initiatives
themselves often failed but the experience gained was in itself valuable as a foundation for
continuing efforts in the area. And, progressively, electricity markets did become more
sophisticated and complete.
Similar trends were ongoing globally and, in fact, the United States did not lead this trend
towards making wholesale electricity markets. Much of the progress in the US was in fact an
imitation of other countries where bolder reforms were being spurred by simultaneous processes
of privatisation. Indeed, the existence of already private utilities to some extent impeded more
dramatic restructuring in the United States because of concerns about breaking the regulatory
contract and the taking of private property rights.
Of the major electricity reforms, the one implemented in England & Wales has received
the most attention and has been widely identified as the inspiration for a series of reforms in
other countries. Unlike the mostly private and regionally diffuse electricity industry in the United
States, England & Wales were served by state-owned corporations. Like the United States,
however, the political climate in 1980s Great Britain favoured reducing the role and scope of the
state in the economy. In 1988, the UK Department of Energy commissioned a White Paper for
developing a competitive electricity industry based upon which the UK Electricity Act was
passed the following year. The Act separated the electricity industry along functional lines-
generation, transmission, and distribution-intending to introduce competition into generation
markets and incentive-based regulation into the transmission and distribution segments.
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Subsequently, the government split up the state-owned Central Electricity Generation Board
(CEGB) into a national transmission company and three generation companies. 34 Britain's 12
Regional Electric (distribution) Companies were privatised in December 1990 and the two fossil-
fuel power generators in March 1991. The national transmission company was initially owned
jointly by the 12 RECs but later was spun off as an independent publicly-traded corporation.
Given that the British electricity reform was more a political programme, it focused on
privatisation and market-making and did not initially address the issue of market power. For all
practical purposes, the generation sector was left as a duopoly, with one generator (National
Power) owning 46% of the total installed capacity and the other (PowerGen) owning 28%. The
rest of the power was supplied by the 12 RECs and Nuclear Electric. As a result of this
concentration, National Power and PowerGen were frequently accused of exercising market
power. In the retail sector, the RECs maintained their exclusive franchises, although customers
whose peak demand was greater than 1 MW could purchase their power competitively from the
RECs or directly from the generation companies. Later, in 1994, this limit was reduced to 100
kW and in 1998 even residential customers were allowed to choose their suppliers.
The main innovation of the British electricity reform was the creation of a national
wholesale electricity market. While the authors of the White Paper themselves had expected the
British electricity market to be based on bilateral physical contracts between generators and
distributors, it turned out that the spot market or pool became the centrepiece of the system. The
power pool was basically a commodities-type market in which all producers were required to
submit bids on a half-hourly day-ahead basis. Based on the bids, the national systems operator
would dispatch power in a merit order starting with the least expensive plant until all the demand
would be satisfied. The pool price, which was received by all generators, was the market clearing
price and equal to the bid value of the last (most expensive) generation unit dispatched. The
designers of the market expected that, theoretically, the generators should bid at their marginal
operating costs and so the pool price should generally reflect the system's overall marginal
operating cost. A capacity payment was added to the pool price in order to ensure enough surplus
capacity in the system to maintain security of supply.
Electricity had to be compulsorily sold through the pool. Consequently, the price of
electricity varied by the half-hour. However, most customers purchased electricity though annual
contracts at fixed rates independent of the variations in the pool markets. The contracts were,
however, allowed to have predefined variations in prices depending upon when the power is
consumed. In order to hedge themselves against adverse variations in pool prices, RECs
purchased contracts for differences (CfDs) where if the pool price is more than the strike price
then the generators pay the RECs the difference and vice versa.
A different, less political and more technical, approach to electricity reform was
undertaken in Norway, which did not consider privatising its state owned electricity companies
at all. Instead, while retaining state ownership Norway implemented a highly decentralised free-
trade model in which a large number of generation and distribution companies and even small
consumers could buy and sell electricity in the pool markets. Selling in the pool was, however,
not made compulsory and over 80% of the energy is still traded bilaterally.
34Initially, the plan was to have two privatised generation companies, one larger than the other in order to absorb the
country's nuclear facilities. As it turned out, the nuclear facilities were not privatised initially and instead a surcharge
was applied to customers' bills in order to allow nuclear energy to be competitively dispatched. The nuclear power
generator was finally privatised in 1996.
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Norway began its electricity reforms more or less at the same time as the Britain did,
having passed its Energy Act in 1990. Prior to this act, the country's electricity industry was
regulated via cost-plus contracts and energy trading was highly restricted. The Energy Act
created a power pool market which was opened to all consumers, potentially even residential
customers. Because Norway's electricity industry was historically composed of small municipal
companies, market power was not an issue. In fact, when it began its reforms Norway had over
300 separate electricity firms although the federal generation and transmission company,
Stattkraft, did produce about 30% of the country's electricity. As part of the reforms, Stattkraf's
transmission business was separated into a new company, Stattnet. In 1996, Norway and Sweden
combined their power markets and formed a new pool company called Nordpool. Subsequently,
in 1997, to promote retail competition, Norway eliminated all switching fees and in the following
year, permitted customers to switch suppliers on a weekly basis.
Other countries, driven variously by more political or more technocratic forces, were also
moving forward with their own efforts at deregulating electricity markets. Chile, in fact,
preceded England in electricity reforms having begun experimenting with electricity market
deregulation in 1978. By 1982, Chile had privatised the industry while also guaranteeing
generators open access to transmission networks and the wholesale power market. In 1992,
Argentina followed with an electricity privatisation programme modelled after the Chilean one
but went further to promote competition by requiring a complete vertical separation between
generation, transmission and distribution functions and limiting the size of generators to less than
10% of the national market. Australia began its electricity reforms in the early 1990s and went
for unbundling, corporatisation and privatisation of state-owned firms, introduction of
competition in wholesale and retail markets, and a reduction in, with a view to the eventual
elimination of, barriers to entry (Outhred 1998). The process took over 10 years to complete and
was slow because it was conducted in a federalised environment. The National Electricity
Market was begun in 1998 and was finally completed when New South Wales entered in 2001.35
The New Zealand electricity reforms went even further and completely commodified the power
market. The 1992 Energy Companies and Electricity Acts corporatised the state-owned national
power generation company (ECNZ) and the regional electricity distribution companies and
eliminated retail supply franchises, monopolies, price controls and public service obligations
(Barton 1999).36 The wholesale market was introduced in New Zealand in 1996. Like Nordpool,
it was not made compulsory; unlike the Nordpool, the New Zealand wholesale market does trade
a lot of the country's energy. New Zealand also split-up ECNZ and maintained a cap on its
investments until its share of power production fell below to 45% of the national market. The
1998 Electricity Industry Reform Act further split ECNZ into three new competing generators
and also made distribution companies separate their wires and retail businesses and sell one or
the other. To promote retail level competition, the 1998 Act established low switching costs and
allowed all customers to choose their electricity suppliers.
Throughout the world, the demonstration effect influenced the pace and character of
electric power reforms as countries imitated and adapted reforms from each others' experiences.
The demonstration effect borrowed from the experiences not only of other countries but also of
other industries, notably telecommunications and, in the case of the United States, natural gas.
3 Western Australia and the Northern Territories did not join the NEM because they are very far from the
interconnected NEM of eastern and southern Australia.
36The Electricity Act of 1992 did, however, include a temporary provision for price controls for residential
customers.
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As Joskow (1997) stated, "the reforms sweeping other natural monopoly sectors necessarily lead
interest groups, regulators and other policymakers to ponder whether these concepts can and
should be applied to electricity for private or social gain."
Although there were great differences in the details, the basic reform model followed by
most countries was based on unbundling, or the vertical separation of potentially competitive
segments of the electricity industry, such as generation, and those that needed to continue as
regulated business, such as transmission. Where countries differed was on the degree of market
de-concentration in generation sector and the extent to which the retail sector was liberalised.
Privatisation was a common though not universal element of the reform efforts. The variation in
the national power policies were a reflection of the intrinsic characteristics of the industrial
structure of each country and its economic priorities.
3. Industrialised Country Experience with Electricity Markets.
Even though more than a decade has passed since the industrialised countries began
experimenting with electricity reforms, the results of these diverse experiences with
privatisation, liberalisation and market-making in the electricity industry are still generating
polemics. Privatisation and liberalisation has spurred productivity improvements in most
countries in which it has been tried and has attracted billions of dollars of private capital
investment in the sector. As a consequence wholesale and retail rates have both fallen and
become better aligned with costs of services for different classes of customers. However,
although the initial evaluations of electricity reforms were generally positive, recent analyses are
much more nuanced in their conclusions. In countries that deregulated the electricity sector,
wholesale prices generally fell initially but subsequent and severe price volatility has become a
major concern. More preoccupying, however, has been the fact that many of the industrialised
countries that did deregulate their electricity markets have suffered episodes of major power
shortages. A critical question that sector specialists are beginning to ask is whether electricity
markets are fundamentally constrained in their ability to provide adequate incentives for
investment in generation capacity. In this section I discuss a few of the reform experiences of
industrialised countries in order to set the basis for a similar exploration in developing country
contexts. The list of country experiences discussed here is by no means exhaustive and is
intended mostly to illustrate the many difficulties of electricity reform and establishing electricity
markets.
Like most reforms exercises, Britain's electricity privatisation and deregulation were
initially and universally eulogised but on many counts the British power pool market, previously
lauded for reducing electricity rates and often proffered to reformers in other countries, has not
lived up to its promise. A recent review of the programme claims that the government, or more
accurately the taxpayers, lost US$ 6 billion in the process (cite). The authors of this study further
claim that overall cost reductions were not very significant because the industry was already
well-run under state ownership and the gains that were realised through the process were reaped
mostly by the shareholders because prices did not fall as much as input costs. The overall
impacts in the economy may well have been neutral but distributional concerns were certainly
affected: as shareholders, citizens gained a lot and as ratepayers they gained a little but as
taxpayers, they generally lost.
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Even ratepayers may not really have benefited as many of the claims of price reductions
that were previously touted have collapsed under further scrutiny. Comparing pre- and post-
privatisation and liberalisation prices in the British electricity industry, Yarrow (1992) argues
that the price reductions after the reforms-3.1% for households and 4.2% for industry-are
exaggerated because the government, in preparing for privatisation, raised electricity rates by
25% for residential customers and by 19% for industrial customers between 1989 and 1991.
Others have argued, perhaps with reason, that electricity prices were artificially low under state
ownership and that the price increases were justified in order to bring profitability and rates of
return on capital up to levels similar to those prevailing in other sectors. Still other studies
(Newbury 1998; Perkins 1996) have claimed that electricity prices would have been even lower
in Britain had the old-style regulation continued. Whether or not electricity was underpriced
under state-ownership in Britain, it is clear that privatisation did not create any significant price
gains for consumers.
Market problems have also assailed Britain's power pool and, in 1998, Britain's
electricity regulator was forced to propose sweeping changes to the model. Its review of the pool
revealed that it discriminated against coal as a fuel, that the two main generation companies
exercised significant market power in it, that it was biased against buyers, that it contained an
administered capacity payment that was incompatible with a properly function competitive
market and that, overall, the pool inflated electricity prices in the country (Green, 1999; Wolfram
1999; Wolak & Patrick 2001). In response, the government abolished the pool and replaced it
with bilateral markets.
A recent evaluation of Norway's electricity reforms indicates that there also many of the
early price gains were subsequently reversed. Based on International Energy Agency (IEA) data,
Middtun & Thomas (1998) report that household rates, for example, fell 8.2% between 1991 and
1994 after having increased more than 100% over the previous decade. However, in 1995, rates
increased by 16.4% to a level 6.5% higher than that in 1991 when the reforms had commenced.
Price comparisons are, inherently, difficult. In Norway, prices may have increased even
more had the reforms not been undertaken. In England, the price effects can be attributed also to
a variety of other factors such as the age of generation units, the fuel mix employed, and
changing technologies. Nevertheless, the initial rosy assessments of electricity reform are
definitely more questionable than initially believed.
Over-optimistic initial assessments of favourable movements in electricity rates are,
however, not the only problem noted with electricity reforms exercises. More problematic,
deregulated electricity markets have corresponded with a decrease in the security of supply. In
Norway, for example, Middtun & Thomas (1998) related that many generators were complaining
about the financial viability of their investments and were curtailing their investment
programmes. Shortly thereafter Norway suffered through an electricity shortage in 1999.
Of all electricity market making efforts, California's electricity fiasco is now a well-
researched case (see, for example, Joskow 2001; Joskow & Kahn 2001; Borenstein, Bushnell &
Wolak 2002; and Woo 2000) and points to some of the hazards lurking within reform initiatives.
In 1993, California's retail rates were about 30% higher than the national average primarily
because of sunk costs resulting from investment and procurement decisions made by investors
under the regulatory oversight of the California Public Utilities Commission. Advocates of
electricity liberalisation in California may have been hoping to shift the burden of these sunk
104
costs from ratepayers to the shareholders of the investor-owned utilities but the utilities-Pacific
Gas & Electric (PG&E), Southern California Edison (SCE) and San Diego Gas & Electric
(SDG&E)-had enough political clout to ensure that the eventual restructuring bill would allow
them to recover their sunk investments. Consequently, California's 1996 electricity restructuring
bill froze retail rates at levels higher than those that would have prevailed had they been based on
a simple pass-through of prices prevalent in the wholesale markets. The idea was that these
higher rates would compensate the utilities for their sunk costs and that once the utilities had
recovered their sunk costs, retail rates could be unfrozen. The logic of this system was based on
the universal expectation at that time that wholesale rates would, in fact, remain low or continue
to fall and so the utilities would enjoy a larger margin between their wholesale and retail rates.
As it turned out, wholesale rates moved in exactly the opposite direction. Utilities were forced to
pay ever higher prices for wholesale electricity but because their retail rates were frozen, could
not pass on the additional expenses to the consumers. In early 2001, the situation became critical:
in February, the California Power Exchange suspended trading; in April, the state's largest utility
declared bankruptcy; and between January and May, the state government spent over US$ 7
billion in purchasing wholesale power.
A combination of strategic error in forecasting the movement in wholesale prices, bad
market designs including an absence of a contract market, and market power led to the California
fiasco. It would be incorrect to conclude that liberalisation per se led to California's problem. A
better market design might well have yielded better results. But, the cautionary tale about the
dangers of power markets still holds.
On the whole, industrialised country experiences with electricity privatisation,
liberalisation and market-making reveal consistent trends, some of which are very positive while
others are disquieting. Problems with maintaining security of supply, price volatility, the exercise
of market power by large incumbent generators have made it clear that an efficient electricity
market does not come about autonomously and that policymakers have to invest time and
resources in discovering the right combination of market structures and rules. As a consequence,
the transition to competitive markets has taken time and is still incomplete. In the United States,
in Britain, in the Scandinavian countries, and in the European Union in general, these efforts are
still ongoing more than a decade after they were initiated. The transition, in addition to being
long, has been difficult. Markets have not proved adept at incentivising investment in peaking
capacity and security of supply has been compromised repeatedly. Worse, it is not often clear
whether investors did not invest because the market did not provide them with enough incentives
or whether they strategically exploited the market to create scarcities that would push wholesale
prices higher.
4. Why are Electricity Markets so Difficult?
If electricity markets have proved difficult to design and maintain despite the technical and
financial resources that have been available in industrialised countries, it is because of the
technical characteristics of the electricity supply system. There are two main characteristics of
electricity that make its markets so difficult. First, electricity has very low demand elasticity
because it has virtually no substitute (at least in the short to medium terms). Second, it cannot be
stored or inventoried, which means that once capacity constraints are reached, the supply of
electricity too becomes inelastic. As a consequence, in scarcity situations where the available
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electricity supply is less than demand, or even where it does not significantly exceed demand,
market-clearing prices can be pushed to very high levels.
Further complicating electricity markets is the fact that transmission and distribution are
still mostly natural monopolies and although some countries have deregulated electricity at the
retail level, the results obtained so far have not been uniformly encouraging. In many countries,
few except the large customers have shown an inclination to switch suppliers. Competition in the
generation sector has proved to be practicable and promising in increasing efficiency and
reducing prices. However, if competition cannot be or is not extended to retail markets then the
regulation which is required ends up insulating the effect of the competition that does exist in
wholesale markets.
Finally, the co-ordination problems of the electricity grid are technically challenging.
Electricity supply and demand must be balanced at all times and at all locations in the network,
otherwise a failure in the grid will result. More extensive areas are now being interconnected via
high-voltage transmission networks. On the one hand this is making possible a more intensive
utilisation of the existing physical infrastructure but on the other hand system reliability is
becoming an ever more complex task. Systems failures have become potentially extremely
costly, a fact testified to by the scope and the rapidity with which blackouts propagated
themselves in the United States and Europe in the summer of 2004.
The combination of these technical factors and the failure to adequately anticipate and
account for them in a deregulated environment has created many market performance problems.
These problems have been exacerbated by the political sensitivity of the electricity sector which
forces policymakers to respond quickly and, at least in appearance, vigorously to any problems
that might emerge. Often, such interventions in the market lead to administered solutions that
worsen the problems they were intended to address or they create other unanticipated problems.
A classic example is where price caps act to reduce investment and cause uncertain supplies and
even greater upward pressure on prices.
It was because of these various problems with electricity markets that policymakers had
traditionally pursued a well-defined set of public tasks in the electric power industry-
principally a secure supply of electricity at a reasonable cost-through regulation. Historically,
competitive environments were believed to be welfare decreasing given the economies of scale
in the industry. Consequently, the authorities allowed electric power utilities to operate as
monopolies and pursued public tasks through regulation or public ownership or both. Regulation
of the industry was required also to reduce investment risks. Given the industry's high levels of
asset specificity, the authorities intended to ensure security of supply by reducing investment
risks and guaranteeing an adequate return on investment. Where such systems were owned by
government, regulation often took a back seat to more direct administrative interventions in
pricing and investment that too sought to pursue the same set of public tasks.
This approach largely did guarantee security of supply in industrialised countries but the
inherent weakness of the regulatory and/or state-ownership approaches were often said to
contribute to overbuilding, cost-overruns, and pharaoic projects. Contributing to the
dissatisfaction, many studies found regulation to be unsatisfactory in achieving its stated
objectives. Amongst such studies, for example, Stigler and Friedland (1962) concluded that
regulation in the electricity industry was ineffective in reducing revenue per unit of power sold
and in reducing the amount of price discrimination between domestic and industrial users while
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Moore (1975) found that regulation was not only unsuccessful in reducing rates but, perversely,
contributed to raising them. As a result, a growing segment of the policymaking community
began to believe that the security of supply was costing more than it needed to and, in response,
policymakers have been turning to markets hoping that they will better achieve the objectives
that regulations were intended to achieve.
Although they are inherently complicated, what policymakers and consumers want out of
electricity markets is a continuation of the public tasks that they have been pursuing through
regulation and public ownership. Consequently, electricity markets are supposed to perform
three primary tasks. First, electricity markets should allocate energy efficiently. Second,
electricity markets should promote competition amongst suppliers so that efficiency is
maximised and prices kept as low as possible. Third, electricity markets should provide the
correct signals to investors so that they make timely investments in capacity expansion and
thereby provide a sufficient and reliable supply of electricity.
As this paper focuses on decisions that lead to investment in capacity expansion, it will
first analyse theoretically and practically how electricity markets function, contrasting between
developed and developing country situations. In the sections that follow it will contextualise
these arguments to the Brazilian case.
4.1. Behaviour of Prices in Electricity Markets
Price setting and investment in electric power can be governed by many mechanisms,
including various forms of market or government authority. At one end of the spectrum, it is
public authority that co-ordinates economic activity, forcing the individual players to operate
according to specific directives that are established by the authorities' conception of the public
interest. Deregulation or liberalisation, as the terms are used in this paper, means shifting from a
reliance on regulation as the principle mechanism to achieve public task goals to a reliance on
competitive markets to deliver the same desired results. Shifting from administered and regulated
environments to competitive and market environments entails changing both economic
objectives and the methods of allocation. The dominant economic objective in the administered
or regulated form is maximising the public's interest whereas in the classical market system it is
maximising the individual's profit. Consequently, while output and consumption are determined
by planning in regulated environments, it is the price mechanism which determines these
variables in the market system. In regulated environments, furthermore, prices are generally
based on estimates of average costs while in the market system prices are most often derived
from marginal costs.
As described in the previous sections, most electricity markets have been designed as
commodity markets where marginal pricing or market-clearing pricing rules are used. This
results in all sellers receiving a uniform price, regardless of their costs of production. Many have
criticised such market designs because they allow sellers who have low production costs to
receive the much higher market-clearing prices. This condition is, however, true for all
commodity markets and is neither a design flaw nor an expression of market power. Intervening
administrative to change the remuneration rules to pay only the bid amount to generators would
not necessary lead to lower prices. In such cases, low-cost generators will logically no longer
continue to bid their marginal costs into the system but will, instead, estimate the likely demand
and the approximate costs of the marginal generators and bid at levels just below this to ensure
that they are dispatched. There might be a confusing period of transition during which generators
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will begin to learn about demand levels and the costs of their competitors, but eventually markets
for such information will establish themselves.
Fundamentally, there are two types of wholesale electricity markets: real-time spot
markets in which producers and consumers transact in a commodity-type market and where
prices vary by periods such as the half-hour or longer term bilateral contract markets where
producers and consumers directly negotiate prices and quantities over periods stretching into
years. Theoretical approaches have suggested and empirical research has confirmed that the
former type of market is more prone to price volatility.
In the spot markets, if the supply situation is tight then prices naturally migrate to those
based on the costs of the most expensive plants that need to be dispatched. The situation may be
exacerbated if generation capacity is concentrated within a few firms which can exercise market
power. With market power, sellers can bid above their marginal costs or even take some of their
plants out of production during peak demand times, making the supply situation even tighter and
pushing prices up even higher.
Volatility is also exacerbated because, unlike other industries such as
telecommunications or airlines where capacity can be adjusted and demand is responsive to price
changes, there is little demand or supply elasticity in the electricity market. Furthermore, unlike
telecommunications for example, where capacity shortages lead to something as innocuous as a
temporary busy signal, shortages or imbalances in the electricity sector lead to very costly and
disruptive blackouts.
Bilateral contracts markets in which buyers and sellers lock in prices and quantities over
a period of time are less volatile because periodic shortages and surpluses are smoothed out.
Even though bilateral contracts markets are less volatile, they are not necessarily cheaper. It is
unlikely that the average prices in spot and bilateral markets will differ significantly because if
they do then it would create arbitrage opportunities. Therefore, even if the spot market accounts
for a small fraction of total power contracted it should still act as a signal for prices in all
wholesale power markets. If, for example, power obtained through long-term power contracts is
consistently and significantly cheaper than that which can be obtained through the spot market,
then buyers would naturally migrate to the long-term markets raising its prices and lowering
them in the spot markets and vice versa.
In both spot and bilateral markets, the fundamental undesirable characteristic is that
prices are determined by the most expensive plant that must run. This means that all of the low
cost plants may earn significant economic rents. Regulation and public ownership, theoretically
at least, avoided this situation because each plant was remunerated according to its cost.
Assuming that productive efficiencies are comparable under regulation and competitive markets
(which is often not the case) average cost pricing differentiated by plants would yield lower
market prices when supply is tight because the costs of the marginal units will be extremely high.
The prices in the competitive (unregulated) market would be even higher if some producers
exercise significant market power and are able to price above marginal cost. On the other hand, if
surplus capacity exists, marginal costs will be well below average costs because the most
expensive plants will not enter the equation. In such cases, the price in competitive markets may
be lower than the price that regulated markets would produce.
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Thus, how well competitive wholesale markets meet the expectations and satisfy the
desires of policymakers and customers depends upon what the supply conditions are. If supply is
plentiful, governments and customers will prefer the outcomes of competitive markets. From
only a pricing perspective, it should not matter much whether the electricity is traded primarily in
spot or long-term bilateral markets as the average prices in both will tend towards the same
value.
4.2. Investment in Deregulated Markets
Our interest now shifts to how well the various market governance mechanisms work to
promote investment in generation capacity, especially that of peaking plants. Peaking supplies
are important because they play a critical role in maintaining reliability during high demand
hours and also provide a cushion against unexpected outages in base-load plants. The problem
with peaking plants in a competitive market system is that they may run only infrequently.
Investors will invest only if they expect to make an acceptable return on their capital
outlays. Theoretically, therefore, to recover sunk or fixed costs, high-cost firms or plants would
have to set prices above their marginal short-run costs otherwise peaking capacity would never
cover its capital costs. Thus, periods of high prices are particularly important to the profitability
of peaking plants. Orthodox market proponents therefore recommend that no constraints be
placed on market prices, explaining that price spikes reflect scarcity more than market power and
any attempts to limit prices would only make the supply situation worse.
Regulated markets, with an implicit guarantee of returns on investment were effective in
promoting investment in generation; indeed some scholars even faulted them for promoting over-
investment (Averich & Johnson 1962). Competitive markets-generally seen as a cheaper
alternative to regulation precisely because they discourage over-investment and other
inefficiencies-have, however, demonstrated problems in promoting timely and adequate
investment in generation.
In competitive electricity markets, if it were left to price signals then investment in
electric power generation facilities would be quite jerky, prone to repeated episodes of shortages
and surplus. First, it takes time, even after the market signals investment, for new capacity to be
built. Generation plants have long lead times. Fossil fuel power plants generally take about two
years to build while hydroelectric plants can take between three to six years to construct. Time
and cost overruns are also frequent occurrences in power projects. As such, supply cannot adjust
rapidly to changes in demand.
Second, the market signals are themselves delayed. Power generation is a capital
intensive activity, which is to say that it has high fixed costs. This means that the marginal
system prices are frequently less than average costs. When the supply situation is comfortable
and sufficient surplus capacity exists, firms will produce and sell as long as the market prices are
above their marginal costs and prices are likely to be much below the average costs of the
marginal generating units. The main problem with this situation is that such marginal cost
pricing will not allow such plants, which do not form part of the base-load capacity, to recover
their fixed costs. As such, price signals to incentivise investment will not be sent until such time
as the supply situation becomes fairly stressed. As a consequence, investment in generation
capacity will be lower and slower than desired from the systems reliability perspective.
Generally, increasing capacity utilisation should lead to a sufficient and sustained increase in the
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general level of prices that would make investment in new peaking capacity economically
attractive but this would occur only after the supply situation had already become tight.
Furthermore, once the new capacity is created and a degree of supply surplus obtained, prices
will again settle down to levels where it would be uneconomic to further increase capacity and
the cycle would repeat itself. Thus, investment in power generation facilities would be lumpy.
This does not augur well for security of supply. If the long-run marginal costs can be
reached only at close to full capacity utilisation, then investors are unlikely to create significant
reserve capacity and the industry will be operating for extended, undesirable, periods of time at
the capacity frontier. Given that it is normal for plants to be taken out for maintenance, scheduled
or unscheduled, the risks of supply disruptions in such situations would be unacceptably high.
The existing base of power plants also affects investment patterns. If the marginal costs
of new plants are less than those of the old ones, then, as they cede market space to the newer
cheaper entrants, the old plants may be mothballed or shifted to peaking production. In this
situation, few problems arise if the capital costs of the old plant is already amortised. However, if
the capital costs are not amortised, then a stranded assets problem is created which, like the
plants in California and the nuclear plants in the UK, require an administrative solution.
If, on the other hand, the new facilities are more expensive than the existing facilities, it
will be much harder to get investment without some form of regulatory intervention that
compensates generators for making units available even if those units do not run. The objective
of such intervention is to provide investors a return based on their average and not their marginal
costs. One simple form for compensating investors when their plants run too infrequently to be
profitable is to create a system of capacity payments made to owners of generation plants to
make them available on a stand-by basis. In England, for example, the systems operator
determined capacity payments based on an estimated loss of load probability (LOLP) and a value
of lost load (VOLL) which was set by the government. All generators that made plant available
would be paid the capacity payment, which was calculated as LOLP x (VOLL-SMP), where
SMP was the marginal system price. These payments tend to increase the security of supply but
they also raise the average price of electricity.
Thus, like the prices discussed in the previous section, investment behaviour too is
context specific. If new investments are likely to be more competitive than the existing plants,
then installed capacity will increase as the older plants are replaced by newer and cheaper ones.
If the contrary, then other financial incentives will need to be offered in order to ensure sufficient
investment in peaking supplies.
4.3. Partial Deregulation and Regulatory Uncertainty
In competitive markets, electricity shortages can result both if new plants are more
expensive than existing ones and if investors are pessimistic about future demand. Since demand
itself cannot adjust quickly in the face of supply constraints and because consumer willingness to
pay for uninterrupted electricity supply can be high, prices can skyrocket. Furthermore, even
with skyrocketing prices, it takes time to construct new capacity and supply shortages may not be
avoided till such time as prices reach such stratospheric levels that a big chunk of demand is
actually priced out of the market. If, as in California, retail consumers are protected from price
variations, then shortages cannot be avoided even by massive price increases in wholesale
markets.
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The previous sections have illustrated how competitive wholesale electricity markets may
not provide adequate capacity. In such scenarios, various forms of regulatory and administrative
interventions become necessary. Indeed, many policymakers themselves have been agnostic
about the market's ability to provide an adequate supply of electricity and have attempted to
blend regulation and competition in order to combine the advantages of the two forms of
governance. With more markets then, ironically, more regulation is required to ensure security of
supply and reasonable prices. These regulations are complex both because they attempt to
harmonise regulation with competition and because competition itself is difficult to promote
across the industry. Whereas in an ideal electricity market there would be price competition in
the entire productive chain of the industry, the structure and technical characteristics of the
electricity industry are, however, hampering efforts towards full deregulation and, as Stigler
(1952) put it, "an industry which does not have a competitive structure will not have competitive
behaviour."
Full deregulation, some have argued, would take care of market problems because the
problems with competitive electricity markets has not been too much deregulation but too little
liberalisation. Such opinions castigate policymakers for being too timid. However, a certain
degree of timidity in electricity deregulation is well-founded because, as Joskow (1997) noted:
"(o)nce a state removes a utility's traditional obligations to serve,
required unbundled rates, provides open access to the network, gives
retail customers a choice, deregulates generation prices and entry, and
requires utilities to divest a significant amount of generation capacity
(or through breaking up during the privatisation process), it will be
very difficult for a state commission to turn the clock back."
Almost all electricity market reform programmes have experienced problems at the
outset and mid-course corrections have always been necessary to mitigate market performance
problems. When problems emerge, government officials are under pressure act quickly and
decisively to fix the problems. Evolving initiatives to remedy serious market performance
problems should therefore be an expected feature of the prices of creating efficient competitive
wholesale electricity markets.
Although it may be inevitable until the right mix of market and regulatory control is
found, such frequent fiddling with the rules can by itself discourage investment. It threatens
regulatory credibility, especially in developing countries which do not have a history of
regulatory independence. In volatile situations, investors may actually anticipate future
regulatory interventions (which will frequently be to their disadvantage) and enter a holding
pattern, which itself forces the intervention that they had feared. The lack of regulatory
credibility thus becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy (Kydland and Prescott 1977). For example,
substantial investment occurs when there are substantial profits to be made. If prices rise as a
consequence of restructuring, and there is evidence of high profits, then there is bound to be
scrutiny and calls for administrative intervention. If investors, fearing price controls, resist from
making new investments and the supply situation worsens as a consequence, prices will rise even
more and put additional pressure for governments to intervene with price controls. Thus, given
the politicised nature of the electricity industry, the problem is that benefits will only occur in the
long run as the structure of the industry slowly evolves, but short-term problems and policy
pressures can derail the processes of reform.
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5. Structure and Peculiarities of the Brazilian Electricity System
Thus far this paper has argued a general case based on the experiences of developed countries.
The paper's focus will now shift to Brazil's experience with developing electricity markets. In
1993, Brazil began reforming its electric power sector. Before the power reforms, price setting
was based on the traditional rate of return regulatory model in which electricity rates,
theoretically at least, reflected the utilities' incurred costs plus an allowance that would allow the
utility to earn a pre-defined rate of return on assets.37 In initiating the reforms, Brazil passed of a
series of laws that were intended to allow more market oriented pricing policies. Privatisation of
the industry began in 1995 with the auction of distribution concessions. At the beginning of the
privatisation process, the policy did not force vertical separation but did restrict distribution
companies to self-supplying a maximum of 30% of their requirements. To prevent market power,
generation companies were restricted to a maximum share of 35% in their regional market and
25% nationally. In 1998, Brazil introduced its version of a spot wholesale electricity market
(MAE) and bilateral contracts markets. According to the new Brazilian electricity policy,
distribution companies had to contract for at least 85% of their load via long term bilateral
supply contracts. The spot market would, therefore, cater to only a small proportion of the
overall electricity market. 3 8 On the retail end, new customers whose power requirements
exceeded 3MW and existing customers whose demand was over 10MW were free to purchase
power competitively and the policy envisioned a gradual relaxation of these limits.
5.1. Structure and Planning in Brazilian Electricity
A background knowledge of the structure of Brazil's electricity industry is critical to
understanding how its electricity reforms and markets were constructed and in this story the
effect of hydropower looms large. Brazil is one of a few large countries where hydropower is the
dominant source of electricity. Large hydropower schemes became Brazil's technology of choice
for electricity because of favourable geographic factors, the country's chosen economic growth
strategies and subsidised capital. In terms of installed hydropower capacity, Brazil now ranks
behind only the United States and Canada and, with over 90% of its electricity needs being
supplied by hydroelectric plants, behind only Norway in terms of its dependence upon
hydropower.
Even compared to the other major hydropower producing countries, Brazil's electricity
structure is somewhat unique. First, Brazil's hydroelectric reservoirs are rain-fed and the rainfall
patterns vary considerably from year to year. As such, Brazilian power engineers designed
hydropower dams with very large reservoirs so that the system could withstand even several
years of drought. Second, in Brazil very often several dams have been constructed in a cascade -
on the same river and, frequently, these dams are owned by different generation companies.
Since the production decisions of any one plant impacts the production capabilities of all the
37Although the 1934 Water Code guaranteed a minimum 10% return on assets for electric power utilities, successive
governments often did not adhere to this provision. Whenever demanded by economic pressures, primarily inflation,
governments generally suppressed electricity rates.
Brazilian power reforms have been treated in greater detail elsewhere and this paper will provide only a brief
overview of the reforms.
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other downstream plants, in order to optimise electricity production the generation from these
various plants has to be co-ordinated
The fact that Brazil's hydroelectric system functions on a pluri-annual basis
fundamentally affects the manner in which capacity constraints and security of supply are
determined. To illustrate, let us take the example of a power generation infrastructure based
predominantly on thermal power plants and assume that there are no problems with the fuel
supply, be it coal, gas, diesel or nuclear. In such a case, capacity is constrained if during peak
consumption hours or during peak consumption months, the sum of the plants running at full
capacity (taking into account normal outages for maintenance, etc) is unable to supply the total
amount of power demanded. This would necessitate as immediate measures the adoption of
rationing or of rolling blackouts or brownouts in order to reduce the effective demand or, if a
market-based measure is preferred, the raising of prices to levels high enough to price out
enough demand from the market. This shortfall in capacity can be eliminated only by
constructing additional power plants, for which high prices in wholesale electricity markets
should act as an incentive. In Brazil, however, capacity constraint is not directly determined by
the installed capacity but rather by the previsions of the stock of water (the fuel) in the reservoirs,
which being dependent on rainfall cannot readily be replenished. If reservoir levels are healthy
and there are favourable previsions for rainfall in the future, then supplies are considered
plentiful and capacity is not constrained. On the other hand, if reservoir levels are low and the
previsions are for only scant rainfall, then capacity would be considered severely constrained.
These two diametrically opposed conditions of plenty and scarce may be encountered even with
the same demand levels and installed capacity. Installed capacity in Brazil is, therefore, always
capable of meeting demand at any given point in time and power is considered scarce only when
the system, if it were to continuously satisfy all the demand, would eventually run out of water
before the rains came.
To determine if installed capacity is, in fact, sufficient, electricity planners in Brazil had
to adopt a unique set of criteria. Since rainfall in Brazil is inherently and substantially erratic,
engineers from Eletrobras-Brazil's federally-owned power generation holding company-
devised a probabilistic system in which installed capacity is considered sufficient if the available
power generation infrastructure is able to guarantee supply of all demand in at least 95% of the
rainfall scenarios simulated each year. In other words, of the various hydrological scenarios
simulated it is expected that supply problems will occur in less than 5% of the scenarios. This
5% risk of shortages was, according to the Eletrobras planners, the appropriate trade-off between
security of supply and cost.39 To reduce the risk further would require the construction of so
much surplus capacity as to render it uneconomic. If the risk of shortages exceeds 5%, then
additional capacity is required in order to relieve the pressure on existing reservoirs.
The primary objective of the electricity dispatch system in Brazil is to optimise the
country's hydropower resources. This optimisation consists of two discrete tasks. The first task is
to maximise the amount of hydroelectricity generation potential via co-ordinated production
decisions. The second task is to determine how much thermal power to produce in conjunction
with the hydropower.
39 In the 1970s, the rainfall scenarios were based on the assumption that the worst recorded drought might reoccur.
This was updated later to incorporate a considerably larger number of theoretical rainfall scenarios produced by a
probabilistic model.
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As mentioned above, in Brazil there are often several dams owned by different
generation companies lined up on the same river system. Consequently, the production decisions
of any one plant create positive or negative externalities for other plants. A simple illustrative
example will make this point much clearer. Assume that there are three different plants on a
river, A downstream from B which itself is downstream from C. Assume also that the reservoirs
of A, B, and C are full. Now if in period 1, when the opportunity cost of water is low, C decides
to bid low enough to be dispatched, A & B will also be forced to produce in order to create space
for the water coming in from C's reservoirs and given this surplus production, the price of their
power will be more or less zero. In this scenario it would be more efficient for A to produce
first, empty its reservoirs, then B to produce, thereby refilling A's reservoirs, followed by C,
which would refill B's reservoirs and so on. Thus, the same volume of water stored in C's
reservoirs produces electricity three times: at C, again at B and again at A. During times of water
scarcity, it becomes even more important that the reservoirs be operated in a co-ordinated
manner. As a matter of fact, Eletrobras had estimated that not operating the reservoirs in a co-
ordinated manner would require an additional 30% of installed capacity in order to produce the
same amount of electricity.
Similarly, the scenarios of hydropower production developed by Eletrobras dictated the
thermal power production decisions. Because the actual marginal costs of producing
hydroelectricity are extremely low, the preference is always to avoid generating power from
thermal plants as much as possible. As long as reservoir levels and previsions for rainfall are
favourable, then the opportunity cost of producing electricity from hydroelectric plants versus
storing the water for production at a later date is low and the systems operator would not
dispatch power from thermal power plants. Thermal power plants would only be dispatched in
cases of water shortage and, theoretically, for the minimum amount necessary to carry the system
into the next period of rainfall. Using the 5% risk of shortage criteria established by Electrobras,
this would mean that the systems operator would seek to dispatch the minimum amount of
thermal power that would ensure uninterrupted electricity supply in 95% of the rainfall scenarios
calculated for the period in question. It is for this reason also that although hydropower
represents about 90% of installed capacity, hydroelectricity comprises over 95% of the electricity
actually produced in the country. Most thermal plants, therefore, are run quite infrequently
except in the regions isolated from the nationally linked electricity grids.
5.2. Price Setting in Brazil's Electricity Industry
Price setting in the Brazilian electricity industry was based on the same general principles
as other electricity industries but were adapted to the structural peculiarities of the Brazilian
power infrastructure. Before the reforms, Brazilian power prices-when the economic and
political situation allowed40-were based on rate of return regulation where prices are set to
compensate the owner for all the operational costs plus a pre-determined return on capital. After
the reforms, the Brazilian system was loosely based on the British model, with its spot and
bilateral markets. There were, however, some fundamental differences between the two. Prices in
the British power pool were the market-clearing prices. The British systems operator would
dispatch plants based on their bid values until all demand was satisfied. The price all producers
would then receive would be what the last (most expensive) plant dispatched had bid. This bid
value, theoretically, was the system marginal cost. The prices in the Brazilian wholesale market,
40Generally, Brazilian electricity rates after 1978 were kept low as an inflation control measure and the electricity
firms generally ceased to make adequate returns on investment.
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the MAE, like the spot prices in the British pool market, intended to represent the system
marginal cost at which supply and demand are in balance but, unlike in the British spot market,
there was no competitive price bidding by hydropower generators to sell in this market. Instead,
it was the ONS that determined the dispatch scheme and the price using calculations based on
probabilistic models that estimated the opportunity cost of using water to produce electricity in
the present versus in the future.
The requirement to maximise the potential hydroelectric generation, as discussed in the
previous section, was the main reason that hydropower generators were not allowed to bid
competitively into the system. Given that hydropower generators were not given any control over
their own production decisions, a unique payment scheme was devised for them. First, the
National Electric Power Regulatory Agency (ANEEL) would calculate the total amount of
assured hydropower in the system and then issue assured energy certificates (CEA) to each
generation firm in proportion to its share of total potential generation capacity. Then, of the total
volume of hydropower dispatched, the generation firms are paid in proportion to their share of
the total CEAs. Thus, for example, a particular firm may physically supply 50% of the electricity
produced in a given period but if its CEAs amount to only a 40% share of potential production
then it would receive only 40% of the total hydropower revenue for that period.
The idea behind this payment scheme was that in a later period this firm would produce
less than its designated share and be compensated for this lost revenue. The Energy Relocation
Mechanism (ERM) was devised to operationalise this idea. It allocated output from plants that
produced less than their share of assured energy to those that produced more. Thus, ERM
guaranteed hydropower producers their assured energy entitlement, provided that in aggregate
the hydropower generators produced enough to meet their total assured energy commitments. If
the total hydroelectric production is greater than the CEA then the surplus, known as secondary
energy, would be shared by all hydropower generators. If the total hydroelectric production were
less than the CEA, then it was incumbent upon hydropower producers to purchase the power
deficit in the MAE. Again, all hydroelectric producers were equally exposed if, as a whole, they
had to secure power in the MAE. This dispatch and payment scheme, it was expected, would
eliminate many of the incentives hydropower generation firms may have to ignore the ONS' real
time dispatch instructions. What this resulted in was a centralised production decision which,
although necessary to optimise production, meant that risk management on the part of the market
participants was absent.
Since hydropower producers, who produce about 95% of the total electricity consumed,
have no control over their pricing and production decisions in Brazil, the MAE could not be bid-
based. As such, the system marginal price had to be calculated differently. For the hydroelectric
generators, the marginal price was calculated as the opportunity cost of producing the electricity
at the present time or at some point of time in the future. This price was, therefore, a probabilistic
determination of the likely reservoir levels in the future.
The system marginal cost was then used to decide the production of thermal power. All
the thermal power generation facilities were required to submit production cost data to ONS and
using this data ONS uses a stochastic dynamic programming model to determine how much
thermal power should be dispatched and from which units. If the system marginal price as
calculated by the ONS were higher than the marginal cost of the thermal plants, then they would
be dispatched in a manner similar to the British system with the lowest bidders dispatched first.
Unlike the hydropower units which would receive compensation based not on their actual
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production but rather on their share of total potential production, thermal facilities would be paid
for their share of actual production.
With the physical dispatch complete divorced from the financial transactions and
contracts, in and of itself, the Brazilian MAE was not designed to play a significant role in
electricity trading, price-setting or incentivising generation investment. The Brazilian electricity
policy required distribution companies to sign long-term power supply contracts with generators
to supply at least 85% of their estimated demands. As such, it would only be small amounts of
non-contracted energy that would be traded in the MAE and settled at the MAE prices. However,
with the proposed liberalisation of retail markets, MAE would inevitably come to play a greater
role.
The wholesale price of electricity in Brazil would be established principally in the
bilateral contracts market. Initially, the government had locked this price for eight years. To
prepare the industry for the transition to a private and competitive environment, the government
had required all generation companies to sign a set of initial contracts with their corresponding
distribution companies. The volumes of these contracts were set to reflect the level of assured
energy that the generators could supply (based on the 5% risk of deficit criterion) and the prices
were set to be in line with those in the existing regulated supply contracts. These prices would
remain constant through the life of the contracts but they would be adjusted for inflation. The
initial contracts were supposed to last eight years, with 100% of the generators' assured energy
covered for the first four years. Then, over the following four years, 25% of the volume would be
liberated each year, to be freely negotiated between generators and consumers. Thus, after eight
years, all wholesale prices would be deregulated and established in competitive markets. On the
retail end, the Brazilian power reforms again borrowed from the British system. Distribution
companies were allowed to fully pass-through to the customers the cost of wholesale power
procurement subject to a price cap (called Normative Value or VN) established by ANEEL. The
distributors' own costs were regulated by the common RPI-X system.
6. Mischievous Markets
Before the reforms, most of the technical decisions regarding investment and dispatch were made
by the public sector with a view to ensuring that Brazil's electricity industry was run efficiently
and fulfilled the public tasks assigned to it. This approach was widely criticised as inefficient and
expensive. Critics blamed the public ownership of Brazilian electric power assets for the sector's
high levels of debt and its inability to invest sufficiently to keep up with demand increases.
Brazil's power reforms, motivated initially by the need to ramp up investments through
privatisation, sought to eventually assign to the market the tasks of providing an adequate and
efficient electricity infrastructure.
Making electricity markets is a complex task, but from its inception, creating the
Brazilian power market was an especially complex undertaking. It required high degrees of
regulatory and administrative intervention in its day-to-day functioning. Brazil's electricity
industry planning methods and structures, which had been developed when it was state-owned
and centrally controlled, had to be adapted to a new decentralised, privatised and competitive
environment. In the process of doing so, the government had to balance competing economic
demands that were pulling the reforms processes in different directions. This section analyses the
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actual effects and potential impacts of the proposed reforms on prices and investment in the
Brazilian electricity industry.
6.1. Price Signals
Prices in almost all types of spot electricity markets are volatile but in Brazil they are
especially so. Since the Brazilian hydropower system was designed to attend demand even in
situations of severe drought, for most of the time there will be a significant supply surplus and
consequently the opportunity cost of water in the hydropower reservoirs and the price of
electricity in short-term markets will be extremely low, more or less equal to the few dollars it
costs to open and shut sluice gates in the dams. Only in a very limited number of occasions
would the available hydropower be unable to attend all of the demand. In even fewer occasions
would supply approach its limits. Electricity prices in Brazil would therefore generally remain
low but when supply limits are reached the prices could potentially spike up to extremely high
levels (see Figure 1).
This form of volatility in the Brazilian electricity system seriously limits the ability of
spot markets to be useful in signalling new investments. With prices remaining so low for most
of the year, or even for consecutive years, most new plants would be unable to recuperate their
fixed costs. This limitation of short-term competitive markets was recognised during the
Brazilian power reforms process. Consequently, the government initially made it compulsory for
distribution companies to contract for at least 85% of their power requirements through long-
term bilateral contracts. It was expected that this necessity to contract would provide the basis for
generation capacity expansion. If a distribution company anticipates an increase in its demand,
then it would contract for power with the most competitive supplier, who would then, in turn, be
able to use the power purchase agreements to obtain project finance.
In a static analysis, these provisions appear sufficient to guarantee adequate capacity
expansion. However, the proposed full deregulation of retail markets sometime in the future
would contaminate the investment decisions. Although the initial policy focus was on
privatisation, Brazil's policymakers intended to segregate the power industry into four
segments-generation, transmission, distribution and retail. The wires business-transmission
and distribution-would have to be regulated as natural monopolies but competition would be
introduced, first in generation and then in retail markets. Initially, the distribution companies
were awarded exclusive retail franchises, but the Brazilian electricity policy intended to split
them into distribution and retail functions and fully liberalise retail markets after a period of
transition.
After introducing retail level liberalisation, Brazilian policymakers would no longer be
able to mandate such requirements as contracting 85% of total demand and the system of
compulsory contracting between distribution companies and generation companies would
become untenable. A regulator could certainly not require distribution companies to sign long-
term power purchase contracts for a certain pre-defined load if its customers would be free to
switch suppliers. Retail suppliers could no doubt sign such contracts to lock-in wholesale prices
for themselves and many might do so but they would have to do so based on their own
assessments of risk. However, given the extremely low levels of prices prevalent in spot markets
for most of the time in Brazil, there would be a strong incentive for retail firms to procure
directly in the spot markets, with perhaps financial hedges for those occasional periods of price
spikes. Retail firms that locked themselves into power purchase contracts at higher prices risked
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seeing their customers migrate to other operators procuring power directly in the spot markets.
These strategies would, therefore, hinder the supply of financing for generation investment.
Deregulated retail markets that could work could no doubt be designed for the Brazilian market
but they would require extremely well thought out and detailed governance structures. Given the
rapidity with which the industry was being privatised, the time and resources required to create
these structures had not been invested.
6.2. Investment Decision Distortions
Competitive markets generally offer few opportunities for peaking supplies to recover
their capital costs (unless there are specific administrative or regulatory provisions-such as
capacity charges-for investors to be compensated for their capital independently of the
prevailing wholesale prices). In such cases, investors favour plants with lower capital costs
which allow them to recover their fixed costs more easily (Teisberg 1993). The trade-off that the
investor makes in this case is that the plants with lower fixed costs will generally have higher
operating costs. If the plant with lower fixed costs also has lower total or average costs, then the
investment is efficient from the long term perspective. However, if the contrary, then the investor
sacrifices long-term efficiency in exchange for lower capital exposure. As a consequence the
average electricity prices will tend to be higher. In effect, this type of strategic decision-making
could cause the industry supply curve to shift upwards.
In the Brazilian case, the trade-off which investors had to make was between thermal and
hydroelectric plants. The difference between their capital costs was substantial. Thermal power
plants generally cost US$ 600 per kW of installed capacity whereas hydroelectric plants could
cost anywhere between US$ 800 to US$ 1,200 per kW. In spot markets, hydroelectric power
would no doubt be more competitive since it has an operating or marginal cost of about US$ 5
per MWh whereas thermal plants, depending on fuel costs, have an operating cost around four
times as much. If given the much higher capital costs of hydroelectric plants their total costs
would be higher than that of thermal plants, then an investor preference for the lower capital cost
option would be economically efficient. However, in the Brazilian case, average costs per MWh
of thermal plants were almost 20% higher than those of hydroelectric plants (approximately US$
39-41 per MWh for thermal versus US$ 32-34 per MWh for hydro). As such, even from the
long-term perspective, hydropower plants were more competitive.
Because investors were apprehensive that they would enjoy few opportunities to recover
their capital costs in a competitive Brazilian power market, they preferred to invest in thermal
over hydroelectric plants. Their preference was temporarily shared by the government because of
the tenuous power supply situation. Thermal power plants can be brought on-line much faster
than hydropower plants and were therefore preferred for the immediate future despite their
higher costs. This preference, combined with the investors' own concerns, led the government to
create the Priority Programme for Thermoelectric Power (PPT), which intended to add over 18
GW of installed capacity between 1999 and 2003 by constructing almost 50 new thermoelectric
plants.
In purely competitive markets, it was not possible for thermal power to compete with
hydropower. A short-term measure that ANEEL created to overcome these market-based
constraints was that they allowed distribution companies which contracted with thermal power
producers to pass-through a greater wholesale charge. To do so, ANEEL established a VN of R$
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61.80 for thermal power supplies as opposed to a VN of R$ 57.20 for "competitive" or
hydropower supplies. This measure could only work as long as retail markets were monopolistic
and regulated. Should retail markets be liberalised, retail commercialisers would cease to
contract with the more expensive thermal power supplies. Even if regulators would put
restrictions on how much hydroelectric power could be sold through bilateral contracts in an
effort to stimulate the sale of other types of power, retail commercialisers would still find it
advantageous most of the time to source the excess hydropower directly in the spot markets.
This does not mean that the more expensive thermal power supplies had no place in the
competitive electricity markets. Thermal supplies would be needed as peaking power. However,
it would be very difficult for them to find parties willing to sign long-term take-or-pay power
purchase agreements in a deregulated and competitive environment. In such an environment
investors, lacking the assured cash-flows of power purchase agreements, would then find it
difficult to obtain project finance, which in turn would make it difficult for peaking supplies to
be constructed.
From any other than the short-term perspective, the PPT was logically flawed. In reality,
however, the programme failed to take off not because of longer term strategic inconsistencies
but because of short-term commercial problems. The immediate problem that confronted the
PPT was that the initial contracts that the distribution companies were required to sign with the
generation companies covered 100% of the former's power requirements between 1999 and
2001. As such, there was no commercial space in which the PPT plants could sell their power
even though there was a physical necessity for the new power. This created an asymmetric risk
for distribution companies. They believed that their initial supply contracts with generation
companies protected them from financial exposure in the event of a power shortage. If they did
contract for additional power and there was no shortage, then they would be left financially
exposed since the ANEEL would not allow them to pass through to the customers the costs of
the extra power contracted. Even if the commercial space had been available for investors to
contract with distribution companies, there were other economic problems with the PPT. One of
the most critical of these problems was that PPT plants were to be fuelled by natural gas, which
had to be imported and paid for in dollars. Since the Real Plan forbade linking utility rates to the
dollar, this created significant exchange rate risks for the thermal power operators. Furthermore,
given the prevailing natural gas prices, the VN established by ANEEL was in any case too low to
allow the thermal power plant operators to make an acceptable return on their investments. An
alternative option to construct the PPT plants as merchant plants which would sell directly in
spot markets was deemed too risky by the investors.
Although the idea implicit in the PPT was that private investors would build the plants
largely using their own resources, eventually the Brazilian government had to intervene
forcefully to stimulate investment through its various agencies, including Petrobras and
Eletrobras. Despite the original incentives offered by the PPT-mainly low cost lines of credit
with BNDES-the economic risks of the undertakings made them unattractive to investors. Once
it realised that the amount of energy it was seeking through the private initiative would not be
realised, the government adopted a series of measures to turn these projects viable: it reduced the
average price of natural gas for the thermal generators, it created long term gas purchase
contracts between the seller (Gaspetro) and the buyers, it established a loow-interest line of
credit with BNDES and it revised the VN to an even higher level. These measures alone were not
sufficient to overcome the investors' qualms. Eventually, the PPT took off, in a modest way, but
only after the government essentially guaranteed the purchase of the PPT plants' power by
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Eletrobras and used Petrobras as a strategic investor in most of the plants. In effect, the
government abandoned market principles and returned to administratively devised frameworks
and state-provided financing to ensure sufficient investment in electric power generation
capacity. This negation of market principles was forced by the political compulsions of ensuring
an adequate supply of electricity and by the technical and economic complexities of the markets
themselves.
6.3. "Old" versus "New" Energy
Another complication to electricity markets was caused by the existing electric power
infrastructure. Even though most of Brazil's power would be traded through long-term bilateral
contracts and thereby would be insulated from the volatility of the spot markets, introducing
competition and, by extension, the freedom for producers to receive the marginal system cost for
their output would lead to a massive increase in the average price of wholesale power in the
country. A substantial portion of Brazil's hydropower was supplied by plants whose capital costs
had long been amortised. Prior to the reforms, these plants were supplying electricity, or "old
energy" as it came to be called in Brazil, at their very low operational costs of around US$ 10 per
MWh. If all of these plants were to sell at the marginal costs of the "new energy"-US$ 32-34
for new hyrdo and US$ 39-41 for thermal power-then the average wholesale electricity prices
would rise tremendously. To avoid rate shocks and smoothen the electricity industry
restructuring, the government decided to lock in the low rates of "old energy" through
compulsory initial contracts.
The government's dilemma was deciding how long to keep these rates frozen. One
segment of the government was concerned that as the initial contracts expired, an increasing
proportion of consumer bills would reflect the market clearing price rather than the significantly
lower operating costs of the amortised generation plants. Thus, liberalising these rates would
lead to a big increase in average electricity rates and push up inflation rates in the general
economy. Calculations made by a government committee established on the eve of the electricity
rationing indicated that with deregulation the average wholesale price of power would nearly
double from R$ 51 per MWh to R$ 97 per MWh between 2001 and 2006 and, as a consequence,
average retail prices would increase from R$ 124 per MWh to R$ 170 per MWh over the same
period (MME 2002).
Another segment of the government was keen to maximise revenues from the
privatisation process and thereby reduce the government's debt load. If the rates were to be
liberalised sooner rather than later, the state-owned generation companies would be more
valuable to investors. Liberalising the rates too soon, however, would lead to such large rate
increases that they would not only drive inflation but might also create popular and political
resistance to the electricity reform process. Indeed, the consultants hired by the Ministry of
Mines and Energy to chart the transformation of the Brazilian electric power industry had
recommended a much longer transition period of 15 years with small amounts of amortised
power being liberalised only after six years (Coopers & Lybrand 1997). The government,
however, decided to shorten this transition period to eight years, with one-quarter of the
amortised power being liberalised every year from the fourth year onwards.
What to do with this amortised energy was one of the most important trade-off decisions
that the government had to take. It might have preferred maintaining a certain degree of
ambiguity about its plans if that would raise the sales prices of the firms during their privatisation
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processes. But, dealing with the "old energy" issue was unavoidable. Although the government's
officially stated policy was that after the transitional period wholesale power rates would be fully
determined by the market, to the investors it did not appear very credible that the government
could remain impassive in the face of the rate shock which would unavoidably result from such a
policy. On the one hand, the government was indicating to investors its intention to fully
deregulate wholesale electricity prices but on the other hand, some senior officials within the
government were publicly expressing concern about the risking retail electricity prices following
the privatisation process. This uncertainty and lack of credibility no doubt created a high degree
of anxiety amongst investors interested in bidding for the federal generation companies.
The cheapness of the "old energy" also complicated the market for new investments.
Given the structural peculiarities of the Brazilian electricity infrastructure, it needed an
extremely large amount of "peaking" power supplies. As I had explained earlier, the available
power supplies are not as much a function of installed capacity as they are of the previsions of
rainfall. Since a much lower level of installed capacity is capable of addressing the country's
power needs most of time, Brazil's primary investment requirements were, in fact, peaking
supplies required for periods of unfavourable hydrological conditions. With few periods of time
in which such plants would actually be dispatched, with the prices for old energy being so low,
and with the absence of capacity payments, the competitive market was not the right vehicle for
ensuring that such plant-essential for long-term security of supply-would actually be built.
6.4. Partial Deregulation and Administrative and Regulatory Errors
For most practitioners in developing countries, the degrees of inefficiencies and
corruption are generally so high in public monopolies that switching from a government
monopoly to a private monopoly is in itself reform enough. Industrialised country practitioners
and theoreticians are more circumspect about the privatisation payoff and have usually insisted
on deregulation and competition as the more critical elements in promoting efficiencies, goading
innovation and providing benefits to consumers. This policy strategy to combine privatisation
with liberalisation has, in turn, been adopted by developing country policymakers, who for most
parts have tended to imitate the specific reform models adopted in industrialised countries. The
British power reforms, for example, have been both widely recommended and widely copied.
In Brazil, the liberalisation of the electricity market was not the initial policy priority of
the electricity reforms. Driving the reforms was the government's desire to ramp up investment
in power generation infrastructure and privatisation was their favoured strategy. Years of
distorted pricing policies, motivated by Brazil's macroeconomic problems, had left the state-
owned electric power firms financially weak and unable to expand the infrastructure. Brazilian
policymakers expected that removing unreasonable price controls and privatising the industry
would bring in the investment and the efficiencies required to recuperate the supply situation.
When devising their power sector reform strategy, however, they borrowed much from the
British experience and expanded the scope of the reforms exercise by intending to introduce
competition in both wholesale and retail markets.
Liberalisation proved to be a difficult process for Brazilian policymakers from both the
technical and the institutional perspectives. Technically, as the preceding sections have analysed,
the general complexities of electric power markets were accentuated in the Brazilian case.
Because of the need to optimise hydropower resources, spot market prices were defined by
computational models and not by the actions of the market participants. Further complicating the
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market was the large price differential between the "old energy" and "new energy". Regardless
of how the "old energy" issue would be dealt with, the marginal costs of the old plants would
remain significantly lower than that of any new plants that would be constructed. Most new
plants in Brazil would therefore be of the peaking variety, which are precisely the types of plants
for which competitive electricity markets are particularly unsuited.
Since relatively free electricity markets would be unable to deal with the technical
challenges posed by the Brazilian electric power infrastructure, various administrative
interventions were required. Administrative determination of these issues, however, created the
classic problem that markets are inherently most suitable for dealing with-diversity of opinions.
Whereas in a market there is a diversity of opinion that serves to make decisions more robust,
with the administrative and regulatory approaches, such diversity of opinion and the consequent
robustness of decision-making is lost. Furthermore, administrative mistakes are harder to catch
because there is no automatic "punishing" response as there is in markets. In Brazil, several such
mistakes were made, partly because explicit policy decisions about how to deal with the trade-off
amongst competing policy objectives were not made explicit. The following paragraphs relate a
sample of the administrative decisions that had to be made and the inadvertent mistakes.
First, the cost of deficit or the VOLL, which ANEEL had established at R$ 684 per
MWh, was found to be inadequate. The fall in the value of the Real after the exchange rate crisis
in 1999 meant that this value became sub-optimal. Furthermore, this cost of deficit was
implicitly assumed to be linear, which is to say that a rationing of 1% or 50% of demand was
assumed to result in the same amount of losses to the general economy. In reality the cost of
deficit increases with the magnitude of the electricity shortfall. By limiting the expression of the
scarcity value of electricity, these price caps reduced incentives for investment.
Second, the dispatch and pricing system used in Brazil meant that many decisions that
normally would have been taken by market participants via demand and supply offers had to be
decided administratively. Prices in the wholesale market, for example, were determined by the
ONS through computation models. To calculate the prices, ONS required data on demand and
supply scenarios. Demand was estimated based on data obtained from distribution companies
and previsions of economic growth. Supply was estimated based on data provided by ANEEL.
ANEEL's calculations about available generation capacity were based on the capacity of power
plants whose construction the agency had authorised, but of course there was no guarantee that
they would actually be constructed on schedule. As it transpired, many of the plants did get
delayed and some others were abandoned. Although the estimates of demand were substantially
accurate, supply previsions turned out to be off the mark.
This overestimation of supply contributed to ONS' decision to delay the dispatch of
thermal power plants in favour of the cheaper hydroelectric plants. This mistake did not really
have a major impact on investment but it did affect the management of the existing energy
supplies. Had thermal power been dispatched earlier, the rationing might have been delayed and
reduced in scope.
The subsequent power rationing then affected the commercial relations in the industry
and further called into question the functioning of the market. After the rationing generators were
exposed to liability claims for their failure to supply power. The generators, in turn, claimed that
the ONS had socialised benefit by dispatching hydropower at reduced prices even though it
would have been prudent to dispatch the more expensive thermal power. Having already
122
socialised the benefits, the generators claimed, ONS could not now privatise the subsequent
losses by holding the generators responsible for the power shortages.
The administrative solutions to the technical problems of the market were hampered by
institutional constraints. The centrepiece of the Brazilian electricity reforms-privatisation-was
run by the National Development Bank (BNDES) which had the economic skills to chart the
privatisation process but not the deep technical knowledge of the electricity industry that was
required to guide the liberalisation process. Nominally, the electricity industry came under the
purview of the Ministry of Mines and Energy but it maintained only a skeleton staff of electricity
experts because, historically, it was Eletrobras that made the technical decisions regarding
planning and operation of the system. As Eletrobras was to become one of several competing
electric power firms after the reforms it could no longer remain with the responsibilities for
planning and operating the electricity system. For this, two new agencies were created: the
National Electricity Regulatory Agency (ANEEL) and the National Systems Operator (ONS).
Both agencies suffered initially from inexperience, both technical and political. There
were pressures, implicit if not explicit, from other parts of the government to present a more
optimistic outlook for the electricity industry and to keep prices low. These pressures originated
in the privatisation process which had led to sustained increases in retail electricity tariffs.
Average retail tariffs rose almost 50% between 1995 and 1998 and some members of the
government began to press ANEEL to control the increase in electricity prices. Such pressures
began to skew agency decisions towards politically desirable rather than technically feasible
results. ANEEL, for example, came under pressure to not automatically allow the rate increases
that distribution companies were entitled to under their concessions contracts, thereby
undermining the investment environment.
The institutional uncertainties affected investor confidence and delayed investment in
generation. In substance, the government gambled with the security of supply. Given the
technical characteristics of the Brazilian electric power system the most expedient way to avoid
raising prices was to reduce the security of supply of the system. If there is a certain average
electricity price based on a 5% risk of rationing, allowing the risk of rationing to increase allows
the nominal value of the electricity prices to remain constant even though the real price increases
because the same price now buys less stand-by capacity.
Consultants and analysts who have studied the Brazilian electric power reforms have put
forward various ideas for making electricity markets works. These ideas include raising the cost
of the deficit and allowing complete pass-through of fuel costs and exchange rate shifts. While
such policy actions would allow markets to work, they would not solve the underlying political
problem of the reforms: how to minimise the trade-off between prices and security of supply.
They would allow an equilibrium to be established between supply and demand markets but
would do so by moving the supply curve more upwards than outwards. For example, raising the
cost of the deficit and instituting capacity payments, as one consultant recommended, to the
levels practised in the UK fundamentally meant increasing the average electricity rates. This
would undoubtedly increase investment but allowing prices to rise just so an equilibrium could
be reached in electricity markets did not appear to be good policy and the whole point of the
government policy was not to allow prices to rise to such an extent.
As it transpired, to resolve this conundrum the government adopted the only possible
solution which was available and that was to intervene directly with its own capital to reduce
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both the cost and the amount of capital required of the private sector. Indeed, only a very small
share of the investment in thermal power was constructed on entirely commercial principles and
only three projects-by AES, El Paso, and Enron-were financed purely by the private sector.
Most of the projects had a high percentage of public capital and multilateral agency financing.
The market mischievously ended up forcing government to assume an even more of an active
role in investment.
7. Conclusions
Several lessons can be gleaned from the international and Brazilian experiences with power
sector reforms. The most important lesson is that power markets are far more complex than their
advocates (and the critics of failed reforms programmes) have allowed for. The complexity of
electricity markets, related to their technical characteristics, has created a number of specific
performance problems. First, electricity markets do not work very well under conditions of tight
supply. When supplies are constrained, problems with price volatility and exercise of market
power by some participants have been recurring problems. The combination of tight supplies and
demand inelasticity means that prices can rise to very high levels. Second, competitive electricity
markets often do not send the right signals for investment in generation, especially of peaking
supplies. This, in turn, also feeds into price volatility and exercise of market power because it
makes the supply situation even tighter. Third, introducing competition into generation markets
has proved feasible but doing the same in retail markets has been much slower. Consequently,
deregulation of the industry has been piecemeal and slow and regulatory intervention has further
distorted market signals. Fourth, experiments with competitive electricity markets have forced a
recognition of the fact that the choice of market design implies making choices about trade-offs
amongst various competing policy objectives.
The most important trade-off is between security of supply and electricity rates. Other
trade-offs include that of rates versus privatisation receipts and of promoting competition versus
promoting large internationally competitive firms. Markets are therefore distinguished by their
structure and rules as these structures and rules are implemented to obtain certain desired
objectives. While everybody instinctively knows what "market" means, this paper has
highlighted the fact that there is not just one model of market in the electric power industry that
one can evaluate and pronounce upon. To come back to the minister's phrase "as much market as
possible" implies asking market for what and consequently, what type of market. Depending on
the policy priorities, the rules of the game, i.e., the market can be very different. Some
conceptions of markets become more popular and hegemonic and desirable from a certain point
of view and therefore have more legitimacy, but they are not necessarily the most appropriate for
some of the contexts in which they have been applied.
Because of these complexities, market-based reforms are not recipes that can be easily
transplanted from one context to another. The first part of this paper introduced the reader to the
electricity reforms in industrialised countries. Its purpose was to provide a base from which to
analyse probable impacts of making electricity markets in developing countries where there is
much less of an experience. Even in developed counties electric power markets are works in
progress that have taken years or even a decade (or more) to work reasonably well. Often,
expensive mistakes have been made along the way as policymakers have groped for the right
combination of governance structures to promote competition, efficiency, reliability and
economy. Many of these mistakes may not have been extensively publicised because the
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wealthier countries have had the financial resources to deal with tricky transition periods, but in
other cases, such as in California, these problems have been comprehensively analysed.
The second part of this paper, using the Brazilian experience as a case, has shown that
electricity market models developed in industrialised countries and imported into developing
countries are prone to malfunctions. Not only are the investment needs of developing countries
much greater, they are also more sensitive to changes in price. Developing country reforms also
take place in contexts of overall reform and investor scepticism. Further complicating the
reforms process is the fact that they are generally initiated when the supply situation is already
stressed. This means that developing countries suffer precisely those conditions under which
electricity markets do not work well. Given these differences in initial conditions, lessons and
recommendations that emerge from industrialised country experiences do not easily translate into
developing country situations. Thus, global experiences with electricity market indicate that
developing country policymakers would be wise to be more circumspect about how much market
is possible in developing countries. There are genuine difficulties in making the right trade-offs
and, more importantly, creating the best governance structures to mediate these trade-offs.
The potential efficiency gains from well functioning electricity markets are too valuable
to not be pursued. These benefits, however, will come only in the longer term as they are
dependent on the introduction of new technologies and services and on the gradual maturation of
markets. In the short term, on the other hand, the reality is that volatility, market power and
changing prices for consumers will create pressure for policymakers to be more cautious in
allowing markets free rein. The policymakers' concerns about insulating consumers from the
volatility of wholesale prices, in fact, make the effective functioning of electricity markets even
harder. In this, timing is key and attempts to do a number of big changes simultaneously may
well stress the governance capacities of developing countries, allowing markets to act
mischievously.
The reader looking for an unequivocal judgement between markets and governments, and
between competition and regulation will be disappointed. Despite its criticism of the way
electricity markets have worked, the paper does not conclude that markets are bad or even that
they are incompatible with developing country needs. Rather, it argues for a broader
conceptualisation of the state-market dichotomy and a greater degree of realism with regards to
the rosy assessment of market potential. Keeping in mind the importance of the role of
government in making appropriate market designs more comprehensive planning is required to
make the transition to competitive electricity markets. As Hogan (2002) stated, "Electricity is an
example where introducing competition leads not to less regulation but different regulation. The
details cannot be deferred or left alone to be discovered through the magic of markets."
Returning to the second part of the minister's statement, "as little government as necessary" thus
appears to be a lot more than previously thought.
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Figure 1: An Illustration of the Low Levels of Prices Prevalent in Brazilian Spot Markets
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